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ABSTRACT 
 
ii 
 
Annually in Britain, iatrogenic harm results in patient deaths, increased morbidity, 
and millions of pounds spent on additional healthcare.  Errors in the administration 
of drugs have been identified as a leading cause of patient harm in major 
international reports,
1 2
 and the literature also suggests that most practicing 
anaesthetists have experienced at least one drug error.
3 4
  
 
Methods of conventional drug administration in anaesthesia are idiosyncratic, 
relatively error prone, and make little use of technology to support manual 
checking.  While there is support for the use of double-checking during anaesthesia 
practice, the availability of a second person during every drug administration, and 
issues around hierarchy and recognised automaticity in checking
5
 can potentially be 
the limitations. Currently there has been little work carried out in the UK in relation 
to the use of double checking protocols and there remains a need for a robust 
check that can be implemented within the National Health Service (NHS). 
 
The first study explored the feasibility of introducing a double check methodology, 
either second-person confirmation or electronic confirmation into clinical practice 
within the NHS. This was the first study of this nature within the NHS and explored 
the attitudes, barriers and benefits of each method. 
The second study was designed to explore the beliefs and attitudes of anaesthetists 
and Operating Department Practitioners (ODPs) on introducing technology which is 
designed to reduce drug error. This study also explored in greater depth the culture 
issues raised in the first study and the impact of introducing the electronic 
ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ.  
iii 
 
The findings suggested that while many participants acknowledged that the process 
of second person double checking was an important factor to minimise the 
opportunity of any unsafe medication administration, the process of second person 
confirmation could be prone to human manipulation and could alter the behaviour 
and practice of the anaesthetist, resulting in a reluctance to adopt it.  
The electronic confirmation method was found to be more feasible. It did not rely 
on the presence of a second person at the time of drug administration, and did not 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ? 
 
This thesis has shown that technology was more readily accepted and seen as more 
feasible to use by anaesthetists within their clinical practice. However, these studies 
have also shown that the culture and beliefs of the organisation and individuals, in 
particular of  ‘blame and shame ?, has such a strong influence that it continues to 
prevent a true safety culture developing into an open culture of reporting incidents, 
recognising that drug errors remain a problem, and that corrective measures are 
required to prevent them.  
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CHAPTER 1 ʹ INTRODUCTION 
 
2 
 
1.1  Background 
1.1.1 dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨĂďĞƚƚĞƌEĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ĞĂůƚŚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ 
In December 1997, the Government published The New NHS: Modern, 
Dependable;
6
 a White Paper with the agenda of providing a ten year modernisation 
strategy for the National Health Service (NHS).  “dŚŝƐtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŚŽǁƚŚĞ
Government will build a modern and dependable health service fit for the twenty 
ĨŝƌƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?6 The paper went on to state that there would be a guaranteed 
national standard of excellence for patients providing assurance for the quality of 
services provided. Across the country these changes were expected to result in a 
more constant and reactive service. The quality the government was striving for 
was, in the broadest sense: doing the right things, at the right time, for the right 
people, and doing them right - first time.
6
 It was expected that as a result of this 
paper, the NHS would now have a clear direction to move in, in order to become a 
modern and dependable service.  
 
1.1.2 Patient safety issues in the United States of America 
In the United States of America (USA), patient safety was also coming to the 
ĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ “To Err is Human: building a 
safer health system ?2 was published following the formation of the Quality of 
Health Care in America Committee (QHCAC), within the Institute of Medicine. The 
Institute of Medicine works outside the government framework to ensure 
scientifically informed analysis and independent guidance. They provide unbiased, 
evidence-based, and authoritative information and advice concerning health and 
3 
 
science policy to policy-makers, professionals, leaders in every sector of society, 
and the public at large.
7
 
The QHCAC was created to develop a strategy for improving quality in health care. 
The report addressed issues relating to patient safety, outlining a national plan for 
reducing errors in health care and improving patient safety in the USA. The paper 
stated that health care was a decade or more behind other high risk industries in 
focusing its attention on ensuring basic safety.
2
 
It was recognised by the committee that there was still much to learn about the 
types of errors perpetrated in health care and their causes, but it was essential that 
patients should not have to worry about being harmed by the health system itself.
2
 
 
1.1.3 Issues of quality in health care still present in Britain 
In Britain, following on from The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,
6
 In 2001 the 
Department of HealtŚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ‘ŶKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂDĞŵŽƌǇ ?;1 
this was in response not only to the realisation that the NHS was still failing to 
provide the appropriate quality of care, but that they were failing to prevent 
serious incidents where patients were being harmed or experiencing very poor 
outcomes.
1
 It had also become apparent that the NHS was failing to learn from its 
ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŽĐĐƵƌ ? “ŵŝĚƐƚƚŚŝƐŵĂũŽƌĂŶĚĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ
measures to assure and improve quality in the NHS, there is one remaining weak 
link. The NHS has no reliable way of identifying serious lapses of standards of care, 
analysing them systematically, learning from them and introducing change which 
ƐƚŝĐŬƐƐŽĂƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŵŝůĂƌĞǀĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ? ?1 
4 
 
It is essential in the modern health service, which involves the use of some of the 
most complex and advanced technologies in existence, safety practices keep pace 
and respond quickly to any errors that occur. However, some aspects of medical 
practice have remained unchanged for many decades
8
 and in this respect the NHS 
still lags behind other high risk sectors, such as aviation and the nuclear industry.
1
 
 
1.1.5 The National Patient Safety Agency 
In 2001 the NPSA was formed and charged with the responsibility of formulating 
solutions for existing problems and developing the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS).
9
 The NRLS aims to identify and reduce risks to patients receiving 
NHS care and leads on national initiatives to improve patient safety. It does this 
through feedback and guidance which it provides to healthcare organisations in 
order to improve patient safety. These include alerts to address specific safety risks, 
tools to build a strong safety culture and national initiatives in specific areas such as 
hand hygiene, design, nutrition and cleaning.
10
 
It is increasingly accepted that adverse outcomes are often due to system failures 
and that by addressing the intrinsic problems, inherent in some systems, the error 
may have been prevented or actions could have been taken to mitigate the 
circumstances.
1
 
 
 
5 
 
1.2 Understanding the Causes of Failure 
There are two approaches to human error described in the literature. The person-
centred approach and the system approach.
11
 Reason
11
 describes the different 
models of error causation ascribed to each and the philosophies underpinning them. 
 
1.2.1 The Person-Centred Approach  
The Individual is responsible for causing errors 
The person-centred approach remains the longstanding tradition within health care 
today despite the efforts of many to move away from it.
11
 The focus is on the 
ƵŶƐĂĨĞĂĐƚƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶĚ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŶƵƌƐĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƉŚĂƌŵĂĐŝƐƚƐ ?
The belief that these unsafe acts originate from aberrant mental processes, such as 
forgetfulness, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence and recklessness leads to 
corrective measures targeted at the individual rather than the situation and 
inevitably falls within the control of management.
1
 
11
 Supporters of this approach 
view errors as moral issues, assuming that bad things happen to bad people.
11
 
Blaming individuals is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions and 
ƚƌǇŝŶŐĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚŝƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƵŶƐĂĨĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĂŶǇ
institutional responsibility is clearly in the interests of managers.
11
 
However, by focusing in on the individual the error is disconnected from its system 
context. As a result two important features of human error tend to be overlooked. 
ZĞĂƐŽŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŝƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ? “error is 
ŶŽƚƚŚĞŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇŽĨĂŶƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞĨĞǁ ?ĂŶĚŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĨĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐ
random, mishaps tend to fall in recurrent patterns.
10 
The same set of circumstances 
can provoke similar mistakes, regardless of those involved, the quest for greater 
6 
 
safety is seriously impeded by an approach that does not pursue and eliminate the 
error triggering attributes within the system at large.
11
 
 
1.2.2 The System-Centred Approach 
The system is responsible for causing errors 
The basic presumption in the system-centred approach is that everybody is fallible 
and errors should be anticipated even in the best organisations. As Reason
12
 and 
Merry and Webster
13
 describe, an error is an unavoidable trait of human behaviour, 
no amount of proficiency or expertise will eliminate it. 
Within the system-centred approach, errors are seen as being created and 
triggered by elements inherent within the system. These elements include the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐĂĨĞƚǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?ƚŚĞĐƵůƚ ƌĞŝƚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
position management takes to risk and chance.
1
 Corrective actions are based on the 
belief that although we cannot change human nature, we can change the working 
environment to lessen the impact any intrinsic characteristics may have on the 
production of errors.  
All potentially hazardous technologies should possess some form of built in barrier 
or safeguard that becomes interjected between the source of the hazard and the 
potential victims or losses that would occur should that risk become realised. When 
an error occurs, the central focus should not be on who made the error but how 
and why those defences failed. What were the factors that led to the creation of 
those conditions which triggered the error? The defences can be categorised by 
their characteristics, they are eŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? ?ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌĞĚƐĂĨĞƚǇĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ )Žƌ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ƉƌŽƚŽĐŽůƐ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ
7 
 
controls and people at the sharp end). The human element of the system can 
weaken or create gaps in these defences in two ways: by active failures and latent 
conditions. Nearly all adverse events involve a combination of these two sets of 
factors.
11
 
 
1.2.3 Active Failures 
1.2.3.1  Slips, lapses, mistakes and violations 
 “<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚĞƌƌŽƌĨlow from the same mental source, only success can tell one 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? 
 [Ernest Mach 1905
14
] 
 
Cognitive psychologists, over the past decade, have expanded our understanding of 
human error, theories of consciousness, memory, attention and performance 
greatly, all of which are fundamental to the understanding of medical error 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞĐĂŶďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶƐĂĨĞĂĐƚƐ ?ŽĨindividuals, such 
as doctors or nurses, leading to the failure to perform an action as required.
14 15
 
These active failures can be divided into slips, lapses, mistakes and procedural 
violations.  
 
Slips 
A slip results from a failure to execute an action, whether or not the plan behind it 
was adequate to reach its objective. Slips are said to be skill based, occurring during 
the execution of smooth, automated and highly integrated tasks that do not require 
8 
 
conscious control or problem solving, therefore a slip can be associated with paying 
insufficient attention.
14 15
 
 
Lapses 
The distinction between a slip and a lapse can be very subtle. Lapses involve 
memory failure, and may only be apparent to the person who experiences them. 
 
Slips and lapses occur when actions do not go to plan, mistakes happen when a plan 
proves inadequate. The individual is aware of the problem and begins to use rules 
or knowledge to solve it. A mistake occurs when the necessary knowledge or rules 
to solve the problem are lacking. A rule-based mistake can occur when normally 
good rules fail to be applied or are misapplied, or when bad rules are applied. These 
rules may originate from the individual or from protocols drawn up by external 
bodies. 
 
Mistakes 
Knowledge based mistakes can be thought of as errors of judgement, manifesting 
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ‘ŽŶƚŚĞŚŽŽĨ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƐĞŶŽƌŵĂůůǇŽĐĐƵƌǁŚĞŶĂůůpreviously 
utilised solutions have been exhausted. As human beings, having recognised a 
pattern or problem as comparable to one faced previously, we quickly provide the 
first hypothesis which comes to mind and tend to stick with it. If the hypothesis is 
correct then we enhance our reputation for being decisive, but when it is not we 
are often slow to change. We prefer to seek confirmatory evidence rather than 
9 
 
putting our hypothesis to the test. This leads to a highly error prone endeavour, 
especially if an individual lacks knowledge or judgement.
14 16
 
 
Violations 
Violations can be described as deliberate breaches of rules or policies. Similar to 
errors, violations do not inevitably imply harm or disregard of safety. Reason,
17
 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ Wbut not necessarily reprehensive  W deviations 
from practices deemed necessary (by designers, managers, and regulatory agencies) 
ƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐĂĨĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŚĂǌĂƌĚŽƵƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?- deviations from 
ƐĂĨĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?ŽƌƌƵůĞƐ ? ?
 
Violations differ from errors in that they stem from considered choices; they are 
deliberate deviations from standard instructions that seem to offer some element 
of advantage to the individual.
18
 Hurwitz & Sheikh
19
 however, suggest that these 
choices are not made entirely freely and that they are often provoked by 
 ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵĨĂƵůƚƐ ? ?ƐƉŝŶ and colleagues20 also 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŽƌĞƌƵůĞƐƐŝŵƉůǇŵĂǇƉƌŽǀŽŬĞŵŽƌĞƌƵůĞǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĂƚ
violation there is often a rationale; a belief, whether right or wrong, that breaching 
a rule or regulation is effort saving and will not cause significant harm to the 
patient.
19
  
 
According to Amalberti
18
 the degree of violation varies according to  ‘ƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨ
instruction, the nature of the work, and ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?/Ŷ
certain situations a certain level of flexibility is tolerated, or even expected. An 
10 
 
example would be evidence based medicine, a set of guidelines for practice rather 
than a compulsory set of instructions. Custom and culture ĐĂŶƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
beliefs and decisions about whether a regulation should be breached or not.  On 
the other hand, violations can stem from recklessness on the part of a health 
professional, who chooses purposely to violate a regulation.
19
 
 
1.2.4 Latent Conditions 
1.2.4.1  The managements influence on error creation 
>ĂƚĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƉĂƚŚŽŐĞŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?Ǉ
themselves, they are often harmless, lying dormant undetected for long periods 
before combining with local factors and active failures to infiltrate or totally 
circumvent any defences in place. 
Latent conditions arise from critical decisions made by designers, builders, 
procedure writers and top level management. All of these decisions have the 
potential for seeding pathogens into the system, even good ones (hence the term 
latent condition rather than latent failure).
11 21 
Latent conditions have two types of 
adverse effect: they can translate into error provoking conditions within the 
workplace, such as time pressure, excessive fatigue, staff shortages, lack of 
experience and inadequate equipment. Or they can create long lasting holes or 
weaknesses in the defences arising from untrustworthy alarms and indicators, 
unworkable procedures, design and construction deficiencies, etc.  Unlike active 
failures, whose precise forms are hard to predict, latent conditions are always 
present.
11 
They can therefore, theoretically, be identified and removed before they 
cause an adverse event. Understanding this leads to proactive rather than reactive 
11 
 
risk management.
11 
However, the process of addressing these latent conditions can 
ƐƚƌŝŬĞĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽƌƚŚĞĐore management philosophy. 
Consequently, attempts to deal with such issues are often problematic as they 
require fundamental changes to the core beliefs and values of senior staff within 
the organisation.
21
 
 
1.2.4.2  How errors get through the barriers 
ZĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? ‘^ǁŝƐƐĐŚĞĞƐĞ ?DŽĚĞůŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ 
As already discussed, key features of the system approach are the defences, 
barriers and safeguards that are inherently present within it. There are many 
defensive layers built into high technology systems, some are engineered such as 
alarms, physical barriers and automatic shutdowns, some rely on people, such as 
surgeons, anaesthetists, pilots, control room operators, while others depend on 
procedures and administrative controls. The primary function of all these defences 
is to ensure the protection of assets and potential victims from local hazards.
1
 
11
 
 
Reason
11 
compared the causation of accidents within a system to ĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ ‘^ǁŝƐƐ
ĐŚĞĞƐĞ ? ?/ĚĞĂůůǇĂůůƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞůĂǇĞƌƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƚĂĐƚ ?
in reality though; they are more like slices of Swiss cheese  W full of holes. Unlike the 
cheese however, these holes are constantly opening, shutting and shifting their 
location. These holes appear due to active failures and latent conditions, and 
although the presence of holes in one slice does not normally lead to disaster, the 
opportunity for disaster arises when these holes line up briefly to allow a window of 
accident opportunity.
1 11
 
14 
12 
 
 
Figure 1: The Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation:  
Defences, barriers and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident trajectory.  
Reproduced from BMJ, J. Reason, 320(7237):768-70, 2000, with permission from 
BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. 
 
Within well defended systems such as those found in aviation and nuclear power 
plants, accidents are rare due to the sheer number of barriers and safeguards in 
place.
1 
However, within many fields of clinical practice there may exist, only a few 
slices of protective measures designed to keep danger away. It can be said of health 
care that the human elements are often the last and most important defences 
against a disaster occurring.
1
 
 
13 
 
1.2.5 Interaction and Coupling  
1.2.5.1  Why is it necessary to understand interaction and coupling? 
Almost any organisation will have areas that interact under closer inspection. 
However as systems grow, whether they are aviation, nuclear or health care, they 
become more and more complex and encounter more and more obscure and 
unpredictable interactions.
22 
Charles Perrow
22 
stated that certain characteristics of 
a system can make it either inherently safer or more dangerous; he described these 
two elements as interaction and coupling.  
 
Interaction 
Interactions can be described as being either complex or linear.  
If there are numerous choices and intertwining parts at any point during the 
process to complete the selected task the interaction can be characterised as 
complex. Complex interactions were not part of the original system design; they are 
unexpected, baffling and difficult to plan for.
22
 
 
Linear interactions on the other hand follow an independent series of steps to 
complete the designated task. They are familiar interactions that even if something 
happens that is unexpected the interaction is visible and so can be rectified.  
Complex interactions by their nature are more at risk of failure than linear 
interactions due to their inherent complexity which can lead to unexpected 
interactions between the different elements within the system.
14
 
 
14 
 
Coupling  
Systems can also be described as either being tightly or loosely coupled. 
A system is tightly coupled if there is a high risk of serious consequences resulting 
from a system failure or error. A tightly coupled system does not have the ability to 
wait for an error or failure to be rectified, it cannot compensate and so accidents 
result more readily.
8
 
Loosely coupled systems as their name implies are more flexible and therefore 
allow greater opportunity for any mistakes to be rectified avoiding serious 
outcomes. Loosely coupled systems, can absorb impacts and failures without 
becoming unstable.
8 22
 
 
1.2.5.2  Recovery from Failure 
Since all systems can fail, it is critical that recovery is possible and that any failure or 
error does not spread causing catastrophic outcomes. Because of this most systems 
tend to have safety devices designed in to prevent such incidents spreading. 
 
Tightly coupled systems, however, have to have safeguards built in at the design 
stage. All possible interactions have to be thought of in advance and buffered 
against as there is little scope to rectify an error once it has happened. 
Loosely coupled systems on the other hand have the luxury that mistakes and 
failures can be repaired more easily, they allow for alternative routes to be taken 
even though they were not predicted in advance. 
The same can be said for the substitution of staff, equipment and techniques. In 
tightly coupled systems there is little opportunity to replace faulty equipment, try 
15 
 
alternatives or substitute staff, whereas in loosely coupled systems all of these 
routes may be possible.  
The key safety design of a nuclear power plant is to prevent a catastrophe; these 
systems are designed with as many buffers and safeguards as possible to prevent 
errors becoming disasters. Why then should the health system rely solely on the 
human element, in this case the anaesthetist, to ensure safe system performance?
8
 
 
1.2.5.3  Are there really similarities between an anaesthetised patient and 
an aircraft or nuclear power plant? 
Within the literature there have been many who have likened anaesthesia to the 
aviation industry.
16 23 
Both anaesthetists and pilots are highly trained professionals 
who are usually determined to maintain high standards, both externally and 
internally imposed, whilst performing difficult tasks in life threatening 
environments. They both use high technology equipment and function as key 
members of a team of specialists, although not always with colleagues of their 
choosing, and are sometimes forced to operate at a time and under conditions 
which are far from ideal. They both exercise high level cognitive skills in a most 
complex domain about which much is known, but where much remains to be 
discovered.
16 
Webster
8 
however prefers, in terms of complexity and coupling, to 
compare an anaesthetised patient with a nuclear power plant; a highly complex, 
unpredictable system with many unknown failure modes. 
 
16 
 
1.3 Safety Culture 
1.3.1 The Safety Culture 
 ‘dŽĞƌƌŝƐŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŽĐŽǀĞƌƵƉŝƐƵŶĨŽƌŐŝǀĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĨĂŝůƚŽůĞĂƌŶŝƐŝŶĞǆĐƵƐĂďůĞ ? 
[Sir Liam Donaldson, Chief Medical Officer
24
] 
 
Different safety cultures have been described in the literature. One definition from 
the NPSA suggests that a safety culture fosters a willingness to report and learn 
from errors.
25
 There is evidence that the possession of a shared set of beliefs, 
attitudes and norms in relation to what is seen as safe clinical practice has a 
positive and quantifiable impact on the performance of organisations.
25
 However, a 
culture that apportions blame onto the individual and ignores the role of the 
underlying system encourages people to cover up errors for fear of retribution. This 
culture of blame also prevents the identification of the true causes of failure.
1
 
 
1.3.2 The importance of a safety culture 
A key issue within an organisation is the safety culture, this is important for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, the personnel within the organisation are constantly changing; the safety 
culture that exists within it does not. Secondly, the culture is as widespread as the 
interventions and safeguards the organisation can put in place and so can influence 
for good or bad the impact these initiatives will have.
1
 
It has been argued that safety cultures can be established by identifying and putting 
in place their key components. The process can be seen essentially as one of 
collective learning, or of a constant and active awareness of the potential for 
17 
 
failure.
1 
It would be unfair to suggest that the NHS as an organisation is incapable of 
achieving this, but the literature suggests that this process takes a long time and 
the implementation and take up of initiatives in patient safety can be patchy.
1
 
 
1.3.3 dŚĞĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƐĂĨĞƚǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞ 
In the aviation industry, safety analysis is well established and based on a systems 
approach.
22
 
26 
The key focus of the system is not just ascertaining and subsequently 
learning from the accidents or serious incidents, but also from the minor incidents 
or near misses, some of which might have the potential to lead to more serious 
outcomes.
1
 
 
During the 10 year period from 1998  W 2007 the Civil Aviation Authority received 42, 
400 reports of incidents involving large UK public transport aircraft. Of these 
incidents 132 were reportable accidents of which 5 were fatal.
27 
These figures 
highlight that the majority of information gathered for educating and training 
within the aviation industry was not gained from the major accidents but from the 
minor incidents that had the potential to escalate into catastrophic outcomes.  
 
The aviation industry does not use evidence based practice to produce a reduction 
in mortality or morbidity. It utilises many logical and practical measures to establish 
a robust safety culture. When dealing with a process with rare but catastrophic 
consequences, it may be impossible to prove statistically the benefit of some safety 
measures. This could be applied to many practices in anaesthesia, where the 
18 
 
number needed to treat to reduce mortality may be large because mortality is 
rare.
28 
 
1.3.4 Official response to error 
Over the last 20 years the incidence of doctors being charged with manslaughter 
has shown a distinct increase,
29
 and the literature advocates that if safety rules 
have obviously been violated then the criminal prosecution of a doctor is justified.  
 
Over the last two decades there have been several independent inquiries involving 
NHS Hospitals and Primary Care Trusts. The Bristol Inquiry
30
 was a particularly 
influential catalyst in putting patient safety and quality improvement high on the 
agenda in the NHS.
31
  
More recently two reports which followed concerns about standards of care at the 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust - the Robert Francis Inquiry report
32
 and an 
investigation and report published by the Healthcare Commission in March 2009,
33
 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “The culture of the Trust was not conducive to providing good care for 
patients or providing a supportive working environment for staff. ? 
 
The Francis report
32
 cited a number of factors that contributed to the culture 
inherent within Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust that compromised patient 
safety:  
x The attitudes of patients and staff; a lack of compassion and an uncaring 
attitude shown by some staff towards vulnerable patients,  
x Bullying and an atmosphere of fear of adverse repercussions,  
19 
 
x Target-driven priorities with a high priority being placed on the achievement 
of targets.  
x Disengagement from management by the consultant body.  
x  Lack of trust in management leading to reluctance to raise concerns.  
x Low staff morale due to financial constraints and staff cuts.  
x Isolation; the Trust and its staff carried on much of its work in isolation from 
the wider NHS community.  
x Lack of openness.  
x Acceptance of poor standards of conduct with insufficient attention to the 
maintenance of professional standards.  
x Reliance on external assessments and denial of the recent criticisms were 
also reported by the inquiry.  
 
dŚĞ&ƌĂŶĐŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ “While benchmarks and data-based 
assessments are important tools, these should not be allowed to detract attention 
from the needs and experiences of patients. Benchmarks, ratings and status may 
not always bring to light serious systemic failings. ?32 
 
1.3.4.1  Previous Cases 
As previously mentioned the Bristol inquiry
30
 reported that between 1990 and 
1995, despite an anaesthetist continuously raising concerns about poor surgical 
quality outcomes, cardiac surgeons at the hospital continued to operate on 
newborns until they were eventually forced to stop by the Department of Health. A 
subsequent public inquiry concluded that thirty-five deaths had been avoidable.
31 34
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Two of the three cardiac surgeons were struck off the medical register but no 
criminal prosecutions were brought.  
In 2002
35
 Dr Mulhem was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to an eight 
month custodial sentence following the fatal administration of Vincristine 
intrathecally, instead of intravenously, to an 18 year old oncology patient. 
Previously in 1999
36
 two doctors, working in a different NHS Trust, were cleared of 
manslaughter after a 12 year old boy was incorrectly injected with the same drug.  
In 1998
37
 a GP was charged and convicted of manslaughter for administering a dose 
of diamorphine to a patient that was ten times the recommended maximum. 
 
In January 2000, GP Dr Harold Shipman was convicted of murdering 15 of his 
patients. The subsequent independent public inquiry into his crimes found the 
number of patients killed by the former family doctor to be at least 250 over a 23 
year period. Whilst this case is one of deliberate overdose of diamorphine with the 
intention to murder and not a medication error, it has impacted on the system in 
which medical professions work within.  The inquiry has published six reports which 
made a number of recommendations for the reform of various British systems. It 
called for coroners to be better trained and underlined that better controls on the 
use of Class A drugs by doctors and pharmacists were needed. Specifically the 
fourth report called for stringent controls on the use and stockpiling of controlled 
drugs such as diamorphine, and the fifth report on the regulation and monitoring of 
GPs criticised the General Medical Council (GMC) for failing in its primary task of 
looking after patients because it was too involved in protecting doctors. 
 
21 
 
ĂŵĞ:ĂŶĞƚ^ŵŝƚŚǁŚŽĐŚĂŝƌĞĚƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƌǇƐĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞ'DƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
constitution should be changed so the GMC is no longer dominated by elected 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?^ŚĞalso stated that the GMC should also be directly accountable to 
Parliament.  
 
More recently, in February 2008, Dr Daniel Ubani, a Nigerian-born German citizen, 
was on his first UK shift as a locum GP when he injected a patient, David Gray, with 
100mg of diamorphine  W 10 times the recommended maximum dose. Dr Ubani had 
flown into the UK the day before and had only a few hours' sleep before starting a 
12-hour shift.  
Dr Ubani was struck off the general medical register by the GMC in June 2010 but is 
still allowed to practice in Germany where he normally resides.
38
 William Morris, 
the coroner in this case, called the death of David Gray "gross negligence and 
manslaughter" and called for a review of European regulations which allow free 
movement of doctors, a national database of overseas doctors applying to work in 
out-of-hours services in the NHS, and more consistent standards in monitoring by 
local health chiefs working for primary care trusts.
39
  
Niall Dickson, Chief Executive of the GMC, said: "On the general issue of doctors 
coming to work here from the European Union, the GMC remains extremely 
concerned that the current arrangements do not provide patients with the 
protection they need. He went on to say that "Patient safety must come first and 
we need to plug the gaping hole in our current procedures. As the guardian of 
22 
 
standards for doctors working in this country, the GMC must be able to assess the 
language and clinical competence of doctors who come from Europe, as we already 
do for doctors coming from the rest of the world".
40
  
Dr Ubani was charged with death by negligence, in Witten, Germany, over Mr 
Gray's death. He received a nine-month suspended sentence and ordered to pay a 
fine of 5,000 Euros (£4,370). This prosecution, in Germany, meant he cŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ be 
charged in the UK for possible manslaughter.
41
  
 
1.3.4.2  The threat of litigation on establishing a Safety Culture 
Merry
42
 advocates that if the system or other environmental characteristics are 
recognized as the cause of errors within health care, punishing the member of staff 
who makes them, without considering these factors, is unlikely to prevent their 
reoccurrence. In addition, standardised interventions, such as the use of new 
technology, have been previously shown to have better safety effects than the 
prosecution of individuals.
4 43
  
Chapman
44
 ĂůƐŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘WƌĂĐƚŝĐŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĐĂŶŽŶůǇ
ƐĞƌǀĞƚŽŚŝĚĞĞƌƌŽƌƐ ? ?/ĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚŽĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞƐŝŶŐůĞĚŽƵƚĨŽƌƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚit will 
become much harder to foster an open culture, interfere with independent safety 
investigations and destroy the willingness of people to voluntarily report errors and 
violations. This in turn will lead to faults in the system remaining hidden, and 
potentially more patients dying.
29 43-47
   
The Bristol Inquiry
30
 ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨďůĂŵĞŝƐĂŵĂũŽƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ
openness required if sentinel events are to be reported, lessons learned and safety 
23 
 
improved. The system of clinical negligence is part of this culture of blame. It should 
ďĞĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?
Charging doctors with manslaughter following a medical error may be an 
emotionally satisfying way to demand retribution; however, by putting the blame 
on the professional, the organisation and anyone else involved are let off the hook. 
More significantly, it may not give the principal victims self-assurance that a 
comparable incident will actually be prevented in the future.
43
 
 
1.3.5 Critical Incident Reporting 
Incident reporting systems are considered useful tools to learn from adverse events, 
errors and near misses within healthcare and other high risk industries. They have 
been described as a key prerequisite for the NHS in the effort to improve the 
quality of services and patient safety.
1 6 23
 The belief is that the learning derived 
from incidents and near misses, rather than pretending the mistake did not occur, 
can lead to improvements in safety.
48-50
  
The investigation of critical incidents was first used in the 1940s by Flanagan within 
the aviation setting.
51
 
52
 In 1978, Cooper & Colleagues
53
 ƵƐĞĚĂ ‘ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂďůĞĞǀĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ
interviewing anaesthetists.
52
 It is now standard within anaesthetic departments to 
have systems in place to record, discuss and disseminate information about adverse 
ĞǀĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŚŽƉĞƚŽůĞĂƌŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞ “ĨƌĞĞůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ?ŽŶůĂƚĞŶƚ
failures, identifying potential threats and improving patient safety.
12 49 50 52
 
Evans and colleagues found that more than 90% of consumers believed that 
healthcare workers should report errors, even when the outcome of the error was 
24 
 
temporary and had no long term health effects on the patient.
54
 In the UK in 2001, 
the NPSA set up the NRLS for the NHS. This is a generic system and covers all 
specialities and since its conception, has received over 4 million incident reports.
52
 
However as already discussed, previous research suggests that many incidents go 
unreported, compromising the effectiveness of such schemes.
55-59
 In addition, 
substantial variation in incident reporting behaviour has been shown between 
different professional groups, where doctors are less likely to report an adverse 
event than nurses and midwives.
60-62
  
 
1.3.5.1  Critical Incident reporting in Anaesthesia 
The Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA) and the AAGBI have recently worked in 
partnership with the NPSA to develop and launch a speciality specific critical 
incident reporting system for anaesthesia.
52
 The new system has been described as 
incorporating most of the features of a potentially successful system, in terms of 
data capture, analysis and feedback.
52 63
 It is clear though, that clinicians will not 
waste their time reporting unless they can see a tangible response and 
improvement to quality and patient safety. There also needs to be the assurance 
that they will be at no risk of retribution.
63
 
 
1.3.6 The Safety Culture within anaesthesia 
Anaesthetists have a long history of involvement in patient safety. Over 20 years 
before the publication oĨ ‘ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?1 ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŽĞƌƌŝƐŚƵŵĂŶ ?2 
the Association of Anaesthetists for Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) had 
established a safety committee to investigate patient safety issues.
64
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Leape and colleagues
65 
write that the current practice in anaesthesia provides an 
outstanding example of how a high level of safety can be achieved in health care. 
Mortality from anaesthesia has declined 10-fold in the past several decades as the 
result of a concerted effort to improve safety. 
Anaesthesia safety was achieved by applying a whole host of changes that made 
sense, were based on an understanding of human factor principles, and had been 
demonstrated to be effective in other settings. Safety they showed was doing a lot 
of little things that, in aggregate, made a big difference.
65 
The NHS is now founded 
on evidence based practice, so convincing managers and the medical profession to 
accept changes without any proof that they make a difference is becoming 
extremely difficult. Furthermore as Webster
8 
states, delivering anaesthesia with a 
safety record similar to that of the aviation industry is proportionally more difficult 
because aircraft are far less complex than an anaesthetised patient. 
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CHAPTER 2: MEDICATION ERRORS IN ANAESTHESIA 
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2.1 Medication Error 
 
 “ǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐŽŶĐĞĐĂŶŶĞǀĞƌŚĂƉƉĞŶĂŐĂŝŶ ?ďƵƚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
ŚĂƉƉĞŶƐƚǁŝĐĞǁŝůůƐƵƌĞůǇŚĂƉƉĞŶĂƚŚŝƌĚƚŝŵĞ ? 
Paulo Coelho [The Alchemist]
21
 
 
2.1.1 Medication Safety a universal goal 
Medication error is not the sole plight of the NHS; they occur in all health care 
settings on an international scale.
66 
Improving the prescribing, dispensing and 
administration of medication is of precedence to governments across Europe, 
Australasia, North America and numerous other countries.
66 
The Government in 
2001 published the paper Building a safer NHS for Patients that defined their goals 
for improving patient safety. Within the paper it described four key areas that 
needed decisive attention of which one was the reduction of serious medication 
errors by 40%.
21
 
 
The publication Building a safer NHS for Patients  W Improving Medication Safety66 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ŵĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĞƌƌŽƌƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
10% ĂŶĚ ? ?A?ŽĨĂůůĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
 
2.1.2 What is a medication error? 
Medication error is not the result of adverse events occurring from the correct 
prescribing or administration of a drug, it is the result of an omission or oversight, a 
28 
 
slip or a lapse when the medication was prescribed, dispensed or administered 
which would otherwise have been avoidable.
14 66
 
Although medication errors may not necessarily result in injury, it is an important 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ
ignored.
66
 
 
2.1.3 The incidence of medication error  
The literature suggests that within the hospital environment, medication error is 
one of the leading causes of harm to patients.
67
 
68 /Ŷ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ‘ƚŽĞƌƌŝƐ
ŚƵŵĂŶ PďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƐĂĨĞƌŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?2 shocked the health community when it 
reported that more than one million medical mishaps occurred each year in the 
USA resulting in 100 000 patient deaths, 77 000 of which were due to adverse drug 
events.
69 
Amongst the first 4000 reports to the Australian Incident Monitoring 
Study (AIMS) there were 1199 reports involving drug incidents
70 
and in the UK the 
NPSA received on average 99,000 reports of adverse incidents per month between 
October 2009 and September 2010 and of these reports, 10600 were medication 
related.
71 
However as Osbourne and colleagues
72 
and Horns and Loper
73 
suggest, 
medication errors are underreported and these figures may just be the tip of the 
iceberg. 
 
2.1.4 Underreporting of medication error 
Bates
55 ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇŵĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĞƌƌŽƌǁŚŝĐŚ
harŵƐƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞ ? ? ? ?ŵŽƐƚůǇƵŶĚĞƚĞĐƚĞĚƌƌŽƌƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽŶŽƚ ? ?&ŝŐ ? ? ?
Errors may be unreported for several reasons, the continued emphasis on blaming 
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the individual when the system is at fault, fear of the consequences of reporting the 
error, the perception that the patient is unharmed by the incident or the lack of 
awareness that an error has occurred.
66 
Leape
56 
suggests that only the most serious 
cases emerge, while others are covered up or discussed in private. 
 
Figure 2: The Medication Error Iceberg 
 
 
2.1.5 Incidence of Drug Errors in Anaesthesia 
The complex process of administering intravenous drugs in anaesthesia can be 
hindered by pressures of urgency, poor communication and fatigue.
28, 74 
Studies 
have shown that a single drug administration can involve up to 40 individual steps; 
it is perhaps of greater surprise then that more errors do not occur.
28, 75
 
Despite literature spanning more than two decades on the incidence of medication 
error in anaesthesia, it remains a global problem.  
30 
 
AIMS collected data on critical incidents from 1988 to 2001. Critical incident 
reporting is widely recognised in both medical and non-medical fields as being an 
important tool in the identification of system based errors.
28 
It was first used within 
anaesthesia in 1978 by Cooper and colleagues
76 
and since then most health care 
systems in the developed world collect critical incident data. The data is used for 
auditing work practice, for correction of factors contributing to the incident and for 
identification of recurrent problems.
76 
 
In 1993 Currie and colleagues
77 
evaluated the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS 
and found there were 144 drug errors reported within anaesthetic practice. 
Abeysekera and colleagues
28 
reanalysed the AIMS database between 1988 and 
2001 which was by then much larger and found 896 incidents involving drug error 
within 8088 reports. More recently Catchpole and colleagues
9 
analysed data from a 
two year period, January 2004 to February 2006, from the NRLS in the UK and 
found that within the 12606 reports on the database 1120 related to medication 
incidents within anaesthesia. 
 
Other authors across the world have analysed the total number of drug error 
incidents over periods of time within anaesthesia, the results of which can be found 
in table 1.  
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Table 1: Incidents of reported drug error within anaesthesia  
 
 
Authors Country Time Line 
Total Number of 
Anaesthetics 
Total reported drug errors % Rate of error 
Fasting and Gisvold 
78
 Norway Sept 1996 to Oct 1999 55,426 63 0.1 
Hintong et al 
79
 Thailand Feb 2003 to July 2004 202699 40 0.02 
Khan and Hoda 
76
 Pakistan Jan 1997 to Dec 2002 44 874 165 0.37 
Llewellyn et al 
80
 South Africa April 2005 to Jan 2006 30 412 111 0.36 
Sakaguchi et al
81
 Japan 1993 to 2007 64 285 50  0.078 
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2.2 Types of medication error reported in anaesthesia 
2.2.1 What is the most commonly reported error?  
The most commonly reported error within the literature is choosing the wrong drug 
or wrong dose.
69 
These types of errors are not new; they have been reported by 
several authors over the last decade.
56 82-84 
Analysing the data from the AIMS 
database, Abeysekera and colleagues
28 
found that 452 incidents out of 896 incident 
reports (50%) involving drug errors concerned syringe or drug preparation error or 
pre-error. Abeysekera and colleagues
28 
defined pre-ĞƌƌŽƌĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŵĂǇ
ŚĂǀĞůĞĚƚŽĂĚƌƵŐĞƌƌŽƌ ?ďƵƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŶŽĚƌƵŐǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ
syringe swaps, wrong ampoule or labelling errors. 37% of all these errors were due 
to syringe swaps. Syringe swap refers to incidents in which two syringes
 
are 
inadvertently confused or interchanged and the wrong drug
 
nearly or actually 
administered.
53 
These results are comparable with the findings of Fasting and 
Gisvold
78 
(44%), Currie and colleagues
77 
(40%) and Llewellyn and colleagues
80 
(21%), 
however syringe swaps errors were reported as being far more prevalent in the 
THAI study,
79
 which accounted for 70.7% of drug errors, and by Orser
3 
who 
reported 70.4% of syringe swap errors in a Canadian study. 
 
2.2.2 When do drug errors occur? 
There is little evidence within the literature at what point during the anaesthetic 
process drug errors are most prevalent. Hintong and colleagues
79 
found that drug 
errors occurred more frequently during induction of anaesthesia (63.4%). Fasting 
and Gisvold
78 
also found similar results with 70% of drug errors occurring during the 
induction phase compared with only 16% during the maintenance phase. However, 
33 
 
conversely Llewellyn and colleagues
80 
found in their study that the majority of 
errors occurred during the maintenance phase. They suggest this may be due to the 
increased vigilance of the anaesthetist at the beginning and end of each anaesthetic 
or may just reflect the fact that the maintenance phase is longer allowing more 
opportunity for error to take place.  
Inferences could be made from other reports that this phase is most prone to 
syringe swap errors, the majority of errors reported involved induction drugs.
28 53 77  
85 
Hintong and colleagues
79 
suggests the reason for this could be due to multiple 
and varied drugs being given all within quick succession. 
There is also disagreement within the literature on the incidence of error related to 
emergency situations. Hintong and colleagues
79 
found no increase in the risk of 
drug errors occurring during an emergency whereas Abeysekera and colleagues
28 
found that over half the drug errors reported to the AIMS database occurred during 
emergency procedures. There is little further evidence to support either of these 
claims within the literature and would therefore benefit from further investigation. 
 
2.2.3 Which drugs are most commonly implicated in errors? 
Despite the literature reporting incident rates for drug errors for nearly two 
decades now, the same drugs are implicated time and time again. Currie and 
colleagues
77 ďĂĐŬŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽƵƚŽĨ ? ? ?ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ǁƌŽŶŐĚƌƵŐ ?
reported in the first 2000 incidents to AIMS, the drugs most commonly implicated 
were non-depolarising relaxants (44 incidents) of which 29 incidents were due to 
syringe swap errors, followed by opioids (27 incidents) of which 19 incidents were 
due to syringe swap errors. Since then other studies have reported similar findings; 
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Fasting and Gisvold
78 
found non-depolarising relaxants (32%) and depolarising 
relaxants (21%) responsible for the most syringe swap errors. Cooper and 
colleagues
53 ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĞůĂǆĂŶƚƐŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚƐǁĞƌĞĂůŵŽƐƚĂůǁĂǇƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ
ŝŶƐǇƌŝŶŐĞƐǁĂƉĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƚŽƚĂůŽĨ ? ?ŝŶĐŝĚents out of 19 involving this class of 
drug. 
Abeysekera and colleagues
28 
reported that neuromuscular blocking agents 
accounted for 39% of syringe swap errors out of 8088 reports within the AIMS 
database. Hintong and colleagues
79 
found similar with 31% of syringe swap errors 
involving muscle relaxants, followed by opioids (26.8%) as did Khan and Hoda
76 
who 
reported 41% and Llewellyn and colleagues
80 
reporting 26% of incidents related to 
neuromuscular blocking drugs. Muscle relaxants are perhaps more at risk of errors 
because they are frequently drawn up in the same size syringe as opioids, another 
drug implicated in syringe swaps, and then placed next to each other in the same 
drug tray ready for induction.
76 79
 
However a more recent paper on drug error incidents in anaesthesia found that 
antibiotics (27%) were more prevalent in syringe swap errors than muscle relaxants 
(9%).
86 
The authors suggested this may have been due to communication errors; 
antibiotics were not prescribed and were given on the basis of a verbal order from 
the surgeon. 
 
2.2.4 Do drug errors actually cause harm? 
Incidents of drug error in anaesthesia have been reported now for many years and 
most anaesthetists admit to having been involved in at least one drug error during 
35 
 
their career
28 87 88 
however despite all of these reports there fortunately remains an 
absence of serious harm reported from drug error incidents. 
The mortality rate reported within the literature has ranged from no deaths due to 
drug error
80 88 
to 0.3% - 1.5%
3 9 28 70 77  
to a mortality rate of 2.5% - 4.8%
78 79 
Hintong 
and colleagues
79 
only found 1 case of death caused by drug error and Fasting and 
Gisvold
78 
only found 3 deaths resulting from drug error. Both these studies had 
small numbers of drug errors overall and so this may account for the higher 
mortality percentage rates.  
It has been suggested that more time and money has been invested in aviation 
safety compared with healthcare because errors in healthcare occur one at a time. 
Individual drug errors are less likely to attract public attention compared to an 
aeroplane crash in which many lives are lost suddenly and concurrently.
89
 
Deaths from drug errors will continue to be reported. However, as suggested 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŵŝŶŽƌĚƌƵŐĞƌƌŽƌƐŽƌ ‘ŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐĞƐ ?ŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
be the tip of the iceberg.  As Merry
89 
suggests, often, only the anaesthetist knows 
that the wrong drug has been given. 
 
2.2.5 Situations associated with error 
Fatigue, distraction, inattention, haste and communication have all been cited as 
causing or contributing to medication error within anaesthesia.  
Abeysekera
28 
found that within the AIMS incidents fatigue contributed to 11% of 
Syringe Swap errors and 10% of ampoule labelling errors, Webster
88 
found similar. 
Distraction has been implicated in 16% - 25% of medication errors
28 88 
whereas 
inattention contributed to 5-13% of errors within two studies
79
 
88 
but was a far 
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greater cause within the AIMS database where 58% of syringe swaps and 41% of 
ampoule labelling errors were attributed to inattention.
28 
Haste has a similar wide 
ranging consequence with 12  W 40% of errors being attributed to it.28 79 88 
Currie
77 
however stated that none of these factors appeared to influence whether 
the wrong drug was actually given within the first 2000 cases within the AIMS 
database. 
 
2.3 Methods to reduce drug error  
2.3.1 Literature 
In 2004 Jensen and colleagues
90 
published a literature review of strategies for 
preventing drug administration errors in anaesthesia. Recommendations were 
classified as strongly recommended, recommended, possibly recommended and 
unclear. From reviewing 98 references the authors produced recommendations 
that would be likely to prevent drug error incidents from occurring.  
Ranked in order of strength the following were strongly recommended and will be 
discussed in more detail: the label on any drug ampoule or syringe should be read 
carefully before the drug is drawn up or injected, legibility and contents of labels on 
ampoules and syringes should be optimised, syringes should always be labelled, 
formal organisation of drug drawers and workspaces should be used and labels 
should be checked specifically with a second person or a device. 
Jenson and colleagues
90
 also recommended that errors in intravenous drug 
administration should be reported and reviewed and similar packaging and 
presentation of drugs contribute to error and should be avoided where possible. 
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dŚĞǇǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽ ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨthe evidence the use of 
pre-filled syringes, the anaesthetist always drawing up and labelling the drugs they 
will be giving, and the use of colour coded labels. They found it unclear from the 
literature as to whether coding by syringe position or size, or by the needle on the 
syringe should be used as means to prevent error. 
 
2.3.2 Reading labels carefully 
One of the final safeguards in preventing drug error is ensuring the label is read 
accurately before giving the drug to the patient.
78 91 
This process applies to the label 
on both the ampoule and the syringe.  
Currie and colleagues
77 
found that that if the wrongly selected drug was in the 
ampoule there was a 58% chance of the drug being administered to the patient, 
however if it was in the syringe there was a 93% chance of administration. They 
strongly believe that it is vital to take great care when reading the ampoule to 
ensure the correct drug is chosen, and their findings suggest that re-checking the 
ampoule was the most effective technique at preventing error. This is supported by 
Hintong and colleagues
79 
and Webster and colleagues
88 
who found that between 
17% and 29% of medication errors were due to a lack of re-check prior to 
administration. 
 
Within clinical practice it is often the case that the anaesthetist will draw drugs up 
into particular sizes of syringe, this usually correlates to the volume of drug but 
indirectly it becomes used as an unconscious check of whether the correct drug has 
been chosen. Bergman and colleagues
92 
stress that labels should be checked 
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carefully and the size of the syringe should not be relied on as confirmation of the 
correct drug to be administered.  
 
2.3.3 Legibility of ampoules and syringes 
While there are multifarious causes of medication error, labelling and packaging of 
drugs is increasingly being blamed for their cause.
93 
Within the first 2000 reports to 
the AIMS database Currie and colleagues
77 
found that 54% of errors were 
associated with the wrong ampoule being chosen due to similarities of design. In 
the paper published by Orson and Oxorn in 1994
91 
they recommended in order to 
minimise drug error that whenever possible, each drug available should have 
 “ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĂŶĚƵŶŝƋƵĞŵĂƌŬŝŶŐƐ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ŵƉŽƵůĞůĂďĞůůŝŶŐĂŶĚĚƌƵŐ
packaging continues to be ambiguous and a potential source of error. As Llewellyn 
and colleagues
80 
state, there is an urgent need for an international standard for 
drug labelling. The NPSA have gone someway to tackle this problem by issuing 
manufacturing guidelines to pharmaceutical companies for medications dispensed 
within the NHS,
94
 these guidelines however were only issued in 2008 and more time 
is needed to evaluate how effective this move has been in preventing error in 
clinical practice. 
Garnerin and colleagues
95 ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞůĂďĞůƐĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂŝŶƵƐĞƌ ?ĚƌƵŐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞ ? ?KƚŚĞƌƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ96 97 have suggested that drug name, type face, colour 
coding or the phrasing of the drug strength can all compound the frequency of drug 
errors. It is suggested that people tend to see what they expect to see, recognising 
words by their shape and not through reading the letters individually.
98
 
99 
There are 
several drugs that have similar names, they either look very similar or sound very 
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similar. Combine this with poor legibility of the label and it leads to increased risk of 
false identification of the drug.
95 100 101
 
Several methods have been advocated to reduce the false recognition of drug 
names; these include the use of TALLman lettering, where part of the drug name is 
in capital letters.
102 103 
Merry and colleagues
100 
suggested including both the class 
name and the name of the drug on highly legible labels, while Garnerin and 
colleagues
95 
found that by displaying the concentration, quantity and volume at 
fixed locations on the label further improved human functioning. 
 
2.3.4 Syringe labelling 
Nearly two decades ago Currie and colleagues
77 
recommended that it should be 
policy for every syringe to be labelled as the drug is drawn up into it.  In 2009 
Llewellyn and colleagues
80 
reiterated this recommendation in stating that the 
education of anaesthesia trainees should ensure they systematically label syringes 
in their daily practice. Bergman and colleagues
92 
also proposed that drug error 
would be reduced if syringes were labelled immediately upon drawing up. However, 
there is the argument that if a drug is being given as soon as it is drawn up there is 
no need to label the syringe. In some cases this may be acceptable, but there is 
always the opportunity for distraction, especially if there is more than one drug 
involved or if there is more than one anaesthetist working together.
77
 
 
2.3.5 Formal organisation of drug drawers and workspaces 
Within the first 2000 reported incidents to the AIMS database Currie and 
colleagues
77 
attributed one fifth of errors to the use of location for selecting the 
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correct ampoule. The practice of taking the ampoule out of its original packaging 
and placing it in a tray ready to be draw up reduces further any indicative 
characteristics used for identification.  
Reason
104 
proposed that safety could be improved through the reduction of 
complexity by making a process simple and linear. Currie and colleagues
77 
suggested the use of standardising the layout where drugs are placed for drawing 
up, through the use of a template that is colour coded to the class of drug. Orser 
and Oxorn
91 
also recommended that drugs, which are not in regular use, should not 
be left to collect in the drawers or on top of the anaesthetic machine.  
Merry and colleagues
105 
have designed a new drug administration system with the 
intention of reducing error in anaesthesia through standardisation. The new system 
utilises plastic trays that have been designed to expedite the placement of syringes 
and ampoules. The number of trays used for each anaesthetic is not limited and is 
relative to the amount of drugs needed. Merry and colleagues
105 
describe the 
ůĂǇŽƵƚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞĂƌĞĂ ?ƵƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐǇƌŝŶŐĞƐŝŶ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƵƐĞ ?Ă ‘ƵƐĞĚĂƌĞĂ ?
for used ampoules or syringes which ensures they are kept in an orderly fashion 
ĂŶĚĂ ‘ƉƌŽŵƉƚĂƌĞĂ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĚƌƵŐƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞŶĞĞĚĞĚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĂnaesthetic can 
be stored. The system, if used as intended, generates a physical record of the drugs 
used within the anaesthetic and through inspection alone it should be obvious 
which drugs have or have not been administered. The drug drawers are arranged in 
a similar layout to the trays, the authors suggest the use of two drawers to prevent 
congestion and ensure potentially hazard drugs are kept separate from the more 
commonly used ones. They go on to suggest standardising the placement of drugs, 
left to right, to reflect the frequency of drug class used. The recommended order in 
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which the drugs are placed from front to back in the drawer is dependent on the 
frequency of use within the individual class of drug in question, the most popular 
choices being sited nearer the front.
105
 
 
2.3.6 Double checking 
One of the recommendations from Currie and colleagues
77 
was if there was more 
than one anaesthetist involved in the administration of drugs, the drug should 
always be double checked with their colleague. Bergman
92 
also suggested that the 
frequency of drug errors would be reduced if the contents of the syringe were 
double checked immediately upon drawing up.  
Within the literature there have been several studies
90 106-108 
that suggest errors can 
be reduced throuŐŚĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐ ?dŚĞǁŚŝƚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ‘ƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƐĂĨĞƌE,^ĨŽƌ
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?66 recommends that ideally, all intravenous drug administration should be 
checked by two qualified practitioners.
66 
Toft
64 
suggests one way to reduce the risk 
of a drug being given inadǀĞƌƚĞŶƚůǇŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂŶ ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇ
ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚǀĞƌďĂůĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐƉƌŽƚŽĐŽů ? ?,ĞŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
expectation is that if one person misses an error the other will detect it. The results 
of the study by Jensen and colleagues
90 
suggested that double checking could have 
prevented 58% of the errors reviewed, which made it the most effective single 
measure in their review. However, Orson and Oxorn
91 
despite strongly accentuating 
the need to double check before administering a drug, stop short of actually 
stipulating whether that check should involve a second person or device. 
There are however critics of double checking as a method to reduce error.  Leape 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐĂƐĂ ‘ƐĂĐƌĞĚĐŽǁ ?ƚŚĂƚƐĂƉƐƚŝŵĞĂŶĚŝƐŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚive,109 
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ǁŚŝůĞK ?ŽŶŶĞůů110 believes the benefits of double checking as opposed to single 
checking remains undetermined. Verbal double checking does not always prevent 
errors from being made or serious incidents from occurring, there are several issues 
that ĐĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƐĂĨĞƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĞĐŬ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞŝƐƵĞŽĨ ‘ĚŝĨĨƵƐĞĚ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚǁŽƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚĂƐŬ
but in reality neither person is truly responsible, or the problem of both members 
of staff relying on the other to be rigorous, resulting in neither giving the task their 
full attention, involuntary automaticity can also impact on the robustness of the 
check being undertaken.
5 111-113
  
In an attempt to address human factor issues that can inherently impact upon a 
two person double check, Merry and colleagues
100 
designed an electronic system to 
execute the double check prior to administration of the drug. The authors 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞŐĂŝŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
information articulated when the syringe is passed over the bar code reader 
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚƌƵŐ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂ “ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝƐĞĚƚǁŽƉĞƌƐŽŶ
ĐŚĞĐŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƉƌŽŵƉƚ ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŶŽƚƉƌŽŶĞƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƐƵƐĐĞƉƚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
 
2.3.7 Involuntary automaticity 
Involuntary automaticity can have a significant impact on the accuracy of a double 
checking protocol. It can provoke the health care professionals who performed the 
double check to fail to recognise any errors present within the system and thus 
provide a faůƐĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? 
Automaticity is a term with its roots in psychology; it can be described as the 
thoughts and processes that take place primarily without the need for conscious 
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regulation or scrutiny. These processes are rapid and extremely useful; they provide 
the scope to carry out tasks efficiently without a great deal of effort.
5 114
 
The drawbacks of automaticity manifest in procedures which are highly familiar, but 
require close attention, such as verbal checklist procedures. Repeatedly using 
identical checking procedures can unintentionally lead to a ritualistic chant of the 
ĐŚĞĐŬůŝƐƚŝƚĞŵƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚƵƌŶĐŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ
ďĞŝŶŐŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ?115 This behaviour, however, is not calculated but unconscious and 
involuntary. Although the task actually requires careful attention, once under the 
influence of involuntary automaticity, the diligence of the individuals undertaking 
the check is only cursory, this in turn leads to an increased risk of any errors that 
are present being overlooked.
5
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2.4 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore issues surrounding drug errors in 
anaesthesia, in relation to technology and systems designed to reduce such errors 
and the inherent culture within anaesthetic practice that impacts and influences 
the subsequent compliance with these proposals. 
 
Currently there has been little work carried out in the UK in relation to the use of 
double checking protocols. Ross and colleagues
106 
found that following the 
introduction of a two person check for all drugs dispensed from pharmacy, errors 
were reduced from 9.8 per year to 6 per year. The British Committee for Standards 
in Haematology, Blood Transfusion task force
113 
recommended that one member of 
staff should be responsible for carrying out the identity check of the patient and the 
unit of blood; however Watson and colleagues
116 
found that very few hospitals had 
implemented the system of single checking by 2006 in preference over a double 
checking system. 
 
Increasingly technology is seen as the way forward in providing the means to 
improve patient safety
100 116 
and although these systems do play an important role 
not all hospitals or health care providers will be able to afford to introduce them.  
There still remains a need for a robust check that can be implemented within the 
National Health Service. Manual double checking presently takes place on an ad hoc 
basis and as previously discussed, technology specifically designed for use within 
anaesthesia has been developed, but is not currently installed within any NHS 
hospital Trusts.  
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Investigating two methods of double checking anaesthetic drugs given by injection 
was a priority area agreed by the NPSA ĂŶĚƚŚĞZŽĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝŵĞĚĂƚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐpatient safety through 
working directly with clinicians. This qualitative study (Chapter 4) involves seven 
NHS Trusts across the UK and evaluates the feasibility of introducing a manual two 
person double check or an electronic bar-code double check using tŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?
system into clinical practice. This is the first study of this nature within the NHS and 
gives an insight into the benefits, barriers and practicalities of introducing these 
systems as seen from the viewpoint of the clinicians who will use them.  
 
Following on from this study (Chapter 5) the cultural issues and attitudes of 
anaesthetists and other professional groups towards drug errors and methods of 
preventing them will be explored in greater depth.  This will be achieved through 
integrating my research aims into a larger international study seeking to validate 
anaesthesia simulation-based error research (VASER). 
 
The aim of my research (Chapter 5) is to explore the beliefs and attitudes of 
anaesthetists and Operating Department Practitioners (ODPs) taking part in error 
research, and their views on the introduction of technology designed to reduce 
errors. Also, as part of the VASER study I will assess the workload of the 
participating anaesthetists in order to evaluate whether the SAFERsleep ? system 
adds further workload to the simulated clinical scenarios.  
46 
 
In addition I will explore the beliefs and attitudes of anaesthetists and ODPs that 
did not participate in the VASER study in order to further judge the cultural effects 
of drug error within anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting. 
 
The thesis is divided into individual chapters addressing these objectives. However, 
the following chapter, Chapter 2, details the methodology and methods used within 
both of these studies (Chapter 4 & Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & METHODS 
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3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One the incidence of medication errors in anaesthesia and methods to 
prevent them were discussed. In order to understand in depth the anaesthĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?
perspective and the feasibility of introducing methods aimed at preventing 
medication errors I have chosen to adopt a qualitative approach. Chapter 2 
describes the methodological issues related to the current thesis and the methods 
used to collect data for the studies presented later in Chapters 3 and 4. I will discuss 
the theoretical basis for these research projects and what characterises qualitative 
research. This chapter will also address the chosen research methods for this study, 
including methods of data collection and analysis using grounded theory. The 
chapter concludes by addressing ethical issues present within both of my studies.  
 
3.2 The Nature of Qualitative Research 
 “We can see social theory as a sort of kaleidoscope  W by shifting the theoretical 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƵŶĚĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƐŚĂƉĞ ?117  
 
Alderson
118
 advocates that theories are at the core of practice, planning and 
research, and their scope powerfully influences how evidence is collected, analysed, 
understood and used. The choice of methods used is often determined by the 
specific theoretical or methodological approach adopted.
119
 
Reeves and colleagues
120
 suggest that theories provide researchers with different 
 “ůĞŶƐĞƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƉƌŽďůems and social issues. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to study everything. The theory chosen helps to 
determine what problems are given priority, what directions are considered most 
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profitable to search for answers, and what types of data are collected. Overall 
theories establish a framework for answering the question why.
121
 
Differing theoretical traditions, within qualitative research, are allied to a divergent 
mix of research questions, data collection methods and analytical techniques.
122
 
Common to all research projects, choosing the most appropriate method suited to 
the line of inquiry is vital to achieving the desired results.
123
 
124
 Researchers justify 
their use of a particular method for capturing data and subsequent analysis under 
ƚŚĞďĂŶŶĞƌ ‘DĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ZŝĐĞ ?ǌǌǇ124 ŐŽŽŶƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
methods describe how you plan to go about collecting and making sense of data, a 
methodology describes and justifies why you have chosen this particular research 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ? 
 
3.2.1 Developing a Methodology 
Qualitative research aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the meanings 
and interpretations people assign to their own actions, to the actions of others and 
to situations and events.
122 125
 dŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƐŬŝůůůŝĞƐŝŶůŽŽŬŝŶŐ
beneath the routine, everyday, taken for granted aspects of the settings under 
study.
122 126 127
 DĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐĐĂŶďĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶďƌŽĂĚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?Žƌ
ŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?.128 The methodology defines how a 
phenomenon is studied. This overarching term incorporates the choices made 
about which population is chosen, the methods of collecting data, the analysis used 
and how the study is actually planned and executed.
128
 Sarantakos
129
 defines 
methodology as a strategy that translates ontological and epistemological principles 
into guidelines that show how research is to be conducted. Researchers adopting a 
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symbolic interactionism, phenomenology or ethnomethodology paradigm will 
approach the research question through a qualitative methodology that utilises a 
more flexible design and qualitative methods.
129
 
 
3.2.2 Major characteristics of qualitative research 
Qualitative research is concerned with the collection and analysis of data that are 
not in the form of numbers. Unlike quantitative research which is seen as objective, 
focusing on the collection of facts, qualitative research focuses more on exploring 
occurrences and illustrations that are subjective but considered as interesting or 
illuminating. In other words, it aims to realize depth rather than breadth.
130
  
A review of the literature on qualitative research methodology suggests a number 
of distinguished characteristics. First of all, qualitative research takes place in the 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?,129 131  where descriptions and accounts of the phenomena under 
study are to be found. This characteristic is related to another characteristic 
described by Bryman
132
 ĂƐ ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ?
The second feature of qualitative research is that it aims at collectŝŶŐ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇ
ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƵƐŝŶŐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ
unstructured rather than structured interviews.
128
 Traditional data collection 
methods include observations, interviews and documents. The data collected is 
often in the form of texts (or words) and images (or pictures) rather than 
numbers.
131
 Another distinguished characteristic of qualitative research is that it is 
inductive, hypothesis-generating research rather than deductive, hypothesis testing 
one.
133
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The above mentioned characteristics of qualitative research, however, give rise to 
criticisms which are presented in the next section.  
 
3.2.3 Limitations of qualitative research 
As mentioned above, adopting a qualitative methodology allows the researcher to 
foster an understanding of the values, beliefs and behaviours of individuals under 
study. However, qualitative methodology has been criticised for a number of 
reasons. These include the way it perceives reality, people and research; the 
methods it uses; the politics it supports; and the relationship it establishes with the 
researched. 
&ŝƌƐƚŽĨĂůů ?ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽŽƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?132 The 
ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶ
beliefs about what is significant and important may have had on the data collection, 
as well as the potential relationships developed between the researcher and those 
being studied.
132
 dŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŵŝŐŚƚĂůƐŽďƌŝŶŐƐŽŵĞ
biases to the research. These biases, as described by Sadler,
134
 can be related to the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ƉƌŝŽƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂŬĞƵƉ ?ŽƌǁŽƌůĚ
ǀŝĞǁ ? ? 
 
The second limitation of qualitative research is that there are problems of 
generalisation.
132
 The findings may not be generalisable beyond the population 
being studied. Within the study findings, however, you would expect a detailed 
description of the context of where the research was carried out, the methods used, 
the procedure for data collection, and the knowledge base for data analysis. This 
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will ensure that those reading the research findings have enough information to 
judge whether or not the findings are transferable to other contexts.   
Bryman
132
 also suggests that interpretation will be greatly influenced by the 
personal preferences of the researcher; this in turn impacts on the ability of the 
research to truly see through the eyes of the researched and to interpret events 
from their point of view. 
 
An understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research 
therefore is crucial for the researcher. Such an understanding will enable the 
researcher to plan and design the research project in order to make the most of the 
strengths and to be honest and open about the weaknesses. 
 
3.3 Sampling 
3.3.1 Purposive Sampling 
Sampling strategies and the adequacy of the chosen sample, as with all research 
projects, can have serious knock on effects to the scientific accuracy of the research, 
typically judged in terms of validity and reliability.
135
 In contrast to the random 
sampling strategies of quantitative research, qualitative research requires in-depth 
study and smaller samples that identify and include those information rich cases. 
Sampling is therefore driven by the emerging categories and hypotheses, the need 
for theoretical elaboration and by the researchers need to ground developing 
theory in the empirical data.   
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The sampling strategy, for both of my studies, was guided by my research question 
but also by pragmatism. I adopted a purposive sampling strategy, which I believe 
contributed to the credibility of the research. Purposive sampling involves selecting 
groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research 
questions, your theoretical position and analytical framework, your analytical 
practice and most importantly the argument or explanation that you are 
developing.
136
 
Purposive sampling began, in my first study, with the choice of NHS Hospital Trusts 
selected. These were chosen to represent a range of NHS secondary and tertiary 
referral centre Hospitals, geographically spread across England and Wales. 
Participants were selected from the qualified anaesthetists and ODPs, who were 
willing to participate, working within the theatres at these NHS hospital trusts.  
 
Purposive sampling is integral to the constant comparative method of data 
collection and analysis.  Individuals are added to the sample until theoretical 
saturation is reached; that is, an exhaustive range of elements that formulate the 
theory is fully described by the data. It was possible for me to review decisions 
about sampling during the research process through the use of purposive sampling. 
On analysing the data from the focus group in the second of my studies, I went on 
to hold a second focus group with anaesthetists and ODPs that had not participated 
in the initial study. This allowed me to explore further the perceptions of drug 
errors within anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting, and the use of 
technology in anaesthetic practice in a group that were not research or technology 
focused.  
54 
 
3.3.2 Sample size 
Given that an individual person can generate hundreds or thousands of concepts, 
large samples are not necessarily needed to generate rich data sets.
122
 
123
 
135
 
137
 In 
qualitative research, the sample size is not determined by the need to ensure 
generalisability, as in quantitative research, but rather by the desire to investigate 
the chosen topic fully and to provide information rich data.
136
 There are no closely-
defined rules for the sample size in qualitative studies, however, there are widely 
accepted considerations related to the sampling decision.
138
  
Determining an adequate sample size in qualitative research is in the end down to 
ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶg the quality of the 
information collected against the purpose to which it will be put.
139
  
Sampling in qualitative research usually relies on a small number of participants 
with the aim of studying them in depth. However, the sampling strategy has to be 
adequate to answer the qualitative research question. Generating too small a 
sample can make it difficult to justify the claim of achieving theoretical saturation. 
Conversely, too large a sample may not permit a deep, case-orientated analysis, 
which is a core principle of qualitative research. In order to saturate any given 
theory it is extremely difficult to predict what sample size will be needed, however 
the literature reports a grounded theory study sample sizes ranging between 10 
and 60 persons.
123 135
 In the first of my studies 36 consultant anaesthetists, three 
trainee anaesthetists, 15 ODPs and seven nurses participated and in the second of 
my studies 20 anaesthetists and 20 ODPs participated overall in order to achieve 
theoretical saturation. 
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3.4 Research Methods 
3.4.1 The research methods 
A research method can be described simply as the approach for collecting data and 
can be associated with a diverse range of research designs.
132
 The research design 
provides a framework for collecting and analysing data, but the research method is 
the tool for collecting that data, for example participant observation or semi-
structured interviews.
132
 
In the next section, I will look at each of the methods used in my research.  
 
3.4.2 Questionnaires 
Within the second of my studies I utilised a Likert-scale questionnaire. This was 
used to gain a baseline measurement of ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ?
agreement and/or discord around the subjects of drug errors in anaesthesia, levels 
of harm caused and the use of technology as a preventative measure. Initially 10 
anaesthetists and seven ODPs completed the questionnaire; it was later distributed 
to a further 10 anaesthetists and 10 ODPs that did not participate in the original 
study.  
  
Bryman suggested that the self completion questionnaire and the structured 
interview are very similar methods.
132
 The apparent difference between the two 
methods is the absence of the researcher with the self-completion questionnaire; 
instead, the questionnaire relies on the participant to read each question and 
answer them independently. However, because there is no researcher to clarify the 
questions, the questionnaire must be clear and easy to answer. As a result 
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ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞƐŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽďĞƐƵĐĐŝŶĐƚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚĨĂƚŝŐƵĞ ? ?
have fewer open questions to ensure ease of answering and easy to follow to 
reduce the chance of questions being omitted. 
 
The advantages of using questionnaires, as described in the literature, is the ability 
for the researcher to gather consistent and sufficiently accurate data in a 
straightforward, cost efficient and convenient manner.
132 140
  
 
Wilson
141
 argued that the principal advantage of using self completed 
questionnaires, compared to interview-led methods, was the ease of administration 
and the reduced costs of implementation. Secondly, self completed questionnaires 
reduce the possibility of the researchers own personality influencing the responses 
from the participants. Research by Sudman and Bradburn
142
 suggested that self 
completion questionnaires worked better than personal interviews when a 
question carried the possibility of such bias. Wellington
143
 suggested that self-
completed questionnaires may provide a richer, more truthful account than data 
collected through interview,
143
 while Bryman
132
 conferred when he suggested that 
there is a tendency within the interview situation for respondents to under-report 
situations that are sensitive or induce anxiety.  
 
In addition, self completed questionnaires are convenient as they can be completed 
at a time and pace that suits the respondent.
132
 Another advantage of the 
questionnaire, as stated by Wellington
143
 is that self completed questionnaires are 
often associated with the collection of quantitative data.  Thus allowing the data to 
be inputted straight into a spreadsheet in a numerical format and analysed quickly.  
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The questionnaire, however, suffers from a number of disadvantages. Firstly the 
questionnaire does not allow the opportunity to probe respondents to elaborate 
their answers or prompt if they are having difficulty answering a question. It is 
therefore vital that questions are clear, unambiguous and easy to answer.
132
 
Another disadvantage of the questionnaire, according to Bryman,
132
 is that any 
questions that are not viewed as important by the participant are likely to be 
ignored or worse still the whole questionnaire is assigned to the waste paper bin. 
To avoid this happening and reduce the risk of missing data, since respondents may 
skip questions that appear to be irrelevant or boring to them, the questionnaire 
should not be overly long and ask too many questions.  
 
I encountered a couple of the disadvantages of using questionnaires that have 
previously been described in the literature.
132
  Firstly the problem I encountered 
was missing data; where respondents fail to answer all the questions. The second 
problem was the failure by 3 ODPs to complete the questionnaire. Low response 
rates to questionnaires can lead to the risk of bias, it has been argued that those 
who do not return the questionnaire may have different responses from those who 
do.
132
 In an attempt to prevent this happening further, I decided that when I 
handed the questionnaires out I would advise the respondent I would be collecting 
them later on in the same day. This enabled, I believe, a greater response rate than 
I would have otherwise had. 
 
In summary, every data collection method has inherent strengths and weaknesses 
and so it is difficult to say that one method is superior to another. Depending on 
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the nature and context of the research, the researcher must decide what method 
or methods are most appropriate to gain the greatest understanding of the 
phenomenon under study. The information from questionnaires, in triangulation 
with the interview and focus group data, gave a deeper understanding and 
description of medication error within anaesthesia.  
 
3.4.3 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were utilised within the research methods of my second 
study (Chapter 5). The requirement for depth of knowledge rather than breadth 
was the determining factor in use.  
 
Interviews are utilised widely in qualitative research. Green & Thorogood
144
  
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ ‘ĂĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞƐ ĂƌĐŚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
gain greater insight into the area under study. Typically qualitative researchers 
make use of unstructured or semi-structured interviews, which may also be 
referred to as in-depth or qualitative interviews.
144
 
145
  
 
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher decides the outline in terms of the 
topics covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the responses from the 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚŽƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?
and the relative significance of each of them.
132
 
144
 Mason
136
 describes qualitative 
interviewinŐĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽƌƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĞǆĐĂǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶďĞĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞƚŽŽůŝŶƵŶĞĂƌƚŚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵƉ
norms and assumptions that may seldom be discussed openly in daily practice.
146
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with three consultant anaesthetists 
and one ODP. The interviews were carried out face to face, and were held in a 
separate meeting room within my department, with the exception of one. The 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ƚŽŽŬ place in their office, as it was more 
convenient for them. Each interview lasted approximately thirty minutes.   
 
In order to allow the opportunity for me to follow up on any interesting points 
raised during the interview, all the interviews were audio recorded, with the 
permission of the interviewee. This allowed me the freedom not to take notes, 
which could have been more of a distraction than an asset. Recording the 
interviews also meant they could be easily transcribed for data analysis.  
The interview questions investigated the perceptions of drug errors within 
anaesthesia, the quality of the anaesthetic record produced and the preparation of 
drugs [Appendix I].  
 
The interviews probed the advantages and disadvantages of current clinical practice 
against utilising the new electronic system, particularly concentrating on the quality 
of the anaesthetic record produced and the preparation of drugs using both 
systems. I was particularly interested in the accuracy and time taken to complete 
both the electronic and the paper anaesthetic record, and the views of the 
participants about each completed document. I also explored how useful 
participants found the electronic system and the overall usability of the system 
compared to the standard paper record. 
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Drug preparation using the SAFERsleep ? system was very different to current 
clinical practice in that the majority of the drugs were pre-filled and pre-labelled 
and presented in a specially designed drugs trolley. Standard practice is for drugs to 
be stored in a cupboard and for the anaesthetist to draw up their own drugs and 
label them. The interview questions were designed to explore the participants 
understanding and perceptions of the time taken to prepare the drugs within each 
scenario and their thoughts on having drugs available in a pre-filled format. I also 
explored the feelings on the potential for distractions within both systems and 
possible ways to prevent them. 
Finally, the interviews also gave me a chance to explore perceptions of drug error 
within anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting and whether the participants 
thought that drug errors were an issue within anaesthetic practice. I also went on 
ƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶǁŚĞŶĂŶĞƌƌŽƌǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ
and if this is influenced by the potential harm to the patient or not. Following on 
from this I asked whether technology has a place in preventing error and if so what 
would be the ideal system requirements in order to achieve this. 
 
3.4.4 Focus Groups 
Like interviews, focus groups are an adaptable method of collecting data for a wide 
range of qualitative research studies.
122
 Focus groups were utilised in both of my 
studies. A focus group has been described previously as a group interview, brought 
together to discuss a particular issue under the direction of a facilitator, who has a 
list of topics to discuss;
132 144
 the focus groups I ran typically had five to eight 
participants and lasted approximately one hour. Conducting a focus group can 
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involve a great deal of work. In order to concentrate solely on facilitating the group 
and not having to worry also about taking notes, I aimed to have the help of 
another member of the research team at each focus group. Hand written notes 
were taken at all focus group interviews, as well as being audio recorded, as a back-
up in case the tape recording failed for whatever reason. 
 
I utilised a schedule to ensure consistency within all the related focus groups 
[Appendix II, III, IV, and V]. This was not so prescriptive that it stifled further 
discussion of new and interesting themes emerging from the dialogue, but kept the 
focus of the enquiry around the overarching research question. 
 
Focus groups have several advantages. Berg
147
 suggests that focus groups are 
valuable in situations where there is only a limited amount of time available to the 
researcher to collect data from a group or setting.  While other authors suggest that 
the focus group creates a safe environment for the sharing of experiences.
148-150
 
They allow the opportunity for participants to raise issues, within the scope of the 
research question that they deem to be important and significant. Green & 
Thorogood
144
 suggest that the focus group allows the researcher the extra 
opportunity to utilise the interaction between the participants of the group and not 
just the interaction between the researcher and the individual participant. It is an 
ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚƚŽŽůĨŽƌĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƚŽďƵŝůĚƵƉŽŶŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?
stimulate thinking and discussion. This can in turn lead to new ideas being 
generated and widening the scope of the analysis. It also allows the opportunity for 
the moderator to clarifying any issues arising and seek a more detailed response.
151
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The potential for producing a huge amount of data over a relatively short space of 
time is great,
144
 while Schneider and Palmer
152
 note that although the focus group 
data does not necessarily provide a more valid report of reality, it did provide rich 
and meaningful data. 
The reason I chose to use focus groups within my research was to explore how 
individuals collectively make sense of the phenomenon I was studying and to 
understand why people feel the way they do about it. Bryman
132
 suggests that 
individuals make sense of a situation not in isolation, but through interaction and 
discussion with one another.  Focus groups reflect how meaning is constructed in 
everyday life; Wilkinson
153
 suggests this makes them more naturalistic than one-to-
one interviews. 
Limitations of using focus groups have been previously discussed in the literature. 
The advantages of utilising focus groups can also be their limitations.
144
 It is much 
harder to ensure confidentiality with focus groups than it is for interviews.
122
  While 
another potential drawback is the dynamics inherent within the group. An intrinsic 
disadvantage is the susceptibility to bias; within the focus group, the goal is to let 
people spark off one another, suggesting dimensions and nuances of the original 
problem that any one individual might not have thought of.
154
 This is useful way to 
stimulate discussion and may also have a quality control effect where participants 
ĐŚĞĐŬĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŐƌŽƵƉ
members, especially overly dominant, judgmental or aggressive participants or the 
moderator, influencing the beliefs of individuals or the group could easily bias the 
discussions or deter others from speaking about sensitive issues.
122
 
144
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In addition, time can be lost due to digression onto irrelevant issues; therefore 
skilful management of group discussions is paramount to achieve the most from the 
group.
151
 Schneider & Palmer
152
 suggest that a poor facilitator will ask leading 
questions, which in turn, suggests they are looking for certain answers. Proficient 
moderating is also vital to ensure ease of analysis, too many people talking at once 
makes it almost impossible to transcribe the discussions from the audio recording. 
This was something I was acutely aware of and tried to ensure during the focus 
groups I moderated, allowing individuals the opportunity to finish what they were 
saying without being interrupted. Despite the many advantages of focus groups, 
they should not be viewed as an easy alternative to interviews. They collect a quite 
different type of qualitative data and do not allow for in-depth exploration.
122
   
 
3.4.5 Reflective Diaries 
ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŝĂƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽĂůůĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚKWƐ ? that participated 
in the first study (Chapter 4) [Appendix VI]. They were used to provide a medium 
for the participants to document their thoughts, experiences and feelings of using 
either of the methods for double checking drugs. Diaries completed by participants 
are thought to reflect the importance they assign to any given event or 
behaviour.
122
 
155
  
 
Comparing the data from the diaries with the observation data was a distinct 
advantage; it allowed me to look for comparables or outliers that may not have 
been witnessed during the short observation time. The diaries gave me a more 
rounded view of the process under study.  
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There is however always the possibility that participants could use the diaries to 
their own advantage, describing events that did not take place or to vent their 
irritation about a process, past or present. I also found a distinct apathy with some 
participants to complete the diary, something I tried to counteract by encouraging 
their completion whenever I visited a participating site. This phenomenon has 
previously been highlighted in the literature as a drawback of using reflective 
diaries.
122 132
  
 
3.4.6 Observation 
 ‘Simple observers follow the flow of events. Behaviour and interaction continue as 
they would without the presence of a researcher, uninterrupted by intrusion ?156 
  
Observation captures the routine and often nondescript characteristics of everyday 
life within the context of their occurrence; it allows direct access to what people do, 
as well as what they say they do.
144
 Mason
136
 describes the knowledge generated, 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝŐŚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ ‘ƌŝĐŚ ?ƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ?ůŽĐĂůĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?
Prominent among the tools of qualitative research is observation, characterised by 
Adler & Adler
157
 ĂƐƚŚĞ “ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůďĂƐĞŽĨĂůůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ?YƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
researchers use observation as a process by which people interacting in their 
natural settings are studied so that their behaviours and words can be put into their 
proper context.
158
  
There are several different approaches to observation; depending on the objective 
of the study, the type of data being collected, and the resources available for the 
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study. The two main types of observation described in the literature are structured 
observation and participant observation.
132
 
159
  
Structured observation is a technique of observing which follows clearly formulated 
rules for how the observation and recording should be carried out.
132
  The emphasis 
for structured observation is on identifying and recording the frequency of events 
or actions. The suggested advantages of this method are that it is a cost effective 
method for achieving reliable and easily collected data and while structured 
observation have the advantage in terms of reliability and validity, the capturing of 
complex actions, that occur spontaneously, may be missed.
159
  
Structured observations allow the researcher to see what people do, however they 
do not allow for the greater insight into the reason why. The underlying meaning 
attached to the individual behaviour is lost to the researcher when structured 
observation is utilised.
159
   
Participant observation, on the other hand is inherently more flexible. It is primarily 
associated with qualitative research and involves the researcher becoming 
immerged in the setting they are observing in order to understand the motives and 
actions of the individual as well as the meanings attributed to environmental and 
behavioural characteristics.
132 159
  
tŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ?ŝƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ
for them to develop a degree of trust with those they are observing. However it has 
ƚŽďĞŬĞƉƚŝŶŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ ‘ƐŶĂƉƐŚŽƚŝŶƚŝŵĞ ?.159  
66 
 
The biggest criticism of observational methods is not being able to accurately assess 
ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚďĞŝŶŐǁĂƚĐŚĞĚŚĂƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ.159 Webb and 
colleagues
160
 suggested that people change their behaviour when being observed, 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĐĂůůƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽƚŚĞƌĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
although the reactive effect is more evident in structured observation overall the 
effect diminishes over time as people become accustomed to being observed.
161 162
  
 
Observational methods were used within both of my studies. As well as my own 
observations during the first of my studies (Chapter 3), independent observers were 
also utilised. These consisted of four consultant anaesthetists, three ODPs, two 
anaesthetic nurses and one sociologist. The main problem I encountered was in 
defining or selecting what to observe in the short period of time assigned to the 
observations. It takes time to develop the skills of observation; it is not just a matter 
of watching and writing down what you see, but of discerning what exactly to look 
for and how to reflect on it.
144
 There is always the risk that if the setting is 
unfamiliar we impose our own expectations on what is occurring from our previous 
experiences, alternatively if the setting is one we are familiar with it may be difficult 
to put aside our professional expectations.
144
 For this reason I designed an 
observation schedule for all the observers to use during their observation periods 
[Appendix VII, VIII]. Using an observation schedule ensured that everyone had a 
clear focus of the research question during their observations and it also helped to 
minimise observer bias.
162
 It is also suggested that using a schedule enables large 
amounts of data to be recorded relatively quickly, ensures consistent record 
keeping, and may provide other researchers with a tool with which to conduct 
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replication studies.
122 159
 In terms of reliability and validity, utilising an observation 
schedule has been seen to be a key factor.
159
 However, an inherent disadvantage of 
a highly structured method of data collection is that any characteristics or 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƚ ‘Ĩŝƚ ?ŝŶƚŽŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞ-defined categories are either missed 
or are unable to be recorded.  In addition, any interruptions during the observation 
period have the potential to lead to missed or partial data collection.
159
 
 
It is recommended that all observations records are labelled with the time and 
location as well as any codenames used,
163
 therefore the record was purposely 
designed to include space for these details. 
The observers were encouraged to reflect on the observation as soon as possible 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ ?ĂƐĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ‘ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨĂŶǇŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĨŝĞůĚ
ŶŽƚĞƐ ?.147 There was a section on the schedule specifically for reflections. Observers 
were encouraged to write down all the things that came to mind about the 
observation, an irrelevant point to the observer might actually be highly significant 
to the researcher. Observers were also encouraged to write down any subjective 
reflections; personal interpretations and remarks about their feelings and 
experiences of the observation.
122
  
One of the limitations of the first of my studies (Chapter 4) could be the lack of 
inter-observer reliability testing. To mitigate this as much as possible I provided a 
one to one training of the observers, ensured they had the basic knowledge to go 
out into the field to observer [Appendix VIII], and was always contactable should 
they have any queries about the process. 
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Following my observations I noted any associations I could see between the 
observations, theories about what was occurring and why, or questions I may have 
ŚĂĚĂďŽƵƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƚŽ
the independent observers that it was alright to ask questions during the 
observation if they needed clarification on anything they were observing. They 
ǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƚŽĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂŶǇ ‘ĂĚŚŽĐ ?ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞƚŚĂƚ
were in relation to the study.   
 
Observation in the second of my studies (Chapter 5) was more structured. The 
behaviour of each individual participant was recorded directly into a specifically 
designed computer programme. The drawback of this approach, however, meant 
that only pre-defined events were recorded. The option to add free text comments 
was basic and not suitable for adding great amounts of extra information. This 
approach was more quantitative in design, in that the resulting data generated 
could be expressed as variables.
132
  
As part of the main VASER study I was lucky enough to go out to Auckland, New 
Zealand and meet Professor Merry and his study team. During this time I was 
taught how to use the observation programme and Borg Workload scale, and inter-
observer reliability was established. 
 
3.4.7 Workload assessment 
As part of the methodology of the second of my studies (Chapter 5), I measured the 
ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? 
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With constantly progressing technology, work place systems are becoming more 
complex. Individuals are having to change their decision making and performance in 
order to meet these dynamically shifting environments, simultaneous tasks 
demands and time pressures.
164-166
 Research concerning the relationship between 
task demand and mental workload has had a long history, dating back more than 40 
years and is recognised as an important issue within the literature.
166-169
  
 
Workload has been described as a dynamic balance between the demands of a task 
ĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĂƚƚĂƐŬ ?tŝĐŬĞŶƐ158 describes the concept of 
ŵĞŶƚĂůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƐŬƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
mental resources.
168 169
 Young & Stanton
170
 define ŵĞŶƚĂůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ “ƚŚĞ
mental workload of a task represents the level of attentional resources required to 
meet both objective and subjective performance criteria, which may be mediated 
ďǇƚĂƐŬĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƉĂƐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
Workload is not an intrinsic characteristic, but rather arises from the interaction 
between the needs of a task, the conditions under which it is accomplished and the 
expertise, actions, and insights of the anaesthetist.
171-173
 Workload demand can be 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇǁŝƚŚŽŶĞŽĨƚǁŽ ‘ĂƌĞĂƐ ? ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚŝƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ
capacity of the resouƌĐĞƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ “ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞ
optimal situation because it means that the individual will have some spare 
resources available should anything unexpected happen. Secondly, high levels of 
workload occur when the demands of the task exceed the capacity of the individual, 
this in turn can lead to the breakdown of performance. The distinction between 
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ƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĂƌĞĂƐŚĂƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇďĞĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĚůŝŶĞ ?ŽĨǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ.166 174 
175
  
 
Mental workload is an all-encompassing concept, within the human factors 
literature that is becoming increasingly important.  Modern technology is placing 
more and more cognitive demands, rather than physical demands, upon the 
individual practitioner. Understanding how mental workload affects performance is 
therefore imperative.
170
 Workload can impact on safety, staffing levels and be 
affected by automation. Over automation has led to issues such as those described 
by Endsley & Kaber
176
 such as loss of situational awareness and manual skill decay 
due to complacency and decreased vigilance. Measuring workload is therefore 
considered important in many high risk environments.
177
 
178
 The increased 
likelihood of error and poor performance has previously been associated with 
raised mental workload.
177
  The rationale for measuring mental workload is to 
evaluate the levels of workload imposed by a task or system with the intention of 
determining and removing workload-related performance lowering elements. 
Although various techniques have been used to measure mental workload, most 
measures can be categorised into one of four types: performance based, subjective, 
physiological or analytic.
173
 Previous studies within the literature have utilised 
measures that fall within one of these four categories.  
 
Performance based measures determine the individuals workload from the ability 
to perform a task. The two major categories of primary based measures, described 
in the literature, are primary task measures and secondary task methodology.
173
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Primary task measures determine the ability of the individual to achieve the 
primary task. This is usually measured through the speed and accuracy of 
completing the task. It is assumed that as workload increases beyond the 
individuals limit for processing information, this will lead to a breakdown in the 
performance of the primary task.  
 
Secondary task measures, on the other hand, assess the capability of the individual 
to perform the primary task alongside an additional or secondary task.  As part of 
the international study a Vigilance light was utilised as a secondary task measure 
(Chapter 5).  
 
3.4.7.1  Vigilance Latency Task 
Slagle & Weinger
179
 ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞĂƐ “ĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽĚĞƚĞĐƚĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ
ƚŽĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚƐŵĂůůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?Warm and colleagues180 
suggested that Vigilance performance during an event, such as an anaesthetic, 
declines over time. They go onto to say that this is due to the cognitive resources 
available for task performance being depleted at a rate faster than they can be 
replenished. Many factors have been suggested that can affect vigilance, these 
include experience, motivation, task complexity, workload and faulty equipment or 
system design.
179
 
As part of the main VASER study data collection methods, the time taken to 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĂ ‘ǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞůŝŐŚƚ ?ǁĂƐƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƚĂƐŬŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ
measure of workload or spare capacity.
181
 A Personal Digital Assistance (PDA) 
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computer was attached to the patient physiological monitor screen and this 
randomly displayed a white circle of light which the anaesthetist had to 
acknowledge by touching the PDA screen. A specifically designed computer 
programme within the PDA recorded the time taken (in seconds) to acknowledge 
the presence of the light.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: PDA with Vigilance light illuminated 
 
 
3.4.7.2  Physiological and Subjective Measures of Workload  
Physiological markers include respiration, heart rate, heart rate variability, 
electrodermal response, eye movements and pupillary responses as indicators of 
mental effort.
170
 These measures have the advantage of being able to be 
continuously monitored, however the disadvantages include hypersensitivity to 
environmental interference or from intrinsic interference such as muscle 
movement, the equipment can also be quite bulky and so quite obtrusive. 
 
Other studies have used subjective measures to assess mental workload. These 
include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA-
73 
 
TLX), the Dundee Stress State Inventory and the Borg Workload scale.
182-184
 of 
which the main VASER study utilised the NASA-TLX.  
Bruneau
185
 ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĞŶƚĂůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂƐƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐĞůĨ-
ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than absolute. The advantages described in the literature of utilising a subjective 
workload measure are ease of use, their relative low cost when compared to 
objective measures, and their wide acceptance within the research community. 
However, disadvantages include the possibility that the mental workload score may 
not reflect the true mental workload level and could be influenced further by biases 
such as dislike of, or unfamiliarity with the task.
185
 In addition, subjective measures 
require the individual to stop the task at some point in order to tell the researcher 
their workload score or for the measure to be completed pre and post task.  
 
 
My second study (Chapter 5) utilised the Borg Workload Scale. This workload 
ratings scale has previously been used within anaesthetic clinical practice, and is 
described in greater detail below. 
 
 
3.4.8 Borg Workload Scale 
The Borg workload scale is a 15 point scale previously validated within anaesthesia 
[Appendix VIX].
181 182 186
 The scale ranges from 6 (completely sedentary participant) 
to 20 (during a full blown OR resuscitation).
187
 This scale of 6 to 20 corresponds to a 
heart rate of 60  W 200 beats per min,182 and participants ratings of the scale have 
been found to correlate closely with actual heart rates.
172
 The scale is also 
asymmetric in the attempt to minimise bias caused by the tendency of respondents 
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to group their answers at the middle or extremes of symmetrical numerical scales. 
The scale integrates multiple workload constructs, including physical effort, mental 
effort, and psychological stress.
187
  
Workload was assessed both by myself and by the participating anaesthetist. I was 
prompted by a specifically designed computer programme at random intervals, of 
between 7 and 15 minutes, to rate workload. I firsƚůǇƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ
directly onto a laptop computer.  
 
Weinger & Englund
188
 suggested that, with increasing anaesthesia workload, 
primary tasks would be given a much higher priority than secondary tasks, which 
ƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ůŽĂĚƐŚĞĚĚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞǇĂůƐŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚĨŽƌƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚǁĞůůƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚthe performance of more 
experienced personnel would be less heavily influenced by workload due to better 
resource allocation.
181
 dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
later (Chapter 5). 
 
 ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?^ǇƐƚĞŵ 
Within the both of my studies (Chapters 4 & 5) the SAFERsleep ? system was 
utilised. In the first of my studies (Chapter 4) it was integrated into clinical practice 
at two NHS Trusts for a period of three months, while in the second of my studies 
(Chapter 5) it was used within the simulated environment. The system consists of a 
number of safety features previously highlighted in Chapter 1; syringe labelling, 
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formal organisation of drug drawers and workspaces, and the use of a double check 
prior to administering the drug.   
The following ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚƐƵƐĞwithin 
clinical anaesthetic practice relevant to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 4 ?dŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?^ǇƐƚĞŵŝŶĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? 
 
The innovations comprising the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶĐůƵĚĞ P 
1)  Pre-filled syringes 
2)  Standardised, more legible labelling 
3)  A bar-code reader, computer and custom software 
4)  A purpose designed drug trolley and drug trays 
5)  Operational rules which promote safe practice  
SAFERsleep system 
attached to the 
anaesthetic 
machine 
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6)  An automated anaesthetic record to improve the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of anaesthesia recording and reduce the cognitive load on 
the anaesthetist.  
 
 
Surprisingly, inconsistent colour-coding, look-alike appearances and illegible 
labelling remain the status quo on drug containers in hospitals throughout the 
world.
189 
          
 
Figure 5: Look alike drug labelling  
 
/ŶdŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂůůůĂďĞůƐ ?ƉƌĞ-filled syringe labels, flag-labels and user-
applied labels) are colour-coded by pharmacological class of drug according to 
existing international standards for anaesthetic labels
190 191
and include both the 
class nĂŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĚƌƵŐŝŶůĂƌŐĞĐůĞĂƌůĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “KƉŝŽŝĚ&ĞŶƚĂŶǇů ? ) ?
Details of less importance to accurate drug administration (including those required 
by regulation) are displayed in smaller lettering. 
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Figure 6: SAFERslĞĞƉ ?Ăƌ-coded flag labels applied to drug ampoules  
 
tŝƚŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĞĂĐŚůĂďĞůĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂďĂƌĐŽĚĞ ?ƵƐƚŽŵƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ
interprets scanned barcodes, redisplays the drug name on the computer screen in 
large type along with its colour-code, and announces the name of the drug using a 
pre-recorded voice. In this way scanning forces checking and provides two cognitive 
processes of identification (auditory and visual) and multiple opportunities to 
detect error. For example, with conventional drug administration methods, 
dopamine has been mistaken for Dopram (doxapram) with fatal results.
192
 However, 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ “/ŶŽƚƌŽƉĞ ?ŽƉĂŵŝŶĞ ?ŽŶĂƉƵƌƉůĞůĂďĞů ?ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇ )ǁŽƵůĚďĞƋƵŝƚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ “ŶĂůĞƉƚŝĐŐĞŶƚ ?ŽǆĂƉƌĂŵ ?ŽŶĂ
white label (and computer display), and in addition the spoken drug name uses a 
second cognitive modality (hearing) to reinforce the distinction. 
 
Algorithm-ďĂƐĞĚ ? “ƐŵĂƌƚ ? )ƉƌŽŵƉƚƐƌĞŵŝŶĚĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ
prophylactic antibiotics or (if appropriate) provide various warnings (e.g. of expired 
drug status) in response to scanning. Forcing functions promote the collection of 
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essential items of information for the record. The custom software also allows the 
computer to access physiological data from the patient monitors and automatically 
compiles a complete anaesthetic record, annotated with timed drug administration 
events.  
 
Workspace organisation in anaesthesia is traditionally idiosyncratic and based on 
convenience rather than principles of safety.
189
 /ŶƵƐŝŶŐ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? ?ƚŚĞĚƌƵŐ
trolley drawers and trays are purposely designed to standardise and rationalise the 
organisation of the workspace and physical tracking of syringes.  
 
 
Figure 7 ?^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ĚƌƵŐƚƌĂǇ 
 
Trolley drawer compartments are colour-coded by pharmacological class of drug 
according to existing international standards for anaesthetic labels in the same way 
as pre-filled syringes  W thus syringe colours match their drawer compartment 
colours.  
79 
 
   
Figure 8 ?dŽƉĚƌĂǁĞƌŽĨ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ĚƌƵŐƚƌŽůůĞǇ 
 
In drug trolleys with the SAFZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐƚŽĐŬƐŽĨƉƌĞ-filled syringes and 
ampoules are laid out in drawers from left to right in the order they would typically 
be used. 
 
 
Figure 9: Second drawer ŽĨ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ĚƌƵŐƚƌŽůůĞǇ 
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Drug administration in anaesthesia has traditionally been decidedly personalised.
100
 
dŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵůĞƐƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞĂŶĚ
rationalise this in a manner analogous to a defined pathway of care. 
 
3.5 The Underpinning Philosophy of the Study 
3.5.1 Symbolic Interactionism & Grounded Theory 
Symbolic Interactionism is a theoretical approach intent on determining how 
people define reality.
122
 dŚĞŐŽĂůŽĨƚŚŝƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ‘the complex 
world of lived experience from the point of view of those whŽůŝǀĞŝƚ ? ?193 Grounded 
theory originates from within this movement;
123 194
  Glaser & Strauss
133
 set out to 
develop a more precise and logical method for the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data. They called this method grounded theory to reflect the 
foundations of the principle; that data is ultimately grounded in the behaviour, 
words and actions of those under study.
194
  
In line with a constructionist ontological position, which considers reality to be 
socially constructed and social phenomena and categories are not only produced 
through social interaction but in a constant state of revision,
132 144
 I have chosen to 
use Grounded theory as the methodology for both of my research studies (Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5).  
 
3.5.2 Grounded theory  
dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚǇƉĞŽĨ
analysis is actually both a method of investigation and the product of 
81 
 
investigation.
195
 It is an inductive technique that focuses on the meanings and 
interpretations of the research participants through the use of highly detailed 
accounts of social interactions.
122
 In order to understand the hidden patterns and 
relationships within social processes, Strauss & Corbin
196
 ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƐŝǆ ?ƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ
by grounded theory; causes, contexts, contiŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĐŽǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ ?
and conditions.  Within this concept, knowledge of social realities is achieved.
123
 
Grounded theory encourages researchers to systematically gather and analyse data 
throughout the research process. The approach is iterative, or recursive, meaning 
that data collection and analysis progress concurrently, constantly referring back to 
one another.
132
 This process enables the development of an integrated set of 
theoretical concepts directly from the observed data. The emphasis is on staying 
close to the origins of the data, ultimately leading to a theory that has emerged 
directly from within the data.
127
  
 
3.5.3 Grounded theory framework 
Grounded theory is quite a unique qualitative method in that it has an apparent 
 ‘ŚŽǁ-to-dŽ ?ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?'ůĂƐĞƌ ?^ƚƌĂƵƐƐ133 attempted to frame the procedures 
they thought informed qualitative analysis, but were never actually written 
down.
144
 This framework is relatively prescriptive in how the data is collected and 
what analysis techniques are used. Glaser & Strauss
133
 argued that you could 
ĞǆƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐƵƐĞƚŽ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƌǇĨƌŽŵĚĂƚĂ ?ĂŶĚ
more novice researchers, with practice, would understand how to utilise them.
122 
144
 These key features include theoretical sampling, constant comparative method, 
coding and categorising, memo writing and theory gen
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All of these processes are meant to take place simultaneously throughout the life of 
the project.  Constant comparison and concurrency are seen as fundamental 
characteristics of grounded theory data collection and analysis. However, 
complexities of time, resources and access to the research setting may mean the 
researcher has to remain flexible and adaptable in order to accomplish data fully.
135
  
 
3.5.4 Applications of Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a method better suited for exploring some questions more than 
others, especially those that aim to understand the processes by which people 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?.197 According to 
Stern,
198
 grounded theory should be utilised "in investigations of relatively 
uncharted water, or to gain a fresh perspective in a familiar situation".  
It is also important to understand that the original intent of grounded theory was a 
methodology specifically designed for sociologists.
199
 The evolution of grounded 
theory across a number of diverse disciplines, including social work, health care, 
psychology and management, has led to alterations of the method in ways that may 
not be completely compatible with all of the original principles. 
 
3.5.5 Limitations of Grounded Theory 
Limitations of using grounded theory have been described previously in the 
literature. Carvalho and colleagues
200
 suggested that the analysis process is 
challenging for novice researchers as it is very subjective, relying heavily on the 
proficiency of the researcher and with little specific guidance on finding patterns in 
the data.
200 201
 The hazard of concentrating solely on identifying codes, without 
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theoretically coding has also been highlighted by several authors.
198 202 203
  Constant 
comparison must continue throughout the process, with emerging themes being 
grouped on the basis of correlation and diversity.
199
  
To reach the point of theoretical saturation is time consuming.
144 200
 The constraints 
of health research, such as the realistic issue of funding, can have an extensive 
impact on utilising grounded theory to its maximum potential. A major constraint is 
the flexibility of the sponsor in allowing further collection of data to ensure 
saturation, or from the results of the initial analysis to change the course of data 
collection.   Most research projects work to tight deadlines and because of this 
Green & Thorogood
144
 question how often theoretical saturation really happens. 
An additional limitation has been described as method slurring, where similar yet 
different qualitative methodologies are confused with grounded theory, e.g. 
phenomenology,
204
 or where studies have been reported in the literature as using a 
grounded theory approach when theoretical coding has not been utilised.
198 205 206
  
Stern
198
 suggests that although there may be likenesses in all interpretative 
methods, the frameworks underlying the methodologies were very different. While 
Baker and colleagues
204
 concluded that the failure to clarify qualitative 
methodologies is culminating in a body of research that is mislabelled.  
 
3.5.6 Constant Comparative Method 
As discussed earlier, fundamental to grounded theory is constant comparison. No 
matter which element of the data you commence coding with, in grounded theory 
you use constant comparative methods. This process stimulates ideas regarding 
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incidents, concepts, categories and their properties; it enhances theoretical 
sensitivity and provides direction for theoretical sampling.
135 195
  
Within both of my studies (Chapters 3 & 4) the data was constantly compared. As 
Charmaz
195 207
 describes I compared data with data, data with categories, and 
category with category to find similarities and differences.  Data was compared 
between earlier and later observations and interviews, and within the same 
observation/interview. I also compared statements and incidents in different 
observations and interviews. Data, which had already been coded, was not finished 
with after its classification but was continually integrated into the further process of 
comparison.
208
 
It was important for me to recognise that if the codes I had generated and defined 
contrasted with the perspective of those participating I did not reject my 
observations and ideas and presume they were wrong. Instead the conflicting 
issues were recorded and the data was re-explored, and further observations were 
undertaken if necessary, to explore these issues and possibly challenge taken for 
granted understandings. 
 
3.5.7 Coding & Categorising 
The literature differs in that some authors describe three distinct stages, while 
others describe four stages of the coding process within grounded theory. It must 
be remembered though that this is not a linear process but ongoing with stages 
taking place alongside each other during the coding procedure. Charmaz
207
 
describes coding as the first step in looking at the data through an analytical 
perspective and directs the researcher to determine the action within the data 
85 
 
transcribed. Jeon
135
 ŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽĚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
within the grounded theory method and is a means by which the quality of 
emerging theory can be determined. ?dŚĞƉŚĂƐĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐŽƉĞŶ
coding, focused coding, axial coding and theoretical coding. Within the coding of my 
data I used the process described by Charmaz
195
 this involved only three phases; 
Open coding, focused coding and theoretical coding. 
 
3.5.7.1  Open Coding 
The process of open coding involved carefully going through the transcribed data 
word-by-word, line-by-line, incident-by-incident, and as Charmaz
207
 described I 
ĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞĐŽĚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚ ? ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚ
fragmenting the data in this way it prevented me from ascribing my own 
perspective, beliefs and emotions, to the data I had collected. By engaging in line-
by-line coding, I was able to make a detailed study of the data and lay the basis for 
the construction of the theoretical perspective. By studying the data in this way, it 
ĂůƐŽĂůůŽǁĞĚŵĞƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂŶĞǁ
light; this helped in my analysis as I was approaching the data with a different 
clinical background to those that participated. As Charmaz
195
 ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ǇŽƵ ‘Ăƚtain 
ĚĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵǇŽƵƌƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǇŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ
ĐŽŶũĞĐƚƵƌĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƐŽƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂŶƐĞĞŝƚŝŶŶĞǁůŝŐŚƚ ? ?
 
In addition I utilised another member of the research team, Ms Dinah Mathew, a 
sociologist by background, as well as Professor Mahajan, my supervisor, to open 
code the initial data. This allowed the coding framework to be verified but also 
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brought a different viewpoint to the coding and observations due to the different 
perspective, my expectation of this process was the possibility that the coding 
might expand in new ways. 
I adopted the stance that each piece of data I collected, whether through 
observation, interview, focus group or reflective diaries could inform earlier data. 
Any new codes that developed led me to revisit the preceding data; any fresh 
connections that had been illuminated were explored further.  
The descriptive power of the generated theory, through direct connection of the 
raw data to the theory, is only achieved through the coding process.
195
 As Glaser
202
 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĐŽĚĞƐƐĞƌǀĞĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝng blocks of theory. ?  
 
3.5.7.2  Transforming Data into Codes 
Within both of my studies, I systematically worked through each transcript, 
underlining words that jumped out of the data and coding them in a way that 
preserved the action or meaning. In my first study (Chapter 4) over 150 codes were 
generated during this process, a slightly smaller number, just over 90, were 
generated in the second study (Chapter 5). The idea behind coding full transcripts is 
to elicit ideas and understandings that might otherwise be missed; this immersion 
in the data allows a deeper understanding of the area under study.
195
  
 
3.5.7.3  Focused Coding 
The second key phase in coding is described as focused coding. Following on from 
the open coding generated within the observation, interview and focus group 
transcripts, I began to focus the coding and to combine and clarify larger fragments 
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of data in line with the themes that were emerging from the data. Focused coding 
hĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĨ ĞƋƵĞŶƚĞĂƌůŝĞƌĐŽĚĞƐ ?ƚŽ
sort through vast quantities of data.
195
  Focused coding requires judgments about 
which initial codes make the most sense to categorise your data concisely and 
absolutely.
195
  
As part of the process of focussed coding I met up with both Ms Matthew and 
Professor Mahajan and we worked through the codes together, bringing our own 
interpretations to the discussion and this process allowed us to clarify the codes 
and pinpoint the themes that were emerging from all of our perspectives.  
The power of grounded theory coding lies within this intense, active absorption in 
the procedure. Data is acted upon rather than only passively read; actions, 
interactions, and viewpoints emerge from the data that had not been considered 
previously. Focused coding confirms any preconceptions you hold about the focus 
of study.
195
 
 
3.5.7.4  Theoretical Coding 
Theoretical coding is an advanced level of coding that aligns with the codes selected 
during focused coding. Glaser
203
 suggests that these codes weave the splintered 
story back together. Charmaz
195
 goes onto say that if used skilfully, theoretical 
codes may define your work permitting a sharp analytical influence, conceptualising 
the relationship between the substantive codes, and moving the story being 
painted in a theoretical direction. In other words, theoretical codes describe 
potential relationships forming between the categories originated during focused 
coding.
195 208
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3.5.8 Memo writing  
Memo-writing is a key process in formulating a grounded theory, it promotes the 
analysis of data and codes early on in the course of the research study.
195
 Writing 
memos ? allows the researcher to preserve and elaborate their thoughts, capture 
the powerful ideas emerging from the data, and define the distinctions and 
connections made. The use of memos allows you to define further questions and 
directions to pursue, subsequently leading to the development of theoretical 
codes.
135 195
  
The generation and fine-tuning of the theories that emerged from my data was 
achieved through the constant writing of memos. This was an integral part of the 
theoretical sampling, coding and categorising within both studies. Distinctive codes 
stood out and took shape as theoretical categories as I continued to write my 
memos.  Glaser
202
 maintains that in conducting grounded theory research there will 
be no robust theory without the utilisation of memos.  
Charmaz
195
 suggests that through writing memos, systematic notes are created to 
illuminate and expand categories. Memos allowed me the scope and opportunity to 
make comparisons between multiple variables within the data. It also presented a 
way for me to document assumptions I made about these comparisons, and 
provided a way to share these with other members of the research team. 
 
3.6 Rigour in qualitative research 
To ensure my findings were credible and robust, it was essential to strive for rigour 
and data reliability. It is not appropriate to apply the term rigour in the traditional 
quantitative understanding to qualitative research, applying these measures to 
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qualitative research requires redefinition. Nonetheless, many qualitative 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐ
should be reflected accurately in qualitative research.
209 210
 Denzin
211
 describes a 
ƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƐƚƵĚǇĂƐŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĚŽĞƐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ? 
 
There are several strategies suggested in the literature to enhance the rigour of 
qualitative research of which I aimed to follow. These include researcher reflexivity, 
purposeful sampling and triangulation. Barbour
212
 suggests that the use of these 
strategies does not in itself confer rigour. To be effective, these techniques need to 
be rooted within the underlying principles and beliefs behind the research. Rigour is 
less about sticking religiously to the rules and procedures and more about loyalty to 
the essence of qualitative work.
139
  
 
3.6.1 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is a term used to describe the practice of critically reflecting not only the 
research but your role and influence as the researcher.
144 213
 In order to understand 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚŝĚĞĂůƐŚĂǀĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?^ĞůĨƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
or reflexivity is increasingly seen as a valid means of adding credibility to qualitative 
research.
214
 Reflexivity suggests an understanding by the researcher, that they are a 
part of the social world under investigation and that their presence has contributed 
to the data collected in some way.
122 144 147
 Who you are and where you are as a 
researcher will inevitably shape the kind of data generated.
144
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My own background is within Nursing, of which it is standard practice to double 
check all injectable drugs administered to a patient with a colleague. This conflicts 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŶŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚƌƵŐǁŝƚŚĂ
second person, prior to administration, is typical. Trying to follow the advice of 
numerous research books I had read, I aimed to maintain a friendly distance from 
the participants within both of my studies and not be drawn into expressing my 
personal views.  
 
At the first focus group (Chapter 4) I started with pre-conceived ideas of how I 
would conduct it, conscious of the fact that my voice should not be overly present 
and with the intention that my role was to prompt, probe and facilitate. However, 
when I came to transcribe this focus group I was shocked at how audible my voice 
was and to discover that I had slipped effortlessly and unconsciously into a clinical 
nursing perspective. I became extremely mindful of this during all the subsequent 
focus groups discussions, but accepted that my background and experience was 
something which would inevitably influence the data I collected.  
 
/ĚŝĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĂƚŵǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽĨŶŽƚ ‘ĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞũŽďƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĐŽůŽƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ ?ǁĞƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂŵŽŶŐƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
the literature, but that it is considered beneficial due to the insight and richness 
gained in the data collected.
214
  
Being reflexive has allowed me the opportunity to reflect on the role conflict I felt 
during the study, and to have an appreciation of how my views contributed to the 
research. 
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3.6.2 Triangulation 
In my thesis, I have also used triangulation. Triangulation involves utilising more 
than one method or source of data,
132
 and within both of my studies I used a 
combination of qualitative methods; observations, focus groups, reflective diaries 
and semi-structured interviews, and quantitative methods; questionnaires and 
workload scores.  
 
Combining multiple sources of data allowed me to evaluate the data I had collected 
over time as well as enabling me to reflect and compare different types of data 
within my research.
122
 Triangulation can be used to develop a broader, intricate 
representation of the issues or phenomenon being studied, rather than as a way of 
cross checking.
122
 Triangulation can be seen as a way of providing a balanced view, 
increasing the perspective of qualitative research.
122
 
212 215
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3.7 Ethical Issues  
My research did not involve vulnerable groups or a particularly sensitive topic, but 
this did not eliminate the need to address ethical issues within both of my studies.  
The principle role of ethics within health service research is to protect research 
participants from harm.
122
 'ĂƵŐŝŶŐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ‘ŚĂƌŵ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĞĂƐǇ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂƐƚŚĞ
ŬŝŶĚŽĨ ‘ŚĂƌŵ ?ĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐŝŶǀĂƌŝĂďůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŚƵƌƚ
feelings, or invasions of privacy.
144
  
The foundations laid down in codes of conduct and research guidelines should be 
followed by all research professions to ensure that no harm comes to those who 
participate in their studies. Researchers have a responsibility to produce good 
quality research. The Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care
216
 
from the Department of Health sets out principles for all those involved in the 
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚŵĂŬĞƐŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĚƵƚǇ ‘ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ
the dignity, rights, safety ĂŶĚǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?.208 217 As well as the 
standards set out in this document, a central principle within qualitative research 
should be to endeavour to treat people as individuals, rather than a means to an 
end. Coercing someone to participate in an interview, or misleading them about the 
purpose of the research, would be hard to justify ethically even if confidentiality 
was respected and no harm ensued.
144
  
 
Both of my studies involved NHS staff and in the second of my studies there was a 
particular issue in relation to confidentiality. A number of colleagues within the 
same anaesthetic department attended the same focus group and it was important 
93 
 
for me to stress that all discussions, as part of the focus group, remained 
confidential.   
 
It has been recommended that ethical implications should be addressed at every 
stage in the research process. This should include protecting participants and 
researchers from harm, using voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality, 
as well as informed consent.
218
  
 
The following discussion will consider these ethical issues, and how they were dealt 
with in my research. 
 
3.7.1 Harm to Participants 
As previously mentioned, the principle aim within research should be to prevent 
harm. Harm resulting from badly conducted research ranges from actual bodily 
injury and emotional trauma to the threat of law suits for scandal or slander in 
relation to the divulgence of personal information. The primary cause of harm often 
described in relation to qualitative research is emotional distress of participants.
219
 
However, this threat can generally be surmounted by perceptive and considerate 
researchers and by providing the opportunity for counselling should it be 
required.
124
  
 
Research has a great potential to take advantage of those who participate.
125
 The 
close contact and the likely personal nature of the information shared by the 
participants, makes qualitative research potentially susceptible to the exploitation 
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of individuals.
122
 Sometimes the consequences can impact on the both the 
participants and the researcher in far-reaching and unexpected ways, because of 
this the researcher needs to take all reasonable precautions to consider the likely 
consequences and repercussions their research may inflict.
122 125 220
  
 
I was mindful in both the focus groups and the interviews that there was the 
potential for the participants, who were all health professionals, to hold differing 
views to mine over acceptable standards of clinical practice. It was therefore 
extremely important to allow their beliefs and values, in relation to my research 
topic, to emerge naturally from the conversation, and not be extracted through 
cross examination.
221
 Adverse comments and judgement could leads to 
demoralisation and defensiveness and would be extremely unhelpful in the 
research process.
221
 It was therefore important to reassure participants that the 
focus of my research was the system and not the individuals.  
 
3.7.2 Informed consent 
/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵy, they must be permitted to 
ŵĂŬĞĂ ‘ĨƌĞĞ ?ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŚŽŝĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶ ?.217 It is important 
that the information provided is comprehensive and at an appropriate level to 
ensure consent is informed and given voluntarily.
144
  Informed consent has been a 
cornerstone of most sets of ethical guidelines since the Nuremburg Code,
222
 which 
have been endorsed through the Declaration of Helsinki.
223
 Participants should 
appreciate fully what their involvement will involve, the reason for the study and 
what will happen to their confidential information.
122
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The participant information sheet, for both studies, fully explained the purpose of 
ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇƌŝƐŬƐĂŶĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ
incurred by the researcher and participants, clearly stating that the participant had 
the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving any reason 
[Appendix X, XI and XII].  
 
Within the participant information sheet for my second study (Chapter 5) there was 
a specific section on what the procedure would be if practice was observed that 
could potentially cause serious patient harm. If during the standard debriefing, 
following the simulated scenario, the participant failed to acknowledge insight into 
potentially harmful practice, the matter would be discussed further with the Chief 
Investigator and the Director of the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre (TSCSC). 
In the unlikely event following this discussion it was felt the issue in question raised 
potential concerns about future clinical practice it would be discussed with the 
head of service (for Consultant Anaesthetists), or Educational Supervisor / Training 
Programme Director (for Anaesthetic Trainees). This would have been done with 
the full awareness and involvement of the participant.  
 All potential participants had the necessary information to make an informed 
decision about their involvement in the research study. Prior to the participating, 
the participants were provided with the opportunity to ask any questions, then 
each participant completed and signed the specific study consent form [Appendix 
XIII, XIV]. In accordance with the Research Governance Framework for Health and 
Social Care in England,
216
 ethical approval for both studies was granted by a 
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Regional Ethics Committee and research governance permission was gained from 
all the participating sites. 
  
3.7.3 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Ethical principles integrate the defence of privacy and the avoidance of deception. 
The right to privacy is a principle that many of us value, and contraventions of that 
ƌŝŐŚƚ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂƌĞĚĞĞŵĞĚƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ.132 Promises of 
confidentiality in research largely relate to who will have access to the data and 
how the data will be used.
224
  
The Declaration of Helsinki
223
 ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇƉƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽ
protect the privacy of research subjects and the confidentiality of their personal 
information and to minimise the impact of the study on their physical, mental and 
ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ? ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽachieve this, the true identity of the participants should 
only be known to the research team.
218
 This becomes complicated when the 
research methods involve focus groups. Participants may find it hard to conceal the 
identity of other participants, despite agreeing to do so at the time of the focus 
group.
122
 
 
The participant information sheet clearly stated that the names would always be 
confidential, and views would always be anonymised. However, it did also state 
that others might access the data to ensure the study had been carried out 
correctly, but all would have a duty of confidentiality and nothing that could reveal 
their identity would be disclosed. dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŶĂŵĞƐ
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entailed removing their names from all transcripts and audio files and ascribing a 
code to them. This meant the data could not be traced back to particular individuals.  
The coding of respondents on audio files and transcripts were known only to the 
researcher and all audio files, transcripts and observation schedules were stored 
and archived securely. 
There has been significant debate about the extent to which it is appropriate to 
modify data in the interests of anonymity, there is the potential that the more the 
data is anonymised, the further away it is from its original meaning and the less 
useful it becomes.
224
   
In both of my studies I did want to be able to acknowledge the people who had 
contributed to the study when the study was published. With six focus groups, 29 
observations and 101 participants, across both studies, it was felt that the numbers 
were sufficiently high enough to make individual identifications from the list of who 
had said what difficult. However, I am aware that this approach does of course 
threaten anonymity.  
 
3.7.4 Researching Peers 
Both of my studies involved either colleagues, who I work closely with on a regular 
basis, or professionals within the area that I work.   
 
When researching the feasibility of a situation or commodity designed to impact on 
clinical practice, it can be extremely valuable to seek the views of those who are 
affected, to understand the experiences encountered during such changes. In this 
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research, the individuals whose experiences I sort to gain were my colleagues and 
peers.  
 
There are distinct advantages ŝŶƵƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞĞƌƐ ?ŽŶĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚĂŵŽƌĞ
mutual relationship is often found, one that most qualitative researchers aspire 
to.
217
 Another advantage is that the researcher, who is already involved in the 
culture of the participants, understands more readily the inherent cultural concepts. 
The drawback of this however, may mean the researcher has a superfluous 
identification with colleagues.  Being too loyal to the profession may mean the 
researcher simply accepts what they observe without asking decisive questions or 
makes unjustifiable assumptions, there is also the issue of cultural blindness when 
observing a familiar field.
217 225
 To overcome this, I appreciated the insight from 
members of the research team who were naïve to the area under study; this 
enabled me to look at the themes emerging from a fresh point of view.   
 
Confidentiality perhaps becomes more of an issue when colleagues are involved in 
the research process. It was important to ensure that colleagues were not able to 
recognise or identify each other from the data presented and that all quotes were 
anonymised. Conducting research within your own professional community means 
you often have knowledge concerning individuals outside the remit of the research 
context.  It is without doubt difficult, if not impossible, to isolate all prior knowledge 
of those colleagues when analysing the data generated by them.
173 224
 It was 
therefore vital for me to distinguish what was actually knowledge gained through 
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the research process and what was gained through my personal contact with an 
individual and not to be shared. 
 
3.8 Summary and conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to define the methodology and methods of my 
research.  
Qualitative data analysis is an intricate and innovative process which is continuous, 
reciprocative, inductive and instinctive. The data analysis within my research 
continued throughout, from the start of data collection to the final publication. I 
employed several strategies to ensure rigour, these included triangulation, 
purposive sampling and reflexivity. Finally, methods of analysis using grounded 
theory, ethical issues and considerations of including my peers in the research have 
been discussed. 
The following two chapters set out the findings that emerged from both of my 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONFIRMING THE DRUGS ADMINISTERED DURING 
ANAESTHESIA: A FEASIBILITY STUDY IN THE PILOT NATIONAL HEALTH 
SERVICE SITES 
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4.1 Introduction 
Previous research (Chapter 1) identified the use of a double checking methodology 
as a possible way of reducing drug errors in anaesthesia. This chapter therefore 
focuses on ascertaining whether it is feasible to introduce such a method into 
anaesthetic clinical practice within the NHS. 
 
Drug errors within anaesthesia remain a serious cause of iatrogenic harm.
80 88
 The 
reported incidence of the errors range from 1: 133 to 1: 5475 anaesthetics.
28 78 79 86 
89 
Despite the wide range of reported incidence, and perceived lack of consensus 
regarding the magnitude of the problem, it is unacceptable that any patients are 
harmed, no matter how minor, while undergoing anaesthesia.
226
  
 
In September 2007, in the UK, the RCoA, AAGBI, and the NPSA set up a 
multidisciplinary Expert Consultative Group to provide strategic direction to a 
project ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ
to the NPSA showing the majority of drug errors occurred during administration, 
and the suggestion that these could be prevented had a double-checking measure 
been in place,
100 
the group decided that the feasibility of introducing a double-
check of drugs given during anaesthesia should be explored. It was noted that 
confirmation of the drugs administered during anaesthesia, either using a second 
person check or a technology based system, is not routinely practiced in the UK or 
elsewhere in the world.  
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This chapter, therefore, aims to explore the feasibility of introducing a practice of 
confirmation of drugs given during anaesthesia in seven NHS Hospital Trusts within 
England and Wales over a three month period during 2008.  
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Study design and participants 
This was a qualitative study using observation, reflective diaries and focus group 
interviews. In patient safety meetings, held at the Royal College of Anaesthetists, 
delegates were invited to participate. Purposive sampling was used to ensure a 
representative sample of NHS secondary and tertiary referral centre hospitals, 
geographically spread across England and Wales from amongst the anaesthetists 
who had volunteered. Anaesthetists from seven NHS Trusts were selected. Two of 
these Trusts were identified to have the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?system (integrated drug 
administration and automated anaesthesia record system which utilises bar-code 
technology) installed, and five Trusts were identified to use the two person 
confirmation protocol. 
 
The study was approved by the West Glasgow Ethics Committee 1 and local NHS 
research governance was gained at all sites. It was left up to the lead participant at 
each site to identify other anaesthetists who were willing to participate. A total of 
36 consultant anaesthetists and three trainee anaesthetists, 15 ODPs, and seven 
anaesthetic nurses participated. Each participant was sent a letter of invitation and 
information sheet. Written informed consent to take part in the study was obtained 
from all participants who were informed that the data from the observations, focus 
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groups and reflective diaries were confidential and that they could withdraw from 
the study at any point without penalty. 
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Table 2: Diagram to show Double Checking Study pathway  
 
 
Double-checking methodology incorporated into routine clinical practice 
Focus Groups with participants and observers take place 
Analysis of data from log books, audio tapes and transcripts using Grounded Theory Approach 
 
 
Ms Matthews and myself visit each study site to 
observe double-checking methodology in clinical 
practice 
Independent Observers:- 
4 Consultant Anaesthetists 
3 ODPs 
4 Theatre Nurses 
 visit each study site to observe double-checking 
methodology in clinical practice 
April 2008 
June 2008 
May 2008 
July 2008 
August 2008 
September 2008 
October 2008 
November 2008  W 
February 2009 
March 2009 
All study sites to have finished the 3 month evaluation of Double-checking methodology 
Recommendations for clinical practice are produced by the Expert Consultative Group.  May 2009 
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Figure 10: Study Process Flowchart
Volunteers requested 
to participate in the 
study at RCoA Safety 
Conference  
Purposeful choosing of 
participating sites from 
the pool of anaesthetists 
who volunteered  
Initial visit to participating 
sites to present study to 
whole anaesthetic 
department 
Ethics Approval & 
Research 
governance gained 
at all sites 
All trial packs taken out to each site by myself, 
Instructions on using the flowcharts takes place during 
these visits. Sites using the SAFERsleep system have 
one to one support from a company representative 
Study starts and double 
checking incorporated into 
clinical practice for 3 
months 
Regular contact with each 
site and visiting if 
necessary, in between 
observation periods, to 
ensure reflective diaries 
being completed and 
sorting out any problems 
encountered 
Study completed in clinical 
areas. Reflective diaries 
collected by myself during 
the final visit to the 
participating sites. 
Participating sites thanked 
for their involvement 
Independent Observers 
identified through the 
RCoA, COPD & AfPP 
Independent Observers 
receive information packs 
on how to observe and 
allocated hospitals to visit 
Independent observers visit 
allocated sites, within 2 weeks 
of their visit either myself or Ms 
Matthew would go out to 
observe at that site 
Regular contact with 
independent observers to 
support them and talk through 
observations & observation 
process if needed  
Professor Mahajan, Ms Matthew & myself 
discuss together our individual coding themes. 
Discussions around what to look at in further 
detail & any outlying themes which warrant 
further investigation 
Line by line coding of first 
three observation 
transcripts by myself, Ms 
Matthew & Professor 
Mahajan 
Further observations by 
myself to focus on the 
areas that were brought 
up in our discussions 
I complete analysis of observation 
transcript & Reflective diaries. 
Discussion with Professor Mahajan 
& Ms Matthew to decide focus 
group questions  
Observer & Participant 
Focus groups take place. 
 
I analyse all the focus 
group transcripts 
Final discussion with 
Professor Mahajan to 
focus the coding as part 
of grounded theory 
methodology 
Analysis completed and 
study written up 
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4.2.2 Primary Outcomes 
The overall aim of the study was to perform a work-place evaluation of the practice 
of double-checking using second-person checks and/or electronic checks 
(^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ), to determine the feasibility and barriers to the introduction 
of a double-check methodology. 
 
4.2.3 Drug Confirmation 
The two methods of confirmation of drugs were integrated into clinical practice for 
a period of three months. At all the participating sites the process of confirming the 
drug to be drawn up into the syringe was standardised through the use of a 
flowchart [Appendix XV]. At the five sites, which participated in two-person 
confirmation, there was the addition of a flowchart for drug administration 
[Appendix XVI]. The flow charts were designed by the human factors team within 
the NPSA, and piloted at an independent NHS Trust prior to the study.  
I went out, prior to the start of the study, to go through these flowcharts with the 
lead anaesthetist at all of the study sites to ensure they understood the process. 
The task of disseminating this information further to the rest of the participating 
anaesthetists at each site was then delegated to these lead anaesthetists.  
At the two sites that had the SAFERsleep ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚ ?ĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĨƌŽŵ
the company spent several days with the participating anaesthetists to ensure they 
were familiar with the correct use of the system and to try to mitigate any problems. 
 
At the two sites assigned to use the SAFERslĞĞƉ ? system, a specific label that 
contained a bar-code identifying the drug was used (Chapter 2). The label was 
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placed onto the syringe after drawing up the drug, and the computer assisted bar-
ĐŽĚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌǁĂƐƵƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ ?the drug prior to administration. Hence, the first 
flow chart was used to draw up the drug, and the electronic system was used 
during administration. The ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system has been designed specifically for 
use within anaesthesia with the aim of reducing errors in drug administration and 
record keeping,
90
 by scanning the bar-coded syringe under the scanner it produces 
audible and visual drug confirmation, at the same time the name of the drug and 
the dose administered are entered into an electronic anaesthetic record. The 
^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system also utilises barcodes to enter anaesthetic events on the 
record, such as the start of surgery or the size and placement of the intravenous 
cannula. The ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system gathers physiological data directly from the 
patient monitor via a serial connector. A real time anaesthetic record is produced 
from these data, and any further information that is entered via the bar-code 
reader.  
 
4.2.4 Reflective Diaries  
All the participants at the pilot sites were asked to keep reflective, also known as 
solicited, diaries.  The reflective diaries were provided by the study team and were 
standard across all sites. Each diary entry was divided into five areas for the 
participant to reflect on; Setting, Drug Preparation, Time, Feasibility and Other 
[Appendix VI]. The prompts provided within these five areas were only a guide and 
were by no means prescriptive, but rather were there to help focus the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐǁĞǁĞƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶ. Participants were 
asked to complete these diaries after every surgical session for the first two to 
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three weeks of the study. Jacelon and Imperio 
155
 have previously found that the 
optimum length of time for completing reflective diaries is between 1 and 2 weeks. 
Less than a week the diaries do not provide enough depth of data; more than 2 
weeks and the participants are tired of making regular entries. Reflective diaries 
provide participants with a means to respond to researcher-requested topics, as 
well as to record reflections that provide an account of their working day.
155
 
 
4.2.5 Independent Observations 
A number of anaesthetists (n=4), theatre nurses (n=4) and ODPs (n=3), working in 
NHS Hospital Trusts not participating in the pilot, were approached for independent 
observation of the study. The independent observers were recruited through RCoA, 
the College of Operating Department Practitioners (CODP) and the Association for 
Perioperative Practice (AfPP). I allocated the observers to observe the two-person 
confirmation and the electronic bar-code confirmation during the three month 
study period at a hospital that was not located in the same NHS region as their 
current place of work. Each person visited two pilot sites and observed both 
methodologies. In addition, myself and Ms Matthews made independent 
observations, at all of the sites, as soon as possible after an observation visit by an 
independent observer. This allowed for comparisons and internal validity checks on 
the data collected. All observers were provided with instructions and a schedule to 
record observations in order to promote consistency (Chapter 2) [Appendix VII, VIII]. 
The observers were asked to transcribe the detailed notes taken during the 
observation period immediately afterwards.  
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4.2.6 Focus Groups 
At the end of the three month study period, a total of four focus groups were held. 
Invitations were sent out to all the sites for two participants to take part in the 
focus groups. Following on from this two focus groups were held, consisting of 
consultant anaesthetists (n=5), ODPs (n=3) and anaesthetic nurses (n=3) from the 
participating pilot sites were conducted within two weeks of the end of the study, 
unfortunately no trainee anaesthetists were able to attend, despite participating in 
the study. The other two focus groups, each with three independent observers, 
were conducted within two weeks of the completion of all observations. I 
moderated both of the observer focus groups with Ms Matthew taking notes for 
one of them. At the two participant focus groups Professor Mahajan moderated 
while I took notes.  
Before the start of the focus groups a brief outline was given of the format of 
questions, we utilised the SWOT format to focus on Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats of both methods of confirming drug administration in 
relation to patient safety.  All participants were assured of confidentiality and 
anonymity. A digital recorder was used to tape all discussions. Pre-defined 
questions and prompts were used to ensure continuity across all focus groups. The 
discussions were continuously taped and transcribed by one of the researchers 
within seven to ten days of completing each focus group. The finished transcripts 
were read through and checked against the original recordings by myself and 
Professor Mahajan for accuracy and integrity; any further comments were added at 
this stage. 
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4.3 Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Data handling and analysis 
The data from the reflective diaries were used to check outliers emerging from the 
observation data to enhance validity and provide triangulation.
122 227
 Outlying 
themes were also explored further within the Focus Groups, allowing for a more 
comprehensive picture of the issues surrounding the introduction of the drug 
confirmation into clinical practice. I also kept a research diary during the study 
period; this was the means by which I wrote memos about the themes emerging 
and to highlight any areas or questions that needed further exploration. The main 
emphasis of analysis was on determining meaning and understanding rather than 
counting events or proving hypotheses.
228
 Qualitative methodology was adopted to 
generate detailed descriptions and categories, as guided by the data
229
 to explain 
the phenomenon under investigation.
122
 The analysis of the data utilised the 
constant comparative method and so was iterative rather than sequential (Chapter 
2).
228
 Grounded theory methodology was used (Chapter 2).  I performed the initial 
analysis and then both Ms Matthew and Professor Mahajan read through the 
transcripts and coded them (Chapter 2). We then met to discuss the coding and to 
concur or revise the thematic categories.  
The line by line coding generated over 150 codes, these were then synthesised 
using focussed coding into theoretical categories of which two categories were 
further broken down into three sub-categories. Throughout the analysis the 
ƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐǁĞƌĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƚŽůŽŽŬĨŽƌ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?
or contradictory themes, and triangulation of data from reflective diaries and 
observations. These themes could then be explored further during the study period 
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through collecting additional purposive data in order to reach the point where no 
new themes were emerging known as data saturation. After finalizing the 
categories, the memos about each thematic category were written to define them 
and ensure consistency between researchers. Memo-writing allowed me to 
elaborate on a category, specify its properties, define any relationships found 
between categories or identify gaps in the data collected.
133
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4.4 Results 
Table 3: Details of the Focus Group Participants - Double Checking Study  
Participant Number Occupation Which method of 
Confirmation 
observed or used? 
Focus Group 1- Observers   
1 Consultant Anaesthetist Both 
2 ODP Both 
3 Nurse Both 
Focus Group 2- Observers   
1 Nurse Both 
2 Consultant Anaesthetist Both 
3 Consultant Anaesthetist  Both 
Focus Group 3- Participants   
1 ODP Electronic 
2 Consultant Anaesthetist Two person 
3 Consultant Anaesthetist Two Person 
4 Nurse Two Person 
5 Consultant Anaesthetist Electronic 
6 ODP Two Person 
7 ODP Two Person 
Focus Group 4- Participants   
1 Consultant Anaesthetist Two Person 
2 Nurse Two Person 
3 Consultant Anaesthetist Electronic 
4 Nurse Electronic 
 
The two main categories that emerged from the data were two-person 
confirmation and electronic bar-coding system, their subcategories being benefits, 
disadvantages, and practicalities. Other categories that emerged were perception 
of drug errors and wider cultural issues related to patient safety.  
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4.4.1 Second person Confirmation  
4.4.1.1  Benefits 
Participants felt that the second person confirmation had the potential to enhance 
patient safety, but it had to be carried out properly, with allocated time and 
without distraction. As one participating anaesthetist stated  “ƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ/ŚĂǀĞŶŽ
doubt that it is a robust and if rigorously applied fairly fail safe methods of getting 
ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĚƌƵŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐǇƌŝŶŐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG3]. This was further 
supported by the comments from both an anaesthetist  “WƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐŝƚŝƐĚŽŶĞ
ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƌŝŶŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂďĞůŵĂƚĐŚƐŽŝƚĚŽĞƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƌŝŶŐĞ ?[Anaesthetist 4, FG4] and nurse  “/ĨŝƚǁĂƐĂĚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽ
rigidly and you were allowed the time taken to do it properly then it was just a 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƚǁŽŵŝŶĚƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĐŚŽƐĞŶĚƌƵŐŝƐƚŚĞŽŶĞŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?
[Nurse 2, FG3] at separate study sites. 
An additional benefit that emerged was that its introduction into clinical practice 
appeared to have increased awareness of drug errors and other safety issues, 
pointed out by two of the observers after visiting the study sites  “/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŚĂƐ
heightened awareness amongst users, they felt they were much more aware and 
spending time just checking ampoules, expiry ĚĂƚĞƐ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1],  “dŚĞ
double checking project has raised awareness and is being used for other 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? [Nurse 1, FG1]. 
Finally there was the consensus that one of the main benefits of two person 
confirmation was that there was no need to buy expensive equipment to be able to 
start;  “zŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚĂŶǇĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?Ăůů ǁĞŶĞĞĚĂƌĞƚŚĞƚǁŽ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG3]. 
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4.4.1.2  Disadvantages 
One of the major barriers to the use of second person confirmation was the fact 
that during an emergency, when the drugs were needed in hurry, and when the 
potential for drawing up the wrong drug or misadministration could be heightened, 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŽĨƚĞŶĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚ ?KŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐKWĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “In 
an emergency situatioŶŝƚŐŽĞƐƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŝŶĚŽǁƚŽďĞŚŽŶĞƐƚ ? [ODP 2, 
FG3]. One of the anaesthetist observers made the observation that  “ĞƌƌŽƌƐŚĂƉƉĞŶ
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐ ?ĂŶĚŝĨƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ
ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞŶǇŽƵǁĂŶƚĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂƚcan work and because the system is ignored 
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇǁĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝƚŵĂŬĞƐŝƚǁŽƌƚŚůĞƐƐŝŶĂůŽƚŽĨǁĂǇƐ ?
[Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. Another observer went on to comment that  “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐ
to do in an emergency is not to compromise the double checking but to call for more 
ŚĞůƉ ?[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
Having to stop and wait for somebody to be available to confirm the drug was not 
intuitive, and it started to impact on the way the anaesthetist worked.  “/ĨŽƵŶĚŝƚ
ƌĞĂůůǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĂƌĞŐŝǀing a drug in the middle of an operation, maybe 
ĂƌĞƉĞĂƚĚŽƐĞŽĨŵƵƐĐůĞƌĞůĂǆĂŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞKWǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? [Anaesthetist 1, 
FG3]. Another anaesthetist commented  “/ǁĂƐŐŝǀŝŶŐŵǇĚƌƵŐƐǁŚĞŶŵǇKǁĂƐ
ƚŚĞƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁŚĞŶ/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƐ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG4] 
This impact on clinical practice was seen in the form of anaesthetists checking more 
than one drug at a time,  “/ĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐďƵƐǇƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŽŶƚŚĞůĂďĞů ?ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞ
busy getting an ampoule out and likewise your nurse is not watching you drawing it 
ƵƉŝŶƚŽĂƐǇƌŝŶŐĞ ?ǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚďĞĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞƵƉ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4]. 
On another occasion an inhalational agent was administered because no one was 
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available to confirm the IV drug.  “/ĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽƉŽĨŽůǁĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚin a 
patient but the perceived hassle of double checking was a disincentive and the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚǁĂƐďĂŐŐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶŚĂůĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞŶƚ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
Several participants described how they had started to modify the confirmation 
flowcharts in order to prevent any perceived delays to the running of the theatre 
ůŝƐƚ ?ƚŚŝƐŚĂĚůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚƌƵŐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶůŝƉƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? “My 
experience of the process was not just that it was time consuming, but that it also 
became menial and frustrating and in any process like that I try to make it as 
efficient as possible. I found I was speeding up the process, so instead of checking 
one drug to its completion and finishing that, I would be checking more than one 
drug at once ? ?ŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ2, FG3]. 
 
4.4.1.3  Practicalities 
The main practical issues related to two-person confirmation were continued 
availability of a second person, one anaesthetist observer commented that the 
double check was  “ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂŶƵŝƐĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĂŶŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞKW ?
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1 ? ?ǁŚŝůĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “within the same 
patient there were other people checking the drugs as the procedure went on, so 
they started off with the ODP and they would latch onto whoever they could find ?
[Anaesthetist 1, FG2]. This same anaesthetist observer also commented that at one 
site they had visited  “^ŽŵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƐƚĂĨĨǁĞƌĞƌĞĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŽďĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?
[Anaesthetist 1, FG2].  
In addition, the observers noted that whilst the anaesthetists drew up the drugs in 
most instances, in some NHS sites, ODPs often drew up the drugs for induction of 
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anaesthesia to speed up the theatre lists; in these instances, availability of second 
person for confirmation was a major issue. Overall, the introduction of the 
confirmation protocol, generally, was not seen as too much of an infringement on 
their clinical practice by nurses and ODPs. In support of this one participant nurse 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “As a nurse it is routine, we always double check whatever we are 
giving ? ?EƵƌƐĞ2, FG4].  It was also recognised by one of the observers that  ‘/ĨƚŚĞ
sequence of events starts at the non anaesthetic end it is easier to do the double 
ĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1] suggesting the process of double checking is more 
acceptable and routine for nursing and ODP professionals. However, there were 
occasions when the confirmation was perceived as a nuisance, and was not carried 
out. Also, some participants were reluctant to perform confirmation in front of the 
patient.  “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĂƚůŽŶŐƚŽĚŽŝƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? ?/ǁŽƵůĚũƵƐƚ
like the patient to not be there, for us to say we are ready now to focus on the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4], this may be in part due to the increased potential for 
distractions when a patient is present in the anaesthetic roŽŵ ? “dŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŚĂĚŶ ?ƚ
arrived and it was easier to concentrate and double check without the patients ?
[Nurse 2, FG4] 
The perception among some clinicians was that double checking a drug would 
cause delays to the administration of that drug or to the running of the theatre list. 
However, others felt that it could be performed without causing too much of a 
delay,  “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŝƚĂĚĚƐŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚŽǁ
often do we go into theatre and we are waiting for the surgeon ? ?ŶĂĞƐƚŚĞtist 2, 
FG4], while one of the observers commented that  “/ĨǇŽƵĐĂŶĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬ ?ďůŽŽĚ ?
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ŝŶĂďůĞĞĚŝŶŐĂŶĞƵƌǇƐŵ ?ǁŚǇĐĂŶ ?ƚǇŽƵĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬĚƌƵŐƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
 
4.4.2 Electronic bar-coding system  
4.4.2.1  Benefits 
One of the main benefits was the ability to check the drug without a second person 
being present. On anaesthetist who used the system described it as an  “ƵŶďůŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?
ƵŶƚŝƌŝŶŐĞǇĞ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĚƌƵŐ ?ǇŽƵŶĞǀĞƌŶĞĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?ĚŽƵďůĞ
ĐŚĞĐŬ ? ?[Anaesthetist 2, FG3] ?KŶĞKWŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “if your ODPs 
ĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽŬĞĞƉĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵďĂĐŬƚŽĐŚĞĐŬƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƐ ? 
[ODP 3, FG3 ? ?ǁŚŝůĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌKWŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “the electronic [system] 
would make it easier in theatre durinŐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ǇŽƵƌƐĞĐŽŶĚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ǇŽƵ ?ĚŚĂǀĞǇŽƵƌŵĂĐŚŝŶĞǁŝƚŚǇŽƵ ? [ODP 2, FG3].  
The system itself was found to be easy to use and effective. Both observers and 
participants commented on the ease of use  “dŚĞƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵǁas simple and 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƵƐĞĂŶĚĂŐŽŽĚĐůĞĂƌƚŽŽů ?ďŽƚŚĂƵĚŝďůǇĂŶĚǀŝƐƵĂůůǇ ? [Nurse 1, FG1], 
while another observer commented  “zŽƵĐŽƵůĚŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂĨĞƚǇ
features that you use, different labels, different syringes, different trays, but the 
ultimate one has to be bar-ĐŽĚŝŶŐ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1 ? ?ǀĞŶƚŚŽƐĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?
that had not used the electronic system directly outlined potential benefits of the 
system,  “/ĐĂŶƐĞĞŝĨǇŽƵǁĞƌĞƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƚǁŝůůƌĞĚƵĐĞƚhe 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐĚƌƵŐƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4]. 
Another perceived benefit noted by many of the participants was the automated 
electronic record that the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?system produced. One nurse observer 
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commented that  “dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂmore complete record of the patient journey through 
ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ?[Nurse 2, FG2 ? ?dŚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚũŽƵƌŶĞǇ ?ĂŶĚǀŝĞǁƚŚĞ
anaesthetic record in advance in areas such as the recovery unit was perceived to 
be immensely important,  “dŚĞŶƵƌƐĞƐŚĂĚ looked at the chart and they had the 
whole picture of what had happened with that patient before they had even entered 
ƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƌĞĂůůǇŐŽŽĚĂŶĚŝĨ/ǁĂƐŝŶƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ/ǁŽƵůĚůŽǀĞƚŚĂƚ ?
[Nurse 2, FG2], Some elements of patient safety were perceived to be essentially a 
by-product of the electronic anaesthetic record, one anaesthetist suggested that 
 “ƚŚĞďĂŝƚŽĨŐŽŽĚƌĞĐŽƌĚŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŝƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŬĞǇƚŽĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? 
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. They illustrated this by suggesting that a consultant who was 
supervising trainee anaesthetists working within different theatres could monitor 
ŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇǁŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇ
had been away;  “dŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƚŽŬĞĞƉƚƌĂĐŬŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĂƐŚappened 
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚŝƐĂŐƌĞĂƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? [Anaesthetist 1, 
FG1]. I found that the quality of the anaesthetic record produced by the system was 
seen, by both participants and observers, as a great incentive to use the system one 
participant commented that the subsequent anaesthetic record produced was  “ĂŶ
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐŵǇƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?[Anaesthetist 2, FG4]. The 
electronic system was also seen to allow the participants more time to concentrate 
on the patient rather than having to concentrate on recording the physiological 
variables of the patient on a paper anaesthetic record. 
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4.4.2.2  Disadvantages 
It was noted by observers and participants that there is the potential for the 
electronic bar-coding system to become a distraction while working through the 
learning curve. One anaesthetist commented that they found when initially using 
the electronic system that  “ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂŶŽŶǇŽƵ
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4]. A couple of the observers also noted that during 
their observations they found that the anaesthetists focus, on occasions, was 
directed at the system rather than the patient;  “ƐŽŵƵĐŚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂŝĚ
to getting the electronic record started and that people were focusing more on that 
ƚŚĂŶŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2], while another anaesthetist commented 
that  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽďĞĂĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨ
patient/anaesthetic care ? ?ŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ1, FG1]. 
Another disadvantage that consistently emerged from the data was the permissive 
design of the system, this was acknowledged by one of the participant 
anaesthetists,  “ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĂůůŽǁƐǇŽƵƚŽĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐǇŽƵůŝŬĞ ?
some people might view this as a ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚǇŽƵĨƌŽŵ
ĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐƚŚŝŶŐ ?[Anaesthetist 3, FG3], they went onto to say that  “/ĨǇŽƵŚĂĚ
bar-coded a drug that said cyanide for example, it would say cyanide and you could 
ĐĂƌƌǇŽŶ ? [Anaesthetist 3, FG3]. A nurse observer, when visiting one of the sites, 
had heard a comment made by an anaesthetist that they thought the system was 
too permissive;  “ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶ ?ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ?ĂůĞƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽƐĐĂŶ
ƉĞŶŝĐŝůůŝŶ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůĂůůŽǁŚŝŵƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?[Nurse 1, FG2]. The drugs could also be 
given without having to swipe them through the bar-code reader, or multiple drugs 
could be scanned prior to administration  “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞǁĂǇƐƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
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because you can scan all the drugs for induction and have them sitting on the side, 
ƐŽƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐƚŝůůĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌƉŝĐŬŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐƐǇƌŝŶŐĞ ?[anaesthetist2, FG4], 
thus defeating the object of confirmation at the time of administration. Locating 
the scanner close to the IV drug administration port could potentially overcome this 
problem. But as one ODP observer pointed out  “dŚĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ
documentation is totally dependent on the syringe being scanned and the dose that 
has been administered being entered correctly by hand. There is still room for user 
ĞƌƌŽƌ ? [ODP 1, FG1]. 
 
4.4.2.3  Practicalities 
The induction of anaesthesia in an anaesthetic room has been a traditional feature 
of anaesthetic practice in the UK since 1860.
21
 Before transferring the patient from 
the anaesthetic room to the operating thĞĂƚƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ǁĂƐ ‘ƉĂƌŬĞĚ ? ?ŽŶĐĞŝŶ
the operating theatre the second system was initiated and the patient data 
retrieved. The unexpected consequence of utilising the system in this way, however, 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ? “Another theatre can retrieve 
your anaesthetic record if they are moving their patient from the anaesthetic room 
ƚŽƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞĂƐǇŽƵĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĐŚŽƐĞƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? 
Consultant Anaesthetist [study team observer 1].  
The other practical issues related to initial teething problems that were 
encountered at both sites related to the physical placement of the system, during 
one of my observation visits an anaesthetist commented that if the arm holding the 
system had been sited on the opposite side of the anaesthetic machine it would 
have made it less of an obstacle, in its present position it was sited too close to the 
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patient. One of the anaesthetist observers also commented that there were 
problems with the siting of the bar code scanner;  “KŶĞ of the issues that I saw was 
the remoteness of the scanner from the cannula, if it was right by the cannula then 
ǇŽƵĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƐĐĂŶŝƚ ?ďƵƚŝĨŝƚ ?ƐĂĨĞǁĨĞĞƚĂǁĂǇǇŽƵŵĂǇƐĐĂŶŝƚ ?ǇŽƵŵŝŐŚƚƉƵƚŝƚ
 ?ƐǇƌŝŶŐĞ ?ĚŽǁŶĂŶĚƉŝĐŬƵƉƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. 
The integration of hospital monitoring devices and IT facilities with the system was 
also initially problematic. One anaesthetist, who had used the electronic system, 
commented that  “KĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇǁĞ ?ůůůŽƐĞĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶg into 
ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀĞƌƐĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůũƵƐƚƐƚŽƉĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4]. On a more 
practical issue it was necessary to ensure that the bar-code label, when attached to 
the syringe, was positioned carefully. One of the participating nurses commented 
that  “^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƐĂƌĞĂďŝƚƚƌŝĐŬǇŽr ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ůĂďĞů ? ?ŝƚũƵƐƚƚĂŬĞƐĂĨĞǁĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐƐŽƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĂďŝƚƚŝŵĞ
ĐŽŶƐƵŵŝŶŐ ? [Nurse 2, FG4]. 
During another observation visit, problems with the scanner reading the bar-code 
label were still being reported;  “/ŶƚŚŝƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƐĐĂŶŶĞƌǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
accept the drug; however the consultant anaesthetist did persist and it was 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?dŚŝƐƚŽŽŬĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚƐ ? [Nurse 3 - observations].  
An oversight in the set-up meant that some commonly used drugs at one site were 
not in the database of the system. This meant that these drugs could not be 
entered into the anaesthetic record and had to be added on by hand once the 
record had been printed. A lot of the issues, except the system database, were part 
of the learning curve and became fewer the more familiar the participants became 
with the system. 
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4.4.3 Perception of Drug Errors and Cultural Issues  
Many participants and observers agreed that drug errors happened in clinical 
practice, but felt that these errors were not a big problem. There was a perception 
that anaesthesia is safe, drugs errors are rare and of not much significance, and 
ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚ ‘ŐĞƚŽƵƚŽĨƚƌŽƵďůĞ ?. This was the view of all 
professional groups, not just confined to the anaesthetists. The general consensus 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĂƚĚƌƵŐĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ?ǁĞƌĞ ‘sanitized. ?ƐŽŶĞ
anaesthetist commented  “ǁĞƐĂŶŝƚŝƐĞŝƚ ?ĞƌƌŽƌ ?ĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚŝƚĂŶĚŝƚƌĞĂůůǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ
ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ŝƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐďƵƚŝƚƌĞĂůůǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ ?ƌĞĂůůŐƵŝůƚǇŽĨƚŚĂƚĂŶĚŝƚ ?Ɛ
ŽǀĞƌĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4] 
However, the attitudes to double-checking varied among professionals. In general, 
nurses thought it was a good idea to confirm drug administration but there were 
mixed feelings among ODPs over confirmation. The majority of ODPs thought that it 
was a good idea. One ODP commented that, at the beginning, anaesthetists and 
ODPs reacted differently to second-person confirmation; anaesthetists  ‘ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚ
ƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?  ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ĚŚĞĂƌĚŽƚŚĞƌ
colleagues referring to double checking as  “:ƵƐƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚĂƐƐůĞĨŽƌƵƐƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶ
ďŽĂƌĚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG4] Žƌ “tŚĂƚĂƌĞǇŽƵďŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌ ?/ƚ ?ƐũƵst a 
ǁĂƐƚĞŽĨƚŝŵĞ ?[ODP 3, FG3]. One of the participants also commented that they felt 
the second person confirmation made them feel as if their capability was being 
questioned. The ODPs on the other hand were of the opinion they already checked 
drugs, therefore there was no difference to their current practice. Several nurses 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐǁĂƐũƵƐƚĂƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌũŽď ? “tĞ ?ƌĞĂůů
used to double checking anyway. As a nurse its routine, we always double check 
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ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǁĞĂƌĞŐŝǀŝŶŐ ? [Nurse 2, FG4] and because of this it really was not a 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƌĞĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? “/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇĂŶŝƐƐƵĞƚŽĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬ ?
[ Nurse 1, FG4]. One ODP observer commented that they felt double checking drugs 
was very important and felt that  “ĚŽuble checking of drugs should always take 
ƉůĂĐĞ ?[ODP 1, FG1]. 
Among participants, the views on the practice of second person confirmation 
ranged from  ‘ŝƚŵƵƐƚĚŽŶĞ ? to  ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞǁĂƐƚĞŽĨƚŝŵĞ ?. Some anaesthetists thought 
there was not enough evidence that drug errors are a problem to warrant this 
intervention  “dŚĞƌĞŝƐũƵƐƚŽŶĞƉŽŝŶƚůĞƐƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞĂĨƚĞƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ W it can distort 
ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? [ODP 1, FG1], while others felt measures to prevent errors should 
be supported  “ŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐŝƐŬŶŽǁŶƚŽǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽǁŚǇĐĂŶ ?ƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ƚŽƐĂǇƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚŽŶĞ ? ?[Study team observer 1], further 
supported by  “ŽĞƐĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇŚĂǀĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ? ?
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
It was highlighted that, in the current climate, theatre efficiency took priority 
making it difficult to introduce new initiatives that may be perceived to slow down 
the running of the theatre lists. This was believed to be at the detriment of patient 
safety by one of the anaesthetists. 
It was a clearly emerging theme that the introduction of the confirmation of drug 
administration during anaesthesia will require cultural change in thinking and 
practice. This is however will not be straightforward and as one anaesthetist 
commented  “,ŽǁĚŽǇŽƵĐŚĂŶŐĞĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?/ ?ŵƌĞĂůůǇŶŽƚƐƵƌĞ ?ǇŽƵ ?ĚŚĂǀĞ
ƚŽƉƌŽǀĞ/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƌĞĂůůǇŝƐĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĞƌƌŽƌŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇ ? [Anaesthetist 2, 
FG4]. 
124 
 
 In order to facilitate it, it will be important to raise awareness regarding drug errors 
among anaesthetists, ODPs and nurses, and prove that confirmation of drug 
administration reduces error.  
Overall, anaesthetists showed a preference for the electronic system, this seemed 
to be due to several reasons; it made lesser demands on the change in current 
anaesthetic practice, it did not rely on the presence of a second person, and it did 
not break the  ‘ƌŚǇƚŚŵŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?.
 
4.5 Discussion  
This study was designed to explore the feasibility of introducing a method of 
confirming anaesthetic drug administration, within the existing environment of NHS 
hospitals, along with the attitudes, experiences and behaviours of the participants. 
Hence, a qualitative methodology was chosen for the study. Both methods i.e. two-
person and the electronic confirmation, were perceived to have the potential to 
minimise drug errors and enhance patient safety. However, the second-person 
confirmation was not always feasible due to the availability of the second person at 
the time of drug administration. In addition, it was perceived to be time-consuming, 
prone to human manipulations, and met with some resistance from the staff.  
 
Halbesleben and colleagues have suggested that systems designed to reduce error 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞďǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?Žƌ
incoŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?230 231 Halbesleben 
and colleagues go onto to say that in order to precipitate their work and lessen 
disruptions, healthcare professionals may repeatedly circumvent these functions by 
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substituting alternative, informally designed, and inconsistently applied work 
processes, known as workarounds.
230
 These workarounds, however, may result in 
reduced patient care quality and safety. Morath and Turnball [05] describe health 
care professionals as masters at work-arounds. They suggest the reason is due to so 
many procedures and processes in the health care delivery system being broken 
which leads to doctors, nurses and pharmacists seeing work-arounds as the only 
way to get the job done.
232
  
 
The two person confirmation was more prone to work-arounds than the 
SAFERsleep ? system; however it was possible for the anaesthetist to administer 
the drug prior to scanning the barcode and achieving the double check. This 
ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŽƵůĚďĞ deemed a work-around.  
 
The electronic confirmation was also independent of the presence of a second 
person, and was found to be reliable and easy to use. However, it required a period 
of training for the staff, and overcoming the problems of introducing and installing 
new technology into the anaesthetic room and operating theatre environment.    
 
Toft
64
 has strongly recommended the use of an explicit appropriately configured 
verbal double checking safety protocol; the expectation is that if one person misses 
an error the other will detect it. In the present study, two distinct protocols and 
flow charts for the two-person confirmation were developed. The protocol design, 
developed by experts in human factors, ensured active engagement of the second 
person in the process. However, the participants found it difficult to adhere to 
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these protocols, in particular, in emergencies, and when there was a perceived 
shortage of time. There was also some reluctance among anaesthetists, which 
could have been the result of cultural change, as two-person confirmation was 
more acceptable to nurses and ODPs, who already double check any injectable drug 
they prepare or give.    
  
Verbal double checking does not always prevent drug errors. This may be due to 
diffused responsibility, where two people are supposed to be responsible for the 
same task but in reality neither person is truly responsible, both relying on the 
other to be rigorous resulting in neither giving the task their full attention.
64 111-113
 
K ?ŽŶŶĞůů110 believes the benefits of double checking as opposed to single checking 
remain undetermined. It is important that some of our participants felt that drug 
confirmation would prevent errors, but they stressed the need for it to be 
performed correctly. 
 
The observers noted that due to resource pressures at some sites ODPs often drew 
up the drugs for induction of anaesthesia all by themselves, which were 
subsequently administered by the anaesthetists. This is clearly in contradiction to 
the existing norm of good practice that, in normal circumstances, the anaesthetist 
should draw up all the drugs that he/she administers or intends to administer 
during anaesthesia. In addition, the circumstances described by one participant of 
trying to speed up the process, by simultaneously confirming more than one drug at 
once, defeats the whole purpose of drug confirmation. This in turn creates a 
situation where the confirmation becomes futile and involuntary automaticity can 
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take hold. Toft
5
 describes the process of involuntary automaticity as the repeated 
use of identical checking procedures unintentionally leading to a ritualistic chant of 
ƚŚĞĐŚĞĐŬůŝƐƚŝƚĞŵƐ ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶƚŚĞŶůĞĂĚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞďĞŝŶŐ
ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ?115 It is important to note that this behaviour is not calculated but 
unconscious. Although the task actually demands careful attention, once under the 
influence of involuntary automaticity, the check becomes only cursory and the risk 
of overlooking any errors present is increased.
5
 Our data suggests that, in practice, 
the two-person confirmation will not be achievable unless resource issues such as 
time and availability of a second person, and the culture in which anaesthetists 
work, are adequately addressed. 
 
Merry and colleagues
100
 designed the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system for double checking the 
ĚƌƵŐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ
regained through listening to the information articulated when the syringe is 
passed over the bar code reader immediately prior to administering the drug, thus 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂ “ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝƐĞĚƚǁŽƉĞƌƐŽŶĐŚĞĐŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƉƌŽŵƉƚ ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŶŽƚ
prone to human susceptibility. In this study, the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?system was accepted 
into clinical practice readily at one site, and after few organisational teething 
problems in the other. The benefit of the anaesthetic record was seen as one of the 
driving factors in this swift adoption. Compared to the two-person confirmation, 
ƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system appeared to be more feasible and less challenging 
culturally.  
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Merry and Colleagues
100
 found that increased familiarity with the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? 
system resulted in greater efficiency of use, particularly during emergencies. From 
our data, training and education of all members of staff in the use and purpose of 
the SAFEZƐůĞĞƉ ?system was of paramount importance in its adoption. Reducing 
cognitive load is helpful to decision making, and so is the clear display of accurate 
physiological data; the automated record achieves both of these.
100
 
 
One of the perceived disadvantages of the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?system was that the 
anaesthetist could bypass many of its safety features by scanning multiple drugs at 
the same time. The risk of this could be reduced by locating the scanner close to the 
IV port. Other technical issues were also raised which included integration with 
existing technologies and IT within the operating theatre, possibility of 
technological failure, space utilization and the location of the scanner. These are 
more logistical issues of integrating new technology into an existing environment 
rather than the limitations of the system. Of the two methods, all observers 
preferred ƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵover two-person confirmation and the 
participants using the ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? system were positive about its potential to 
reduce error.  However, I would suggest that any system used to confirm drug 
administration, during anaesthesia, should be capable of overcoming the logistical 
and technical issues raised in this study for its appropriate utilization in enhancing 
patient safety.  
 
The introduction of any new technology may have its own hazards which may not 
have become immediately obvious in this study. A further detailed expert technical 
129 
 
hazard assessment exercise should be conducted with a view to developing 
recommendations for introducing such a system in the NHS environment. 
 
This data suggests that clinical staff differ in their perception of the significance of 
drug errors and their attitude towards measures to prevent them. It is therefore 
important that the introduction of any method of preventing drug errors should be 
accompanied by a drive towards awareness of drug errors. This may be achieved by 
active engagement of professionals in reporting, analysis and dissemination of 
learning from critical incident reporting at local and national level. For any measure 
of patient safety to be successful, an acceptance by the professionals is essential. 
This study has uncovered a number of factors, barriers and facilitators, which can 
determine successful uptake of safety interventions in clinical practice within or 
even outside anaesthesia. Further studies for in-depth exploration of the cultural 
issues, some of which are uncovered by the present study, are required for 
successful implementation and long lasting uptake of safety initiatives in health 
care systems.   
 
4.6 Limitations 
There were a number of limitations with this study. Prior to starting out in assessing 
the feasibility of introducing a double check methodology into clinical practice, it 
would have been ideal to have evidence that double checking, whether by second 
person confirmation or through the use of technology, does actually reduce error.  
The Expert Consultative Group was aware, however, of an ongoing multi-million 
dollar study already taking place in New Zealand. They took the decision that it 
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would not be cost effective to carry out a similar investigation, into the 
effectiveness of a double checking intervention, in the UK. The Expert Consultative 
Group were also of the opinion that double checking would reduce drug error and 
therefore, one of the main limitations of this study was that it was based on opinion 
and not data. 
Another potential limitation of this study was that the sample was one of 
convenience. Following a safety conference at the RCoA where the call for 
volunteers was announced, there were several anaesthetists who contacted the 
RCoA and volunteered to participate in the study. We were lucky enough to have 
more contacts than we needed and were able to choose the sites to represent a 
broad spectrum of teaching and district general hospitals across the country. There 
is the potential for these to represent more safety conscious departments and the 
results may be limited to the anaesthetists who are motivated in the area of patient 
safety. However, the findings of the participants were triangulated by using 
independent multi-professional observers and the reflective diaries. In addition, we 
included the nursing staff and ODPs from the participating sites in the study to build 
a more complete picture.  
There was a possible limitation with the observation schedule. It probably would 
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶďĞƚƚĞƌƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŝĞůĚŶŽƚĞƐ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐĂŶƵŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĨŽƌŵŽĨ
collecting data. I did find, however, that the observations from the independent 
observers were very similar to my own observations at the same sites, and so I was 
satisfied that there was consistency in their observations.  
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The relationship between the researcher and the participants has been recognised 
as a source of potential bias. In this study this relationship was recognised. To a 
large extent these influences are unavoidable, however, the researchers tried to 
minimise these by having a heightened level of awareness, adhering to basic rules 
ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ? 
 
This study has produced a considerable amount of data from multiple sources. The 
issue of the observers causing a Hawthorne effect has been discussed previously 
(Chapter 2).
208 
The introduction of observers did not appear to change the 
behaviour of any of the anaesthetists or assistants during the process, as the 
phenomenon of observation is not new in the NHS environment. The risk of 
different observers placing importance onto different aspects of the process was 
limited through the use of the observation schedule [Appendix VII], the observers 
were also encouraged to reflect on what they had observed at the end of the 
session in order to capture any prejudices or preconceptions they may have that 
could impact on the data collected. I also aimed to limit the bias through using two 
independent study team members, one unfamiliar with the anaesthetic 
environment, to cross check the observations of those more familiar with the 
setting under observation and these produced correlative accounts. I believe that 
the data collected were an accurate account of the experiences of the participants, 
and this was confirmed at the focus groups for those who had participated, and 
through the reflective diaries. The findings were also similar across all seven sites 
which support the generalisability of the study. These findings may be transferable 
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on international scale but this study does have idiosyncrasies that are only typical in 
the NHS. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In summary, the introduction of the two person drug confirmation was found to be 
difficult to achieve at times, due to staff availability and its reliance on time being 
allocated for the process to take place unhindered. If this check was to be 
introduced in the NHS a significant impact on the existing working practices of the 
anaesthetist and issues related to resource and cultural change will need to be 
addressed for it to be successful. The electronic confirmation, on the other hand, 
was more feasible as it is not reliant on a second person to be available and is more 
ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?/ƚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐt to 
remain as an independent practitioner being able to give the drug when they want 
to give it and not when a colleague is available to check. For it to be effective, 
technological aspects of making its integration into the operating theatre 
environment will require further attention.  
 
This Chapter has presented a feasibility study which was not designed to explore 
cultural issues. However it soon became apparent that one method was more 
readily accepted than the other. Despite the SAFERsleep ? system being the more 
ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇĨŝƚ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? 
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There were several remarks during the focus groups that related to cultural issues, 
but unfortunately I was unable to go into greater detail at that point as that would 
detract from the main aims of the study. However, the themes were so strong that I 
felt I needed the opportunity to explore these in greater detail. 
This opportunity presented itself through the VASER study. Although it was a 
simulation based study and not strictly clinical, it did provide me the opportunity to 
use the SAFERsleep ? system again but with a totally different staff group. 
 
dŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? )ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƉƚŚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĂŶĚ
KW ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚďĞůŝĞĨƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞ
drug error, and the potential impact ŽŶƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ?
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CHAPTER 5: VALIDATING ANAESTHESIA SIMULATION-BASED ERROR 
RESEARCH (THE VASER STUDY). 
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5.1 Introduction  
For a safety measure to be successful, its acceptance by the professionals is 
essential. This can be achieved by deep understanding of the cultural issues, active 
engagement of the professionals, and taking into consideration any resource issues 
that may have positive or negative impact on the implementation. Previous 
research (Chapter 4) identified that the perception of the significance of drug errors 
varied amongst anaesthetists, and this may determine their attitude towards 
measures to prevent them.  
Due to the remit of my first study (Chapter 4), I did not have the opportunity to 
explore deeper the cultural issues and attitudes of anaesthetists and other 
professional groups towards drug errors and methods of preventing them. However, 
through integrating my research aims into a larger international study seeking to 
validate anaesthesia simulation-based error research (VASER), it was possible to 
explore these cultural issues in more depth. 
During 2008 a substantial clinical randomised controlled trial (RCT) ŽĨ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?
in comparison with conventional methods of drug administration and record 
keeping in anaesthesia was undertaken at Auckland City Hospital, New Zealand. 
This provided the opportunity to validate simulation based research in patient 
safety by repeating the study, with the same hypotheses and outcome measures, in 
a simulated environment at the simulation centres based in Auckland, Nottingham 
and Cambridge.  A simulation-based research design has been developed by 
Professor Merry ?Ɛ research team to allow safety initiatives to be tested during 
reproducible clinical scenarios of standardised complexity.
226
 dŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?
allows an increase in the frequency of error through ensuring that each anaesthetic 
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scenario is complex.  It is also possible to have every anaesthetist care for exactly 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚǁŽ “ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŽƵƐĞƚŚe intervention of interest with one and not 
the other. 
 
The objective of the VASER study was to assess the validity of simulation as a 
research tool for investigating initiatives to improve anaesthesia safety.  In order to 
achieve this objective the aim was tŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ
individual principles which underlie it in comparison with conventional methods of 
anaesthesia in a simulated operating theatre setting.   
 
Over the last decade innovations have been designed to address errors in drug 
administration and record keeping in anaesthesia. These innovations have been 
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽĂŶŽǀĞůƐǇƐƚĞŵĐĂůůĞĚ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?100 based on lessons from 
empirical incident reporting, the psychology of human error, and the principles of 
safe-system design and human factors widely used in other industries. The 
^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂŶĚis now in regular clinical use 
within one Trust in the United Kingdom, and has also been used in well over 
250,000 anaesthetics worldwide.  In addiƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the United States.
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5.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of my research within this study was to explore the beliefs and attitudes of 
anaesthetists ? and ODPƐ ? taking part in error research, and their views on the 
introduction of technology designed to reduce errors. Also, as part of the VASER 
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study I assessed the workload of the participating anaesthetists in order to evaluate 
whether the SAFERsleep ? system added further workload to the simulated clinical 
scenarios.  
In addition I explored the beliefs and attitudes of anaesthetists ? and ODPs ? that did 
not participate in the VASER study in order to further evaluate the cultural effects 
of drug error within anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting. 
 
5.3 Methods 
VASER was a multi-centre, mixed methods study. The study was approved by the 
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland Ethics Committee 2, and had 
research governance approval from Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust. 
No patients participated in the study; it was purely based within the simulation 
suite using Hi-fidelity manikins. 
Recruitment was through a purposive sample of convenience on the basis of 
availability; all eligible Consultant anaesthetists, anaesthetic trainees and qualified 
ODPs within the Specialist Support Directorate of the Nottingham University 
Hospitals NHS Trust, were invited by letter and/or verbally by one of the 
researchers to participate. 
 
Written informed consent to take part in the study was obtained from all 
participants prior to participating. As discussed previously (Chapter 2), participants 
were informed that all information collected during the course of the research 
would be kept strictly confidential and that they could withdraw from the study at 
any point. 
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5.3.1 Study Design 
Study participants participated in the study for one morning (08.00-12.45) or one 
afternoon (12.15  W 17.00) at the TSCSC during which time both simulated study 
scenarios were completed. For each simulation there were two possible states: 
/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐƵƐĞĚ )ĂŶĚŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƵƐŝŶŐ
conventional methods).  These states were allocated randomly between the two 
scenarios with stratification for time of day (morning or afternoon).  The 
randomisation for the whole study was performed by the University of Auckland 
research team from which the randomisation sequence for the participants to be 
recruited in Nottingham was derived. This trial was open label as blinding was 
impossible in this context.   
All participants were provided with pre-reading material and were orientated to the 
equipment and the environment. Briefing was used to reinforce-specified key 
points related to the use of the SAFERsleep ? system, simulation, details of the 
study, format of the study day and the tests used.   
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Figure 11 Simulated theatre set up for the introductory VASER scenario 
 
An introductory simulation scenario was initially completed by both the 
participating anaesthetist and ODP together allowing familiarisation to the 
simulation environment. An educational debrief with the participating anaesthetist 
and ODP followed this scenario, which allowed for individual reflection and 
feedback on practice and behaviours observed during the simulation and on the 
ŽƉƚŝŵĂůƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
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Scenario 1 (Orientation Scenario) 
70 year old, male, generally well patient for elective 
Laparoscopic +/open anterior mesh rectopexy. First 
case on elective list, routine elective ASA 2  
Assessment:  
Generally well, history of depression on citalopram, 
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂů ‘ŵŝƐƐĞĚďĞĂƚ ? ?ŶĞǀĞƌĐĂƵƐĞĚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?
no allergies, no reflux, no previous anaesthetics.  
Scenario Summary: 
Induction: brief post-induction hypotension with BP 
down to 80/35, pulse 45. Followed by period of 
stability with BP around 120/80, period of stability 
Minor event: Hypertension OR hypotension 
¾ Hypertension following trocar insertion to 
210/110, pulse 70. Resolves after 5 minutes 
(with or without treatment.  
OR 
¾ Hypotension following trocar insertion. Falls 
progressively to 80/50 over 5 minutes, stays 
there (unless treated) for 5 more minutes.  
Resolution and Blood pressure, second period of 
stability, handover to another anaesthetist who 
dŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƚŽůĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
acute case and they need to go and see them.  
Scenario 2 
76year old male, admitted to the medical ward 
yesterday with abdominal pain and has deteriorated 
significantly in the past 6 hours. 
Assessment:  
Has had previous abdominal surgery and is thought 
to have adhesions. He has a history of mild 
dementia, COPD, ex-smoker, and possible previous 
MI 3 years ago. He is normally on a beta blocker and 
aspirin, he is slightly confused and there is some 
suggestion of heavy alcohol intake.  
Scenario Summary:  
Acute case for laparotomy with query small bowel 
obstruction and dead gut 
Induction: brief post-induction hypotension which 
stabilizes with appropriate treatment  W any 
reasonable treatment 
Incision: period of hypertension, followed by 
reperfusion hypotension and atrial fibrillation. Intra-
op ABG will have glucose of 13, becomes acidotic, K 
rises to 4.1. Will need significant inotropic support. 
Initially questionable bowel, but looks viable so rapid 
progression to closure. 
Emergence and Extubation: no ventilated bed 
available. 
Scenario 3 
49 year old male, acute vascular case 
following complications from abdominal 
surgery the previous day.   
Assessment: 
Usually well, history of recurrent terratoma 
treated with chemotherapy and surgery. 
Usually normal renal function, now rising 
creatinine. Now has compartment syndrome 
in his right leg.  
Scenario Summary: 
This patient is hyperkalaemic, recently 
transfused (K+ 5.9 mmol, Hb 12.3 on ABG).  
Arterial line and central line in situ.  Heparin 
infusion running at 10.6ml/hr via Central 
line. Will run out in 30 min after briefing. 
Induction: Post-induction hypotension 
stabilizes with any reasonable treatment.  
At incision there is hypertension, followed by 
reperfusion hypotension requiring further 
vasopressor support. ABG and ECG will show 
hyperkalaemia and acidosis and there is 
myoglobinuria with risk of acute renal 
failure. Oliguria. Surgeon requests mannitol.  
Surgery is rapid  
Emergence and Extubation: extubation with 
transfer to PACU and HDU is planned. 
Table 4: Scenarios Script for Study 
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Time Line VASER Study 
VASER Simulation 
Scenarios 
Interviews Error Questionnaires Analysis 
Sept 2009 
VASER pre-study 
briefing for 4 
anaesthetists 
8 Participants completed 
scenarios 
 
6 Error Questionnaires 
completed 
 
Nov 2009     Finalisation of interview questions 
Dec 2009 
VASER pre-study 
briefing for 6 
anaesthetists 
 1 Interview completed   
Jan 2010  
12 Participants 
completed scenarios 
2 Interviews completed 
11 Error Questionnaires 
completed 
Interviews transcribed 
Feb 2010  
 
1 Interview completed 
1
st
 Focus Group 
completed 
 
Interview transcribed 
Analysis of Interview transcripts  
Finalisation of focus group questions 
 
March-April 
2010 
    
Focus Group transcribed.  
Analysis of Focus Group data highlighting need for 2
nd
 focus 
group 
June 2010     
Analysis of Borg Workload Scores 
Analysis of Error Questionnaires highlighting need for more 
questionnaires to be completed 
July-Aug 
2010 
   
20 Error Questionnaires 
completed 
 
Sept 2010   
2
nd
 Focus Group 
completed 
 2
nd
 Focus Group Transcribed 
Oct 2010     Analysis of Focus Group data 
Table 5: Study Time Line VASER Study 
5.3.2 Data Collection 
During the simulated anaesthetics I observed and recorded key times in the 
anaesthetics, as well as an inventory of all relevant disposable items (including 
drugs) used during the anaesthetics, directly into a laptop computer using specialist 
task analysis software developed for the original clinical study. Purpose designed 
sharps containers and video-recording was also utilised.  
As part of the VASER study objectives, errors were recorded using a predefined list, 
identical to the clinical study in Auckland, New Zealand. Drug related errors 
included (but not be limited to) omissions, swaps, wrong doses, wrong routes 
double administrations, errors in the technique of drug drawing-up and 
administration. Errors in drug administration recording were also included. The 
anaesthetists completed a form to record self-reported errors at the end of each 
anaesthetic, before the debriefing. 
Established measurement tools, which have been previously validated in clinical 
anaesthetic practice as well as in the clinical study in Auckland, New Zealand, were 
also utilised. The Vigilance Latency Task (VLT), the Borg Workload Scale (BWS) and 
the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) were all utilised in the main VASER study. I 
used only the Borg Workload Scale within my study and this is described in greater 
detail in Chapter 2. 
 
The VLT and BWS are minimally invasive measures. The VLT involved acknowledging 
the illumination of a small, bright light on the anaesthetic machine at 9 to 14 
ŵŝŶƵƚĞƌĂŶĚŽŵŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůƐ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĚĞǀŝƐĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĂŶĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?Ɛ
vigilance and spare work capacity. In this study a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) 
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ǁŝƚŚĂƚŽƵĐŚƐĐƌĞĞŶǁĂƐƵƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚƚŽƵĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
screen.  
 
At 7 to 15 minute random intervals, I measured the psychological workload of the 
anaesthetist with the BWS and the anaesthetists then self-reported their workload 
score. This involved me asking the anaesthetist to verbally rate their BWS at that 
particular time point, I also scored what I believed the BWS of the anaesthetist to 
be at that time. Only the Participating anaesthetist, and not the ODP, was asked to 
complete these tasks. 
 
At the end of the procedure, as part of the main VASER study, both the anaesthetist 
and the ODP completed the NASA-TLX, and used visual analogue scales (VAS) to 
rate the physical and mental demands of the previous anaesthetic and specific 
components of the new system and comparable conventional alternatives. 
Methods of identifying drug administration error developed and refined in previous 
research by the Auckland team were also used. A modified sharps container 
allowed positive identification of all used ampoules; this method was supplemented 
with techniques of inventory reconciliation of drugs in the drug drawer before and 
after the procedures. 
 
As part of my research aim participants were also invited to complete an error 
questionnaire and participate in a semi-structured interview or a focus group.  
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5.3.2.1  Error Questionnaire 
The error questionnaire [Appendix XVII, XVIII] was designed to allow me to gain a 
baseline understanding of both anaesthetists ? and ODPs ? views on the occurrence 
of drug error in anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting as well as previous use 
of technology in drug error prevention and record keeping. A five point Likert scale 
was used in order to measure intensity of feelings about these points.  Each 
respondent was asked to indicate his or her level of agreement with the statement, 
ŽŶĞŽŶƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ĂŶĚĨŝǀĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽ
 ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞƉůŝĞƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŝƚĞŵǁĞre collated and grouped into 3 
categories; strongly agree and agree was termed a positive response, strongly 
disagree and disagree was termed as a negative response and finally neither agree 
or disagree was termed a neutral response. The results are presented grouped as 
anaesthetists and ODPs.  
Prior to being used within my study I piloted the questionnaire on a small group of 
anaesthetists and ODPs to ensure it would function effectively. There are a number 
of reasons why I chose to pilot the questionnaire; to test how long it would take to 
complete, to check that the questions were not ambiguous and to check that the 
instructions were clear. 
 
5.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
At least four weeks after the completion of the scenarios participants were invited 
to participate in semi-structured interviews (Chapter 2). A digital audio recorder 
was used to continuously tape all the discussions. All interview tapes were 
transcribed within 5-7 days of the interviews. The completeness of each transcript 
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was checked against the original audio file and the transcripts amended where 
possible. All transcripts were imported into NVivo 8, a qualitative data analysis 
package (QSR International Ltd, Melbourne, Australia), these were then analysed 
using the grounded theory approach (Chapter 2). The emerging themes were then 
used to construct the focus group questions.  
 
5.3.4 Focus Group 
At the end of the study period participants were invited to take part in a focus 
group (Chapter 2). Both focus groups were conducted within the University Division 
of Anaesthesia and lasted approximately one hour. I ran the focus Groups with the 
help of another member of the research team; one of us acted as moderator, while 
the other took written notes. A digital audio recorder was used to tape all the 
discussions.  
A focus group schedule was utilised to start the discussions. The questions within 
the schedule for the first focus group [Appendix IV] were generated by the initial 
analysis of the transcripts from the semi-structured interviews; the questions for 
the second focus group [Appendix V] were generated from the themes that 
emerged within the first focus group.  
The audio tapes were transcribed within 5-7 days of holding each focus group.  The 
typed transcripts were read, and checked against the audio recordings for 
completeness and accuracy. Again the transcripts were analysed using a grounded 
theory approach (Chapter 2).  
The findings are illustrated with appropriate, anonymised quotations in the 
subsequent results section 
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5.4 Analysis 
5.4.1 Qualitative Analysis 
The main categories that emerged from the interview and focus group data were 
Drug error in anaesthesia with sub-categories: the occurrence and causes of error, 
vigilance of the individual involved and the level of risk at an individual level and 
within the environment; the SAFERsleep ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵwith sub categories being 
advantages and disadvantages; Reporting of drug error with sub-categories being 
reluctance to report, recriminations of reporting and feedback; and finally Culture 
with subcategories of culture and system. Following analysis of the initial focus 
group using a grounded theory approach it was deemed necessary to further 
explore the emerging themes to achieve theoretical saturation. In order to achieve 
this, a further three anaesthetists and one ODP participated in a second focus group.  
 
5.4.2 Error Questionnaire Analysis 
dŚĞĞƌƌŽƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞƐǁĞƌĞĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶďǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂŐƌĞĞ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŐƌĞĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐǁĞƌĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŐƌŽƵƉĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƚŚŝƐƚŝƚůĞ ?
ĂƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚĞƌŵĞĚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŽƌĂŐƌĞĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐƚĞƌŵĞĚŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?&ŽƌĞǀĞƌǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
percentages were calculated for each composite and presented in bar graphs. 
 
5.4.3 Borg Workload Analysis 
The subjective workload data of the anaesthetists were divided into two groups; 
either using conventional methods during the simulation or using the SAFERsleep ? 
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system during the simulation. The highest, mean & lowest workload scores were 
calculated, and these were subsequently compared using Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
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5.5 Results 
Ten Anaesthetists paired with ten qualified ODPs completed two standardised 
highly scripted simulated anaesthetic scenarios.  One scenario was with the 
SAFERsleep ?system and one using methods currently used in clinical practice 
within the Trust. 
The length of the scenarios ranged from 45 minutes to 1hr and 25 minutes 
depending how the anaesthetist reacted to the different challenges within the 
scenarios. From this an average of 10 Borg workload scores were recorded from 
each anaesthetist across both scenarios.  
20 anaesthetists and 17 ODPs completed the error questionnaire. Four 
anaesthetists and one ODP participated in a semi-structured interview, two 
anaesthetists and three ODPs participated in the first focus group and three 
anaesthetists and one ODP participated in the second focus group.  
 
The results for the Error questionnaire, Qualitative analysis and the Borg Workload 
scores are presented separately. 
 
5.5.1 Error Questionnaire 
20 anaesthetists and 17 ODPs completed the error questionnaire [Appendix XVII, 
XVIII].  The questionnaire comprised of a total of 12 questions focusing on incidence 
of error in anaesthesia, reporting error and the use of technology in error 
prevention. The results were split into professional groups and then further 
subdivided into those anaesthetists and ODPs that had participated in the VASER 
study and those who had not. The graphs are presented below.  
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Key to Charts 
 Negative response   Neutral response  Positive response 
 
5.5.1.1  Error in anaesthesia 
Question 1: Drug errors are common in anaesthesia 
 
 
 
53% of ODPs thought that drug errors were not a problem in anaesthesia compared 
to only 15% of anaesthetists. These views conflict with those of the focus group and 
interview participants [see later] who believed drug errors were a problem within 
anaesthesia, suggesting the anonymity of the questionnaire may present a more 
accurate view of the beliefs around drugs errors within anaesthesia. 
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Question 2: Drug errors can cause significant harm in anaesthesia 
 
 
The majority of anaesthetists and ODPs believed that drug errors do cause 
significant harm in anaesthesia, on further analysis of the data I found that the 
anaesthetists and ODPs that disagreed with this statement were those who had 
participated in the VASER study. 
 
Question 5: My thoughts or actions are commonly influenced by the risk of 
medication error during my anaesthetic practice 
 
 
The majority of anaesthetist that agreed with this statement had not participated in 
ƚŚĞs^ZƐƚƵĚǇ ?dŚĞŶĞƵƚƌĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞKW ?ƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝŶŐ
of the question rather than a general indifference towards drug error, due to it 
specifically stating anaesthetic practice. 
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Question 11: Whenever feasible, all drugs for parental administration should be 
supplied in pre-labelled and pre-filled syringes 
 
 
 
There was a high level agreement across both professional groups with this 
statement. On closer examination of the data the anaesthetists that had not 
participated in the VASER study, which utilised pre-filled syringes as part of the 
SAFERsleep ? system, were less in favour of using pre-filled syringes than those who 
had participated.  
Professional Group Negative response Neutral response Positive response 
KWƐǁŚŽĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
participate in 
VASER  
10% 0% 90% 
ODPs who did 
participate in 
VASER  
0% 14% 86% 
Anaesthetists who 
didŶ ?ƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ
in VASER 
20% 20% 60% 
Anaesthetists who 
did participate in 
VASER  
0% 20% 80% 
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5.5.1.2  Reporting error in anaesthesia 
Question 3: Drug errors that are caught and corrected do not need to be reported 
 
 
There was a high level of disagreement with this statement across both groups, the 
level of agreement within the anaesthetist group was similar for those that had and 
had not participated in the VASER study.  
 
Question 4: Failing to record a drug given during an anaesthetic is a medication 
error 
 
 
 
The level of agreement to this statement again does not match the data emerging 
from the interviews or focus groups.  
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Question 6: Inadvertent administration or failure to administer medication, that 
has no immediate potential to harm the patient, should be recorded as an error 
 
 
 
There was 100% agreement to this statement by the anaesthetists that had 
participated in the VASER study compared to 42% of anaesthetist that did not 
participate.  
 
5.5.1.3  Technology  
Question 7: Anaesthetic records should be computerised 
 
 
 
Overall there was not an overwhelming support for computerising anaesthetic 
records across either profession. On closer examination of the data the agreement 
between those that had participated in the VASER study, in both professional 
groups, compared to those who did not was also very similar. 
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Question 8: New technology will prevent drug errors in anaesthetic practice 
 
 
 
Within the VASER study there was always the potential for the more technology 
minded anaesthetists and ODPs to volunteer to participate rather than those who 
were not. However the level of disagreement to this statement would suggest that 
this was not the case. On closer breakdown of the data, although more of the 
anaesthetists that did not participate in the VASER study disagreed with this 
statement, there were still over half of the anaesthetists who had participated in 
the study who believed new technology would not prevent drug errors. 
 
Question 9: I have previously used computerised record keeping in anaesthesia 
 
 
 
There was a similar distribution across both professional groups for previously using 
technology and this was also reflected in the participants and non participants of 
the VASER study. 
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Question 10: The introduction of new technology will have a positive impact on 
my future anaesthetic practice 
 
 
 
Slightly more ODPs agreed with this statement than anaesthetists, with 86% of 
ODPs that had participated in the VASER study agreeing compared to 50% of ODPs 
that did not participate. 
 
Question 12: I would welcome the addition of new technology in anaesthetic 
practice which is designed to reduce the chance of medication errors 
 
 
 
While all of the anaesthetists that did not participate in the VASER study agreed 
with this statement only 40% of those participated in the study did. The level of 
agreement within the ODP groups were comparable, however the level of 
disagreement was confined to those ODPs who had participated in the VASER study. 
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5.5.2 Qualitative Results 
5.5.2.1  Drug Error in Anaesthesia  
Occurrence of Drug Error 
There was general consensus among both professional groups that drug errors do 
ŚĂƉƉĞŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƐŝĂ ? “I think without a doubt drug errors do happen, we 
know that right the way across hospitals, as anaesthetists we are going to be no 
different ? ?ŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?, Interview], this theme was consistent with the 
perception of error theme found in my previous research (Chapter 4).  
There was the overall perception that errors were quite common, one of the 
anaesthetists suggested that anaesthetists were probably more prone to making 
errors due to the relatively high number of injectable drugs given in a short space of 
time. There was also, however, the perception that drug errors were also under 
recognised and under reported,  “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇ
ƵŶĚĞƌƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ? [Anaesthetist 10, Interview],  “ƌƌŽƌƐ
ƚŚĂƚŐŽƵŶŶŽƚŝĐĞĚŽƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ/ ?ŵƐƵƌĞƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?[Anaesthetist 
03, Interview]. 
ŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĂƚĂǁĂƐĂǀĞƌǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚŚĞŵĞƚŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ĞƌƌŽƌ
ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? ?dŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚŝƐŝŶŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝů ?ƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƌƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐĚƌƵŐĐĂŵĞƚŽďĞŝŶŐ
administered to the patient the more serious the error was deemed to be by the 
participants. If the error was picked up when the drug was not in immediate danger 
ŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂŶ ‘ĞƌƌŽƌ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶĂ ‘ŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐ ? “If you 
notice the mistake and throw the syringe away before it gets anywhere near a 
patient then that is not a near miss ? ?ŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?, FG1]. However the closer to 
the patient, in actual distance, the incorrect drug came to being administered the 
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more likely it was seen as a near miss or an actual error and subsequently reported 
 “/ƚĐŽŵĞƐĚŽǁŶƚŽŚŽǁĐůŽƐĞǇŽƵĂƌĞƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƌƌŽƌĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚ
ďĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG1]. 
Within the focus groups and the interviews we had no one that believed drug errors 
did not occur within anaesthesia, however as previously shown this is contrary to 
the error questionnaire results.  
 
Causes of Drug Error  
There was a general consensus amongst the participants that they believed time 
pressure was a significant cause of error in anaesthetic practice. The pressure to 
keep the theatre lists running was a significant cause of concern; one participant 
described one theatre list where they were left little or no preparation time,  “/ǁĂƐ
thinking of time pressure such as a busy elective list, rushing ƚŽŬĞĞƉƵƉ ?ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ ?ƌĞũƵƐƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŽƵƚ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǇŽƵ ?ƌĞ
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŽǀĞƌƌƵŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƐƚŝůůďĞŝŶŐƐĞŶƚĨŽƌ ?[Anaesthetist 2, FG1].  The strains 
currently being put on teams was also put forward as a cause for error  “ƚŝŵĞ
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚƚĞĂŵŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŽƵŶǁŝŶĚŵĞŶƚĂůůǇŝŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĂƐĞƐ ?
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
 
Another potential cause of error emerging from the discussions was lack of 
familiarity or experience. Drawing up infusions that were not commonly used 
within theatre was highlighted as a potential source of error,  “>ĂĐŬŽĨĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƚǇ
ŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƚǀĞƌǇŽĨƚĞŶ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG2]. 
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Error were perceived as more preventable the more experienced the anaesthetist 
or ODP was, one anaesthetist suggested that  “ĂůŽƚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐĞƐ
ĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG2] while 
another anaesthetist commented that with greater experience the anaesthetist 
would be more likely to have the  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƐŬŝůůƐƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŽƌŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĂƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. 
Finally, the point was put forward that similarity of drug packaging or ampoules 
could be a further source for error,  “ďŽǆĞƐůŽŽŬǀĞƌǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚĞǇ, one box of 
something looks very similar to another box of something or the ampoules change 
ĂŶĚůŽŽŬǀĞƌǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG2],  “ǁĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĚƌƵŐƐůŽŽŬ
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ďŽǆĞƐůŽŽŬƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?[Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. 
 
5.5.2.2  The SAFERsleep ? system  
Advantages 
One of the main benefits of the SAFERsleep ? system was the design of the whole 
package. Participants remarked on the advantages of using the specifically designed 
drug trays, the pre-filled drugs and their storage in purposely designed drawer 
units;  “ƚŚĞƉůĂƐƚŝĐƚƌĂǇƐǁĞƌĞďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚ ?ŬĞƉƚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐǀĞƌǇƚŝĚǇ ? [ODP2, FG1] 
 
The belief was that pre-filled drugs removed the possibility of drawing up the wrong 
drug in the first place,  “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉƌĞ-filled syringes we can have the better, 
ĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚǁŝůůƐƚŽƉŵĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞĞƌƌŽƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂŶĞƌƌŽƌƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞ
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽƌǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚƚƵƌŶŽǀĞƌ ? [Anaesthetist 
10, Interview]; one of the main causes of drug error sited in the literature. The use 
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of prefilled syringes was also perceived as time saving,  “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚŝĚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵ
a very big fan of pre-filled, um pre-ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƐǇƌŝŶŐĞƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞĞƌƌŽƌƐĂŶĚŝƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĚŽĞƐƐĂǀĞƚŝŵĞ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG1]. In fact the 
whole system was seen as allowing more time to be spent with the patient, this 
seemed in part to be related to the automation of the anaesthetic record,  “/
thought the electronic one was very accurate, timely and um it took us off to do 
other things rather than focus on putting down different parameters, so I thought it 
ǁĂƐĂǀĞƌǇƵƐĞĨƵůĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG1]. 
Several ODPs commented that they liked the audible feature of the SAFERsleep ? 
system; the name of the drug was articulated as the drug was passed over the bar-
code scanner. From their point of view it improved their working relationship with 
the anaesthetist  “/ĨǇŽƵĐĂŶŚĞĂƌƚŚŝŶŐƐďĞŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŶŝƚďƌŝŶŐƐǇŽƵĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ
anaeƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?[ODP 3, FG1]. One ODP illustrated this by describing a situation where 
an anaesthetist had been giving lots of drugs in quick succession, but not telling the 
ODP what was going on. They said they had felt like a spectator, however with the 
SAFERsleep ? system they felt it was possible to gain a greater insight into the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨĚƌƵŐƐďĞŝŶŐƐĐĂŶŶĞĚ ? 
 
There were a couple of themes from my first study (Chapter 4) that were also 
evident in this analysis. Firstly that the anaesthetists found it more acceptable to 
use SAFERsleep ? system when double checking drugs than having to find a second 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽĐŚĞĐŬ “/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐĂďĞƚƚĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐĚŽƵďůĞĐŚĞĐŬĞĚ ? 
[Anaesthetist 2, FG1]. Secondly, although the anaesthetists believed the 
SAFERsleep ? system would not eliminate drug errors completely, it would go some 
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way to reducing the incidence of drug error in anaesthesia;  “hƐŝŶŐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵůŝŬĞ
s^ZǁŽƵůĚƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĚƌƵŐĞƌƌŽƌďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ
disaƉƉĞĂƌ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1] another anaesthetist commented that  “/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚƐǇƐƚĞŵŐĞƚƐǇŽƵŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĂƚƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ?Ƶƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?Ɛ
more accurate ? ?naesthetist 10, Interview]. 
 
Disadvantages 
Due to the nature of the study, there was a steep learning curve for both the 
anaesthetists and ODPs to master in a short space of time. The nature of the hi-
fidelity scenarios and the introduction of the SAFERsleep ? system were at times 
described as demanding  “/ ?ĚůŝŬĞƚŽƐĞĞŝƚǁŽƌŬŝŶĂůĞƐƐƐƚƌĞƐƐĨƵůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?Ɛ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŵĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŵĞ ? [Anaesthetist 3, Interview]. This led the 
SAFERsleep ? system to be described as more of a distraction than a help at times. 
KŶĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ “/ǁĂƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƋƵŝƚĞŽǀĞƌůŽĂĚĞĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ? 
[Anaesthetist 5, Interview], due to having to take in a lot of new information 
quickly.  
 
Another barrier discussed was that in order for the system to act as a double check 
of the drugs it is necessary to scan the syringe prior to administration. Several 
anaesthetists commented that this felt unnatural but was something they believed 
would change over time with familiarity of use. The interface of the system also 
caused concerns. The SAFERsleep ? system did on several occasions double swipe 
the drug; this meant that two entries for one drug administration were inputted 
onto the anaesthetic record  “,ĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƐĐĂŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƵƐĞĐŽĚĞƐĨŽƌ
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everything else was a nightmare as it kept scanning the same thing over and over 
again for lines ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG1].  This subsequently meant the anaesthetic 
record had to be edited to show accurate drug administration. It was an obvious 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞǀĞƌĂůĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝt happened 
so frequently, it was becoming an irritating distraction,  “/ ?ŵƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƐŽƌƚŽĨƵƐĞƌ
ŝŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞǁŽƵůĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨŵǇĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
[Anaesthetist 3, Interview], moving on from this there were comments made about 
the accuracy of the subsequent anaesthetic record within both focus groups. One 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “I Found it sometimes did double swipe 
ĂŶĚ/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƐƵƌĞŝĨŝƚƉŝĐŬed up the drug every time ? ?naesthetist 1, FG1], whereas 
a concern raised in the second focus group was the potential requirement to 
continuously annotate the chart  “So it would potentially create more work for us in 
that we would perhaps annotate the electronic record to explain the fact that being 
ĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2], as well as the belief that the electronic record 
would not be a truthful reflection of the patients physiological monitoring  “/ǁŽƵůĚ
still want to make sure that what was happening in reality was being reflected 
ƚƌƵƚŚĨƵůůǇŽŶƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĐŚĂƌƚ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG2]. 
 
5.5.2.3  Reporting of Drug Errors in Anaesthesia  
One of the major overarching themes emerging from my analysis was the 
reluctance to report drug errors using the national critical incident reporting system. 
I was actually quite surprised by the underlying strength of feeling. I have sub 
divided this theme into the following categories; reluctance to report, 
recriminations of reporting and feedback.  
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Reluctance to report 
There was a palpable reluctance to use the current reporting system within both 
professional groups. This reluctance however was not apparent in the error 
questionnaire results, where there was a strong belief that drug errors should be 
reported, even when those errors are caught and corrected, or presented no 
immediate harm to the patient.  
The general consensus for this reluctance, within the focus group discussions, was 
due to the distinct lack of feedback when incidents are reported and the lost 
opportunity to learn.  
 
Several participants thought that people should be allowed to make one mistake 
before being reported  “ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞŽŶĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? 
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1],  “/Ĩŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞŝƚŝƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ŝĨŝƚ ?ƐĂƐĞĐŽŶĚŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŝƚ ?Ɛ
probaďůǇĂƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ? [ODP2, FG1] but the subsequent debate on how anyone would 
know when or whether this was a first mistake did not produce any concrete 
resolutions.  
 
Several participants also believed that if a mistake was noticed before reaching the 
patient it did noƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?ĂŐĂŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞ ‘ĞƌƌŽƌ
ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? ?“ŝĨŝƚǁĂƐĂŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐƚŚĞŶŶŽ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ? [ODP2, 
FG1], however there did seem to be a feeling of slight confusion over what was a 
reportable incident, as one anaesthetist commented  “ŝƚ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶƚŽ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG2]. 
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 There was also strong support for a more informal approach to error management; 
one ODP stated  “/ƚŚŝŶŬŝĨ/ĨĞůƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĐŽƵůĚďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂŶĚĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚ ?ǁŝƚh 
ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŚĞŶŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?[ODP2, FG1], 
while another ODP said  “ŝĨ/ƐĂǁŽŶĞ/ǁŽƵůĚĨůĂŐŝƚƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚďƵƚ/
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƌĞƉŽƌƚŝƚ ?[ODP1, FG1]. Only if the individual showed no sign of recognition 
or remorse would they go on to report it  “ŝƚ ?ƐĚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?
ŚŽǁƚŚĞǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽŝƚ ? [ODP2, FG1].  
 
In a similar finding to my previous study (Chapter 4), several participants thought 
that drug errors within anaesthesia did not cause significant patient harm;  “ĂůŽƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞŶŽĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? [Anaesthetist 5, Interview], 
 “/ ?ǀĞŚĂĚĚƌƵŐĞƌƌŽƌƐƚŚĂƚ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚǁĞƌĞŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŶĚ/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŵ ?
[Anaesthetist 2, Interview]; this could possibly be one explanation for the 
reluctance in incident reporting. 
 
The perception of the severity of the error, in the view of the anaesthetist or ODP, 
appeared to be the deciding factor as to whether the error was reportable or not. 
There was a general consensus that every little error did not need to be reported 
and if an untoward event was justifiable as part of the anaesthetic this also would 
not be reported. 
 
Several participants thought that it was appropriate to report an incident if there 
was a lack of insight shown by the person making the error. If, though the error was 
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acknowledged or there was remorse shown by the individual, this was a significant 
response and the error was seen as being adequately dealt with. 
Another participant did believe that they thought reporting at a local level was 
more acceptable than to an outside department;  “ĂƚĂĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂůŽƌůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞů
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŽŬƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐĞŶĚŝŶŐŝƚŽĨĨƚŽĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞĨĂƌĂǁĂǇƚŽďĞƚŽůĚŽĨĨ ? 
[Anaesthetist 1, FG1]. 
 
Recriminations 
The perceived punitive response to error seems to be deep seated and quite 
evident in all of the discussions. Several participants thought that the reporting 
process was not constructive but was used as tool to punish those who made 
mistakes. One anaesthetist commented that the lack of reporting might be down to 
 “Ŷot wanting to be suspended or hauled in front of the clinical director or you know, 
ŚĂǀĞǇŽƵƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƐŽƌƚŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐŽ ?ƐĞůĨƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ? 
[Anaesthetist 3, FG2] ,  “ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚĂƌŶŝƐŚĞĚǁŝth the error if incident reports are 
ƵƐĞĚ ?[ODP2, FG1] while an ODP suggested that they were  “ƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚƵďŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂƐĨĞĞůƐůŝŬĞďĞŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĂďŽǆĂŶĚďĞĂƚĞŶĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? [ODP3, FG1]. Another ODP discussed the negative experience they had 
ďĞĞŶƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚĞƌƌŽƌƐ ? “I have been twice 
ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞĚŽǀĞƌǁŚǇ/ŚĂǀĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ? [ODP 3, FG1]. This was also 
evident when the system was the cause of the fault. 
The impression was that reporting would improve if there was a more discernable 
electronic method of recording and reporting the information  “ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂ
few changes in the last three or four years, people have lost track of where and 
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when to report but once that becomes filtered into one recognisable electronic 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚǁŝůůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ? [Anaesthetist 5, Interview]. 
 
Feedback 
The widely held view seemed to be that once incidents were reported the 
information was not utilised any further and there was little feedback, one 
anaesthetist commented that  “/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŐĞƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ
ĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?[Anaesthetist 3, FG2 ]. 
 
There were several comments from participants that they had not received 
feedback following the submission of a critical incident form; one anaesthetist 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞ “Ĩilled out a form and nothing ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?[Anaesthetist 
2, FG2] while another stated that  “zŽƵƐĞŶĚŝƚŽĨĨĂŶĚŝƚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ? [Anaesthetist 3, 
FG2], this appeared to be a consistent theme across both professional groups as an 
ODP also commented  “/ ?ǀĞŶŽƚŚĂĚĂŶǇĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬĨƌŽŵĂŶǇĨŽƌŵƐ/ ?ǀĞƉƵƚŝŶ ? [ODP1, 
FG2 ? ?KŶĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚǁĞŶƚĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ “if you used the critical incident 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĞŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŐĞƚĂŶǇĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ?[Anaesthetist 1, 
FG1]. 
 
One anaesthetist suggested that the lack of feedback impacted on the use of the 
reporting system  “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞƐĞĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
ĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ? [Anaesthetist 10, Interview]. There was also the belief 
that this led to a lost opportunity for teaching and learning  “/ƐŝƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽ
debrief the individual and be used for teaching or is it just going to be reported and 
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ŶŽƚƵƐĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ? [ODP2, FG1] as one anaesthetist pointed out a reporting system 
should be used for  “WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŝƐƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ůƐĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ
ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĨƵƚƵƌĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. 
 
5.5.2.4  Culture  
dŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ ‘ƐĂĨĞƚǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶŵǇƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?Chapter 4) and 
this was explored further here. Despite the increased attention on safety culture 
over the last decade, and the need to recognise the part the system plays in the 
origin of error, there still seems to be a person-centred approach to why the error 
occurred. Several participants believed they worked within a strong blame culture 
ĂŶĚŽŶĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚknow maybe a bit 
ŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƉůĞĂƐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 3, FG2]. Another prominent theme was 
that the organisation should take more responsibility to prevent errors occurring, 
one anaesthetist suggested that  “/ŶĂŶǇŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǇŽƵĚĞƐŝŐŶƚhe 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG ? ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ
happening and that one of the failures of the organisation in preventing errors was 
that it was  “ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 2, FG2]. 
 
There was a concern raised by a couple of the participants that the reporting 
system was used inappropriately due to the intrinsic blame culture of the 
organisation. One anaesthetist suggested that  “we have to be cautious though that 
ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƚƵƌŶƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŽǀŝŐŝůantes reporting every possible error or near miss as it 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƉŽŝŶƚůĞƐƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? [Anaesthetist 1, FG1] while another suggested this 
already happened to some extent  “ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŶĂǁĨƵůůŽƚŽĨŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŽƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
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ƉƌŽďĂďůǇŝƐŶ ?ƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚƌƵĞŶĞĂƌmisses or incidences, more of a way for staff to 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽƌŐƌŝĞǀĂŶĐĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?[Anaesthetist 2, FG2] the 
worry of this was that it had the effect of diluting the important messages that 
could be learnt from the true incidents or errors. 
 
5.5.3 Borg Workload Scores 
Workload scores were measured for 10 anaesthetists. An average of five workload 
scores were collected per scenario. Table 4 shows the highest, mean and lowest 
ŽƌŐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚƐĐŽƌĞƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ ?dŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ƐĞůĨƌĂƚed scores were compared 
against the observer scores. Apart from the highest score results (P - 0.005), we 
could find no difference between the anaesthetist and the observer ratings. 
 
Table 6: Borg Workload Scores 
Data are presented as Median [IQR] *P - 0.005  
Borg Workload 
Scores 
Using SAFERsleep ?System Using Conventional Methods 
Anaesthetist 
self reported 
Observers 
Evaluation 
Anaesthetist 
self reported 
Observers 
Evaluation 
Highest  16 [15,17] 15* [14,16] 15 [14,16] 14.5 [13,15] 
Mean 13 [12,15] 13 [12,14] 12 [12,14] 12 [12,13] 
Lowest 12 [11,13] 12 [11,12] 12 [10,12] 12 [11,12] 
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The box plot shown in Graph 1 represents the highest, mean and lowest scores 
recorded by the observer, the yellow boxes showing the scores recorded during the 
conventional method, while the green boxes represent those recorded during the 
SAFERsleep ? system scenarios, on analysis we could again find no difference in 
scores between the two methods. 
 
Figure 12: Highest, Mean and Lowest Borg Workload scores of the anaesthetist as 
rated by the observer  
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5.6 Discussion 
This study was designed to explore, in greater depth, cultural issues surrounding 
drug error in anaesthesia and the barriers, benefits and potential impact of 
introducing technology into clinical practice, such as increased workload for the 
anaesthetist.  
I found that although there was the general perception that errors do occur within 
anaesthesia, there was still the perception that these do not cause significant harm 
and the majority do not need to be reported. I found many similarities to my first 
study (Chapter 4); however the main difference was the reluctance to report drug 
errors when they did occur. 
Anaesthetists disagreed, more than the ODPs, that technology would prevent drug 
errors in anaesthetic practice, however over half of the anaesthetists and ODPs 
questioned said they would welcome new technology that was designed to reduce 
drug error. Several anaesthetists commented that the SAFERsleep ? system was a 
distraction; however I found no difference between the Borg Workload scores 
during the scenario using SAFERsleep ? compared to the scenario using 
conventional methods of anaesthesia. 
 
5.6.1 Errors 
There was consensus among both professional groups that drug errors do occur 
within anaesthesia.  ODPs ? believed drug errors were more common than 
anaesthetists however both groups did agree that drug errors, when they did occur, 
caused significant harm. As previously discussed (Chapter 1) the incidence of error 
within anaesthesia has been reported as high as 1:133 anaesthetics.
88
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/ŶĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ
ďǇƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨŵĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĞƌƌŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
anaesthetists compared to the ODPs. The ODPs remained neutral on this subject; 
this may in part be due to the wording of the question. The responsibility of the 
ODP is not to prepare or administer drugs during an anaesthetic as this is the role of 
the anaesthetist.  
There was a high level of agreement, from both professional groups, with the 
statement that failing to record a drug given during an anaesthetic constituted an 
error.  Errors of omission have previously been implicated in twice as many 
medication errors compared to errors of commission,
234
 so it was encouraging to 
find that both professional groups believed them to be reportable events.  
There have been many ways described in the literature to prevent drug errors.
28 88 
90 235
 One of the questions put to the participants was whether the use of pre-
labelled, pre-filled syringes for parental administration should be adopted. The 
majority of participants agreed with this statement, with the ODPs slightly more in 
favour. Within the review by Jensen and colleagues
90
 utilising prefilled syringes 
within anaesthesia was listed as ninth on the list of recommendations to prevent 
drug errors. Other authors suggested that through using prefilled syringes it would 
virtually guarantee the accuracy of labelling and would facilitate the use of highly 
legible, printed labels, reducing the risk of medication error.
90 100 236
  
Time pressure was put forward as one of the major causes of drug error within 
anaesthesia; this has previously been cited within the literature (Chapter 1). 
Abeysekera and Colleagues
28
 suggested that ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ ?ŵĂǇůĞĂĚƚŽ
short-cutting of usual checking routines, while Hintong and Colleagues
79
 found that 
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haste was one of the most common contributing factors to error in anaesthesia.
28 79
 
The main issue I found ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞ ‘ƚŝŵĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ? ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ
ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞůŝƐƚƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƐŵŽŽƚŚůǇĂŶĚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ?KŶĞ
participant described the next patient being sent for while they were still taking the 
previous patient round to the recovery unit, they stated that this had put increased 
pressure on them while they were preparing the drugs that would be needed for 
the next patient. They went on to comment that they had had no time to collect 
ƚŚĞŝƌƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĂ ‘ƉůĂŶ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĐĂƐĞ ? 
 
The proximity of the drug error to the patient seemed to be the deciding factor in 
whether an error was reportable or not. If the error was noticed while the drug was 
being drawn up, the general consensus was this was not a reportable incident. 
Webster and Colleagues
88
  commented that picking up the wrong syringe might be 
thought so common place as not to merit reporting. However, I found that if the 
drug was very close to being given to a patient, especially if the syringe was 
attachĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂŶŶƵůĂďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĞƌƌŽƌǁĂƐĚĞƚĞĐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚŝƐďĞĐĂŵĞĞŝƚŚĞƌ
ĂŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐŽƌĂŶĂĐƚƵĂůŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?/ĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞĂƌŵŝƐƐ ?ǁĂƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŶƚŚŝƐĂůƐŽ
influenced whether the incident was reported or not.  
 
5.6.2 Reporting 
Since the introduction of the NRLS, generic for all specialities in the NHS, by the 
NPSA in 2001 over 4 million incidents have been reported.
52
 One of the 
fundamental beliefs for reporting incidents is that safety can be improved through 
learning from incidents and near misses, rather than denying their occurrence.
48
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The importance of incident reporting has been acknowledged previously, however 
several authors have found under-reporting to be a common problem.
57 237 238
 
Underreporting was a theme that emerged from my analysis; however I found 
contradictory evidence between the focus group and interview data and the error 
questionnaire data. Although there was a high level of agreement within the 
questionnaire data that drug errors which are caught and corrected need to be 
reported, this was not evident in the analysis of the interview or focus group 
transcripts. There was a similar finding for failing to record a medication on the 
anaesthetic chart. Within the focus group data, several anaesthetists suggested that 
drugs were not recorded on the anaesthetic chart due to the chart being a dual 
speciality document. One anaesthetist gave the example of where a surgeon had 
taken the record to write up the surgical notes and this had meant that any drugs 
given in the last ten minutes of the operation were unintentionally missed off the 
chart. Another anaesthetist commented that a nurse from the recovery unit had 
come round to the theatre to find out if a patient had been given a particular drug 
that had not been documented on the chart. This omission was not reported, and 
from the discussions this appeared to be a common occurrence. Omissions of 
recording drugs on the anaesthetic chart were only reported when they had led to 
an actual error, for example the patient had received the same drug twice in too 
short a time period. 
 
One of the deciding factors in whether an error or near miss should be reported 
appeared to be the perceived seriousness of the mistake. Smith and colleagues 
228
 
reasoned that the hallmark of expert anaesthetic practice is having the skill to 
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ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƐŝĂŝƐ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?Žƌ
 ‘ĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐŝŶƚƵƌŶĚĞĨŝŶĞƐƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇŽĨƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?/ŶĂ
later publication Smith and colleagues 
237
 ƚĞƌŵƐƚŚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƐĞƚ ?Žƌŝŵpose a 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƌŽƵƚŝŶĞŽƌĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƐ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ĂŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
expertise in anaesthesia brings with it the authority to define the boundaries 
between routine and critical but also between acceptable and unacceptable.  
Another reason put forward that influenced the enthusiasm to report was the lack 
of feedback received by participants. This issue has previously been reported in the 
literature by Evans and colleagues; 
239
 who found that two thirds of respondents, to 
a survey of 186 doctors and 587 nurses, cited lack of feedback as the greatest 
deterrent to reporting. In this study several of the participants noted that they had 
received no feedback to any of the incident forms they had submitted. One 
anaesthetist commented that if you did report an incident, following the correct 
procedure, the individual concerned would have no feedback and no opportunity to 
learn from it. While another commented that despite a drug error occurring on the 
Intensive Care Unit, within the same hospital, very few anaesthetists had heard 
about it. The same error reoccurred within the anaesthetic department, which they 
suggested could have been prevented if there had been feedback within the Trust 
to all departments, rather than only to the department involved. Benn and 
colleagues
240
 suggested that a vital aspect to promote future reporting is to ensure 
ongoing feedback. However, as seen within the results of this study, the 
relationship between reporting an incident and receiving any sort of response or 
follow-up is often lengthy and questionable.
52
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The potential for recriminations following the reporting of an incident was put 
forward as a barrier to reporting. One participant suggested that errors may not be 
reported because the anaesthetist does not want to appear stupid, especially if it 
could be deemed a silly mistake. This corresponds to the notion that only bad 
doctors make mistakes.
52
 In this study in line with previous literature,
241-244
 there 
was the perception within both professional groups that reporting was punitive, not 
constructive, and that their career would be tarnished if they reported an error.  
One participant described the process as being taken into a box and beaten. A 
Previous study found that the potential for blame influenced the level of reporting. 
This idea was more dominant if the reports were to be reviewed by someone 
outside anaesthetic practice. This may go some way to explain the under-utilisation 
ŽĨƚŚĞEW^ ?ƐNZ>^ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶďĞŝŶŐ ‘ůŽƐƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝŶĐŝdent.237   
In response to underreporting within anaesthesia, the RCoA, AAGBI and the NPSA 
have developed a speciality-specific critical incident reporting system. Reported 
incidents through this system will be reviewed by professionals and independent 
experts, and acted upon promptly. The intention of the group is to disseminate 
summary reports of the analysis regularly to all clinicians, thus providing the much 
needed feedback directly to those who report the incidents.
63
  
 
5.6.3 Technology 
Within healthcare, information technology has been described as a revolutionary 
force bringing about drastic changes in patient care.
245
 However, one of the 
recommendations made from my previous study was to further investigate the 
impact of introducing technology, designed to reduce drug errors, on the 
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ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ/ĨŽƵŶĚĂŵŝǆĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
questions related to technology within the error questionnaire, this was also 
reflected in the focus group discussions. There was a strong distrust of technology 
within the focus group of anaesthetists and ODPs who had not participated in the 
VASER study. It was difficult though to say whether this was due to lack of 
familiarity or more to do with a perceived loss of control over the subsequent 
anaesthetic record. The response within the interviews however was positive and 
all of the participants thought that the introduction of technology would have a 
constructive impact on their clinical practice.  
 
5.6.3.1  Computerised anaesthetic records 
Less than half the anaesthetist thought that anaesthetic records should be 
computerised, there was a similar response from the ODPs. There was also more 
reluctance to adopt a computerised anaesthetic record by the anaesthetist that had 
not previously used it. This may suggest that they had pre-conceived ideas about 
how the system collected and collated the data rather than how it actually worked 
in practice.  
The main concern was that electronic version would not be an accurate record and 
would need annotating to ensure that the chart reflected what had truly happened 
in clinical practice. Discrepancies between what gets recorded retrospectively and 
what actually happened are well known in anaesthesia.
235
 Previous studies have 
shown that the hand written anaesthetic record can, and often is, subject to the 
 ‘ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŽĨƐŵŽŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?.246-249 Smoothing has been described as due to three 
possible causes; firstly averaging the physiological monitor readings of a given 
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variable when a single reading is unexpectedly out of range; secondly ignoring an 
aberrant reading or thirdly recording a high pressure a bit lower and lower 
pressures a bit higher.
246
 The resulting anaesthetic chart has previously been 
described as showing what the anaesthetist wishes it to show rather than what the 
monitor recorded.
246
 Other studies have demonstrated discrepancies between 
handwritten records and automatically generated records, with the times of 
induction and emergence being the most commonly occurring errors in accurate 
recording.
245 248
 Reich and colleagues
248
 went as far as suggesting that some of the 
physiological data in the handwritten records were inaccurate. The main concern of 
the anaesthetists appeared to be related to how they were judged as practitioners 
should the charts be reviewed by someone outside of the anaesthetic community. 
dŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚĂŶ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŵŝŶŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ
be seen as failing to look after the patient adequately.  
 
5.6.3.2  Prevention of Drug errors 
Two thirds of the anaesthetists and half of the ODPs thought that new technology 
would not prevent drug errors in anaesthetic practice. However in a recent study by 
Webster and colleagues
250
  they suggested that the multiple checking techniques of 
the SAFERsleep ? system may make undetected events less likely to occur than with 
conventional methods.  
 
The main obstacle described by the participants was remembering to scan the drug 
prior to administration, enabling the system to double check the drug. This was 
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recounted as feeling unnatural, although the general consensus was that it would 
improve over time. The potential for professionals using work-arounds with 
technology has been previously reported in the literature and briefly discussed in 
Chapter 4. Work-arounds mostly occur when the member of staff feels there is a 
block in the system that is hampering their ability to do their job. Work-arounds can 
also potentially create more holes in the system. Each workaround represents a 
ůĂƚĞŶƚǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĂĨĞƚǇƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĐĂŶŝŶƚƵƌŶůĞĂĚƚŽ ‘ĂůůƚŚĞƐůŝĐĞƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ^ǁŝƐƐĐŚĞĞƐĞĂůŝŐŶŝŶŐ ? ?,ĂůďĞƐůĞďĞŶĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂůƐŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶŽŶĞ
work-around occurs it may lead the health care professional to engage in other 
unsafe practices.
230
 Webster and colleagues
250
 found a similar problem, the only 
drug errors reported were when the principle of scanning prior to administration 
was violated. They concluded that it was possible to assume that if the anaesthetist 
had complied with the requirement of the system to scan before administration, all 
or most of the 19 reported incidents related to clearly documented violations might 
have been avoided.
250
  
 
5.6.3.3  Distractions 
Several anaesthetists commented that data entry into the SAFERsleep ? system was 
distracting and became a source of frustration. One anaesthetist commented 
because it was a new task, any slight distraction had a much bigger impact. 
Distractions have been implicated as a cause of medication error previously in the 
literature. More recently distraction was cited as the cause of a fatal drug error on a 
neo-natal ward in July 2010, in Nottingham.
251
  Returning a narrative verdict, the 
Coroner said: "There's no doubt that a dreadful mistake took place but drug errors 
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are more common than we know, in this case there were two people that made a 
drug error because of ĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?252 
 
Westbrook and colleagues
253
 found that the more interruptions nurses received 
during medication administration, the greater the number of errors. Additionally, 
they found that the greater the number of interruptions, within a single drug 
administration, the more severe the error.
253
 Previous studies utilising the 
SAFERsleep ? system have found a similar problem relating to distraction, around 
the use of the barcode scanner. Houliston
254
 suggested this might be due to 
inconvenience of having to pass the syringe over the bar code scanner and wait for 
it to be read, as well as the requirement for exact positioning of the label in order 
for it to be  ‘ƐĞĞŶ ?ďǇƚŚĞƐĐĂŶŶĞƌ ? 
 
Previous studies have shown that when technology has been integrated into 
anaesthetic practice the anaesthetic process is not necessarily faster, but the 
workflow and time constraints are altered. Also discussed was the worry that the 
entry of data into the electronic system may distract from the core principle of 
continually focusing on the patient. The concern then is that the anaesthetist 
spends more time interfacing with the computer than the patient.
245
  
 
5.6.4 Workload 
Workload has been described by Leedal and Smith as  “ĂĚǇŶĂŵŝĐďĂůĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨĂƚĂƐŬĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĂƚƚĂƐŬ ?.172 Due to the 
complexity and multiple dimensions, workload is affected by external 
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circumstances both within the environment and from existing perceptions, 
organisational dynamics and emotional factors.
255
 Weinger and colleagues
255
 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚǁŽƌŬƐĂƐ “ĂĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ?ŚŝŐŚ-
technology, high workload, high-ƌŝƐŬƚĂƐŬĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĞǇŐŽ onto say that this 
can result in even the smallest of equipment or human failings having a disastrous 
consequence.  
 
A further definition of mental workload has been provided by Byrne and 
colleagues,
256
 ƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŵĞŶƚĂůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƐƚŚĞ “ĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŵĞŶƚal effort 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂŶǇŐŝǀĞŶƚĂƐŬ ?. They go onto say that there is a limit to an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐŵĞŶƚĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?dŚĞ
proportion of the mental capacity in use at any given time is dependent on the task 
being performed.
256
   
 
The importance of measuring mental workload is a high priority within many high 
risk industries due to the impact on safety. Increased mental workload can have a 
direct influence on the occurrence of error and poor performance.
177
 Weinger and 
Englund
188
 suggested that, as the workload increased for the anaesthetist, high 
priority would be given to primary functions compared to  secondary functions, 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ůŽĂĚƐŚĞĚĚŝŶŐ ?. They also suggested that individual tasks (especially those 
involved in gathering information) would tend to be performed for longer periods 
(i.e. longer than average dwell times). In a survey of 279 anaesthetists, carried out 
by Gaba and colleagues,
257
 63% of respondents suggested that they had made 
errors because of workload.  
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It has been suggested that the more experienced the individual anaesthetist is, the 
greater their ability to deal with increased workload. Weinger and colleagues
181
  
proposed that this is due to experienced anaesthetists having better resource 
allocation and therefore are less strongly influenced by workload, while Leedal & 
Smith
172
 ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƐƚĂĨĨĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽƐŚŽǁ ‘ƐƉĂƌĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ŝŶ
performance during routine cases, which they suggested allows an attentional 
 ‘ƐĂĨĞƚǇŵĂƌŐŝŶ ?ƚŽŚĂŶĚůe any adverse events should they arise.172 181 The 
anaesthetists that participated in the scenarios were Consultant Anaesthetists and 
Senior Trainee Anaesthetists. Both scenarios had scripted challenges throughout, 
designed to increase both mental and physical workload. Each scenario continued 
until surgery had finished and the anaesthetist had decided a post operative 
management plan. The length of the scenarios ranged from 45 minutes to 1 hour 
and 25 minutes depending upon how the anaesthetist responded to the different 
challenges within the scenarios. In order to assess workload the anaesthetists were 
ĂƐŬĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŶŐƚŽĂ ‘ǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞůŝŐŚƚ ?
placed on the anaesthetic machine, designed to illuminate intermittently. The 
anaesthetic record completion and the vigilance light were designed as secondary 
tasks, but the participants were not made aware of this. 
 
Leedal & Smith
172
 described the benefits of introducing a performance based 
measurement as giving a measure of capability for the main task of interest, and 
where a secondary task is introduced, as within this study, a measure of spare 
capacity. A disadvantage of this measure is the ability to determine the increases or 
decreases in workload if the individual compensates with increased or decreased 
181 
 
effort respectively.
172
 Another possible limitation is that the secondary task may 
actually interfere with the primary task.
258
 Therefore the measurement of 
performance on the main task will give an indication of the anĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚ ?
but it is not possible to assume that as workload increases performance 
deteriorates. 
 
5.6.4.1  Borg Workload Scale 
The Borg workload scale was used to rate workload within this study. The scale has 
been used previously to rate anaesƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚďǇtĞŝŶŐĞƌĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ.181 
186 255
 The scale ranges from 6 to 20 and has been found to correlate to a heart rate 
of 60-200 beats min¯¹,
182 259
 a score of 12 was roughly equal to the workload an 
anaesthetist would undergo at the time of a routine oral intubation.  
 
The advantages of using the Borg scale include the ease at which it can be 
implemented and its non-invasiveness. In light of results from previous research, 
the scale was used during the scenarios and not retrospectively, this ensured that 
any potential bias due to memory loss or superseding activities was removed.
178 187
 
The Borg workload scale [Appendix VIX] is asymmetrical to minimise the 
respondents grouping their replies at the centre or extremes of the scale, reducing 
bias that can be a blight of symmetrical numerical scales. In a similar finding to 
Weinger and colleagues,
255
 we found that real time subjective workload assessment 
was practical and minimally invasive during the scenarios. 
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A suggested disadvantage of the scale is that the more experienced the 
anaesthetist the more likely they are to underestimate workload in demanding 
experimental tasks.
259
   Weinger and colleagues
255
 found higher subjective 
workload scores from novices as opposed to experienced anaesthetists. Within our 
results we did not find any outstanding differences in Borg workload scores 
between the Consultants and the trainees, however all the trainee anaesthetists 
who participated were nearing completion of their training. The inclusion criteria of 
the study prevented novice anaesthetists taking part and so the results may have 
been similar to Weinger and colleagues
255
 findings if this group had participated. 
 
My observation ŽƌŐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚƐĐŽƌĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐƐĞůĨ
ratings for all but the highest scores. I found that I tended to underestimate the 
workload scores, which may suggest that workload for the anaesthetist at that 
point was more cognitive in value and so not obvious to me as an onlooker. I also 
found no difference in recorded workload between the SAFERsleep ? scenario 
compared to the conventional methods scenario, either for my ratings or the 
participant anaesthetists. This would suggest that despite the steep learning curve 
experienced by some of the anaesthetists in first using the SAFERsleep ? system it 
did not have a noticeable impact on their workload during the scenarios. 
 
I have also found that we are able to create scenarios that effectively constitute 
times of high and low workload; however the lowest workload scores were found 
to be higher than those recorded in previous studies observed during clinical 
practice. This may suggest that that within the simulation environment, 
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anaesthetists are waiting and preparing themselves for a critical event. This may be 
due to previous experiences of participating in simulation training exercises as all 
the anaesthetists who took part had been on at least one course within the 
ƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?^ĞǀĞƌĂůĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ “ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐďĂĚƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ?ŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚŝƐ ?ĚƵƌŝŶg the debriefing for 
both scenarios the anaesthetists were informed that the scenarios did not involve 
catastrophic events. 
 
5.7  Limitations 
There were a number of limitations within this study. Firstly it was a single centre 
study and so this could be seen as a limitation. Secondly, as with the previous study 
it was a sample of convenience. Anaesthetists within the anaesthetic department 
where I work volunteered to part of the study, and there is always the possibility 
that these may have been the more safety conscious individuals within the 
department. The anaesthetists also only had a short space of time to come to terms 
with the SAFERsleep ? system. I tried to mitigate this to some extent by providing 
training in how to use the system prior to the actual study day. 
Although cultural issues did come through within the focus groups nicely, the 
attitudes and beliefs of the participants were slightly different to those expressed in 
the questionnaire data. This leads me to believe that because the questionnaire 
was on such a small sample of people it may have been better omitted. 
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5.8  Conclusion 
In conclusion, drug errors within anaesthesia are recognized as a problem; however 
within this study there was an underlying belief that most do not cause serious 
patient harm. Working from the understanding that preventing error in medicine 
requires more than simply telling clinicians not to make mistakes, Merry and 
colleagues
100
 designed the SAFERsleep ? system as a package to prevent drug 
administration errors in anaesthesia. The SAFERsleep ? system has been designed 
to view errors and failures as evidence of faulty work systems that need to be re-
designed rather than due to weaknesses of the individual clinician.  My previous 
research evaluating the feasibility of introducing a double check into anaesthetic 
clinical practice (Chapter 4) found that using the SAFERsleep ? system was more 
readily accepted by anaesthetists than utilising a two person check.
260
 The potential 
ĨŽƌƵŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂŶĚĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ
when this technology is introduced however was not explored in that study.  
The results from this study have shown that, within the simulated environment, 
there was no difference in the workload scores of the anaesthetist when using the 
SAFERsleep ? system compared to standard conventional methods of anaesthesia. 
The simulated environment may however have unexpectedly and unintentionally 
raised the lowest Borg workload scores of the anaesthetists and the observer had 
the tendency to underestimate anĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƚŵŽƌĞƐƚƌĞƐƐĨƵůƚŝŵĞƐ ? 
The prominent theme emerging from this study was the reluctance to report errors 
when they occurred. This reluctance, alongside other factors such as lack of 
feedback and a perceived culture of blame may be one explanation for the 
apparent unwillingness to utilise critical incident reporting. The level of reporting in 
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an organisation has been correlated with the existing safety culture. Hutchinson 
and colleagues
261
 have suggested that higher reporting rates may be related to a 
more supportive and positive culture of safety, rather than a marker of less safe 
care. 
 
 Future studies need to explore further the organisations role is developing and 
promoting a more positive safety culture, whether through education, anonymous 
speciality specific reporting or timely feedback to enable learning from those errors 
which are reported.
52 63
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
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6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the attitudes and beliefs of 
anaesthetists in relation to drug errors in anaesthesia, the technology and systems 
designed to reduce such errors and the inherent culture that impacts on and 
influences the subsequent compliance with these proposals.  
 
Currently there has been little work carried out in the UK in relation to the use of 
double checking protocols, and despite Toft recommending the use of double 
checking protocols in preventing drug error, this recommendation appears to be 
based on opinion rather than fact. On closer inspection of the literature there is 
little concrete evidence to suggest the process of double checking actually reduces 
drug error. However there remains a need for a robust check that can be 
implemented within the NHS. As previously discussed (Chapter 1) manual double 
checking presently takes place on an ad hoc basis and technology specifically 
designed for use within anaesthesia has been developed, but is currently only 
installed within a very few NHS hospital Trusts.  
 
The first study detailed in this thesis (Chapter 4) was to explore the feasibility of 
introducing a double check methodology, either second-person confirmation or 
electronic confirmation into clinical practice within the NHS.  
 
Investigating two methods of double checking anaesthetic drugs given by injection 
was a priority area agreed by the NPSA ĂŶĚƚŚĞZŽĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
188 
 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝŵĞĚĂƚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĂĨĞƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
working directly with clinicians.  
 
This qualitative study involved seven NHS Trusts across the UK and evaluated the 
feasibility of introducing a manual second-person double check or an electronic bar-
code double check into clinical practice. This was the first study of this nature 
within the NHS and explored the attitudes, barriers and benefits of each method. 
Previous literature (Chapter 1) has recommended double checking as a way of 
preventing drug errors; however this study was the first to look at the feasibility of 
introducing a double check methodology into anaesthetic clinical practice within 
the NHS in the UK.  
 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggested that while many participants 
acknowledged that the checking of injectable medications by one of their 
colleagues was an important factor to minimise the opportunity of any unsafe 
medication administration, the process of second person confirmation could be 
prone to human manipulation. The findings also showed that the process of double 
checking could alter the behaviour and practice of the anaesthetist, resulting in a 
reluctance to adopt it. The electronic confirmation method, on the other hand, was 
more feasible as it did not rely on the presence of a second person at the time of 
drug administration. I found that it was more readily adopted by the anaesthetists, 
mainly due to the process seemingly being more intuitive to their current working 
practice. 
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The recommendations made from this study are that anaesthetists, and other 
professional groups, should give serious consideration to implementing methods of 
confirming the drugs administered during anaesthesia. However, if second person 
confirmation is being considered as the method for implementation then adequate 
resources in terms of time and personnel should be ensured. I found that despite 
both of the methods being perceived as being effective in preventing drug errors, 
the introduction of the two person drug confirmation in anaesthesia practice was at 
times difficult to achieve due to resource issues such as staffing and time allocation.  
 
For the second person confirmation to have any chance of success, it is critical that 
there should be active engagement with the clinicians who will be using it; this is to 
ensure that the impact on the existing working practices of the anaesthetist is 
determined and enables any anxieties to be resolved.  
 
A further recommendation, in relation to the electronic confirmation method, is to 
ensure careful planning at the outset to enable a smooth integration with the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ŽǁŶ
IT system. It is essential that adequate training is provided for staff, no matter 
which method is chosen to be introduced.  
 
The final recommendation for this study was that the implementation of confirming 
drug administration during anaesthesia should be accompanied by constant drive to 
improve the patient safety culture within the operating theatres. Kizer
262
 defined a 
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ƐĂĨĞƚǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂŶĚorganisational behaviour, 
based on a system of shared beliefs and values that continuously seeks to minimise 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŚĂƌŵƚŚĂƚŵĂǇƌĞƐƵůƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐĂƌĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ?.262 This is also in line 
with tŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞǀĞŶŬĞǇƐƚĞƉƐƚŽƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?ƐĞƚŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞNPSA, 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂĨĞƚǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐ “Đreating a culture ƚŚĂƚŝƐŽƉĞŶĂŶĚĨĂŝƌ ?.263  
Education in methods to improve patient safety, training in human factors, team 
working, reporting and learning from incidents, and participation in safety 
improvement initiatives are also essential elements in order to achieve Ă ‘ƐĂĨĞƚǇ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? 
 
Since Chapter 4 found that the use of an electronic confirmation method of 
checking injectable drugs in anaesthesia was more acceptable, and as previously 
discussed technology is increasingly seen as the way forward in providing the 
means to improve patient safety,
100, 116 
the study proposed in Chapter 5 was 
designed to investigate the impact of introducing the electronic confirmation on the 
ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƉƚŚƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĂŝƐĞĚ
in this first study (Chapter 4). This was achieved through integrating my research 
aims into a larger international study - VASER. 
 
The aim of this research (Chapter 5) was to explore the beliefs and attitudes of 
anaesthetists and ODPs taking part in error research, and their views on the 
introduction of technology designed to reduce errors. Also, as part of the VASER 
study I assessed the workload of the participating anaesthetists in order to evaluate 
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whether the SAFERsleep ? system added further workload to the simulated clinical 
scenarios.  
 
In addition I explored the beliefs and attitudes of anaesthetists ? and ODPs ? that did 
not participate in the VASER study in order to further judge the cultural effects of 
drug error within anaesthesia and their subsequent reporting. 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggested that the introduction of the 
electronic confirmation did not impact on the anaesthetist workload, however as 
previously suggested, there is a definitive need for adequate training to ensure that 
the learning curve of using new equipment was minimised.  
 
Another finding from this study was that while the majority of participants were 
positive that drug errors should be reported, there was a palpable reluctance to 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŵŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨďůĂŵĞ ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ?ŝĨĂŶĞƌƌŽƌ
was reported were the two main themes that stood out from the analysis; there 
was also the issue of lack of awareness of the actual causes of error.  
 
The Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC)
264
 suggested that the lack 
of success in reducing drug errors could be attributed to a general lack of 
awareness or alarm about errors. Leape supported this view stating that low error 
rates lead to complacency,
265
 while Dean and colleagues
266
 suggested that 
prescribing errors made by junior doctors were due to a lack of knowledge and self-
awareness related to error.  
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Finally, I found that the anaesthetists and ODPs that did not participate in the 
VASER study had similar views on drug error incidence, incident reporting and the 
use of technology to those who had participated. 
 
Recommendations from this study (Chapter 5) to address these issues are focussing 
future work on the acknowledgment of errors, undergraduate and lifelong 
education in relation to safety culture, and interventions to improve the safety 
culture already inherent within the organisation. 
 
This thesis has shown that technology was more readily accepted and seen as more 
feasible to use by anaesthetists within their clinical practice. However, it has also 
demonstrated that the culture and beliefs of the organisation and individuals, of 
one of  ‘blame and shame ?, has such a strong influence that it continues to prevent a 
true safety culture developing into an open culture of reporting incidents.  
 
The palpable reluctance to report, a major theme encountered within chapter 5, 
however contradicts the overall picture painted within the literature and how I 
perceived the anaesthetic profession to be prior to starting my thesis. Anaesthesia 
is depicted as a profession that drives safety initiatives and promotes patient safety 
far more than any other professional body. The anaesthetic profession has set up 
the Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group (SALG) and is the first profession to have 
speciality specific incident rĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŝĨĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐĚŽŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ
report errors or near misses, whether due to fear of retribution or lack of 
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understanding how can this then feed into learning and improving practice and 
subsequently patient safety. The Aviation industry operates a just or "no blame" 
reporting culture which they believe to be essential if a complete picture of the 
causal factors behind an event is to be identified. The European Regions Airline 
Association [ERAA]
267
 ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞ ‘:ƵƐƚƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ŝĚĞĂůĂŶĚpromote the provision of 
such an ideal in incident reporting ?dŚĞZƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞŶƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞ
pilot is free from threats of legal action and career inhibition risks, unless, such 
actions result from wilful misconduct, non adherence to Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) or under the undue influence of alcohol or any other form of 
substance abuse ?ŝŶƐƵĐŚĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĞZƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶǇůĞŐĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ
that may be brought.  
Unfortunately within the NHS there still remains a perceived  ‘ďůĂŵĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? 
(Chapter 5) and until this alters /ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĐĂŶ
compare their safety record to that of the aviation industry. 
 
Given the opposing priorities between safety, performance level and resource 
constraints, the message that can be drawn from the literature, as well as the 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
to ensure and maintain drug safety within the anaesthetic environment there needs 
to be a fine balance between the demands of production and maintaining safety 
principles. Wilson
268
 ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŵŽƐƚƉƵďůŝĐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽ
prioritise safety over all other values; they must serve multiple, mutually 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŵĂŶǇƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞƚĞŶsions between various 
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priorities within the organisation. The need for safety within anaesthetic practice, 
reducing associated costs of drug error including extended hospital stay, the drive 
ƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞdƌƵƐƚ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐƐĞƚďǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵent, all of these 
issues impact and put increasing pressure on theatre departments to run extremely 
tight, inflexible operating lists.  
 
The Francis report
32
 ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂĚŝƐƚƵƌďŝŶŐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨŚŽǁŽŶĞdƌƵƐƚ ?ƐƉƌĞ-occupation 
with targets can impact severely on patient care and safety. It was recognised that 
within that Trust there were health care workers with questionable standards of 
practice, however the acceptance of poor professional conduct and insufficient 
attention on the maintenance of professional standards highlights that a failing 
safety culture is a mixture of both person and system based violations and errors.  
 
It is important to focus on how best to realistically improve and maintain safety in 
anaesthetic drug practice, alongside these competing and potentially detrimental 
priorities. /ĨĞĞůŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
 ‘ůĂŵĞ ? ?Within each error or incident the role of the individual health care 
professional or layer of the system, such as the targets set by management or the 
protocols defining practice, needs to be acknowledged and the responsibility 
distributed accordingly. Rather than what seems to be the current practice of 
pointing the finger and blaming the last link in the process, which unfortunately is 
usually the health care professional. 
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6.2 What this thesis did not explore 
This thesis did not explore in greater detail the impact that error awareness, 
individual and organisational learning and team culture has on safety within 
anaesthetic practice.  
 
There was the suggestion within this thesis that awareness of error was lacking and 
that this had a direct impact on the levels of incident reporting taking place. 
Leape
265
 suggests that the reluctance by doctors to accept that errors do happen is 
due to the high rates of injury and death not being consistent with their personal 
experience. Speciality specific reporting is a potential solution to this problem of 
error awareness as long as feedback to clinicians is timely and consistent. As 
previously discussed, the AAGBI, RCoA and the NPSA have developed a speciality-
specific critical incident reporting system for anaesthesia. It will be interesting to 
see if this system raises awareness of error and impacts on the levels of reporting 
and learning within anaesthesia.  
 
Education has also been suggested as a critical part of changing the culture within 
an organisation, Fukuda and colleagues
269
 found that hospitals which implemented 
an education programme around incident reporting significantly increased the rate 
of reporting by doctors.  
 
Training alone, however, is not enough; improving patient safety requires a 
multifaceted approach, one which involves the whole team. Espin and colleagues
20
 
found that team collaboration was centrally important to the study of safety and 
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medical error. They suggest that errors often occur in team settings in which many 
health care providers work together. Within the theatre environment in which 
anaesthetists work there are many different professional groups, therefore, 
understanding the similarities and differences ŽĨĞĂĐŚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ perceptions is 
critical to preventing drug errors.  
 
Working effectively as a team can support individuals in avoiding mistakes, 
intercepting errors, and reduce psychological precursors.
1 20 265
 Previous work has 
looked at the role of team building and training within the theatre environment.
270-
273
 The concern I encountered within this thesis was that individuals were more 
willing to report incidents that involved colleagues from their own profession rather 
than those involving a member of a different professional group (Chapter 5). The 
problem with this approach to reporting incidents means that many team based 
errors go unreported and unsafe practices continue to persist with no prospect of 
organisational learning.
20
 Future work needs to explore how best to foster a shared 
outlook of responsibility in order to achieve changes and improvements to the 
culture of safety. 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
I started out with the Department of Health recommendations that double 
checking should be utilised and introduced to prevent drug error. Due to the 
peculiarity of anaesthetic practice where many injectable drugs are given in a short 
space of time, I chose to look at the feasibility of introducing such a check into 
clinical practice. 
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I found that the second person confirmation method was not taken up as it was 
perceived to be time consuming, there was a perceived lack of availability of the 
second person to check the drug, as well as the process being seen as open to 
manipulation. The SAFERsleep ? system was preferred due to the lesser impact on 
the anaesthetist; however there were barriers to its adoption. These barriers 
included culture, attitudes and beliefs, stemming from a fear of retribution. 
 
My studies have shown that the introduction of any safety intervention is only 
possible if efforts are made to improve the safety culture within the organisation. 
Accordingly, I would like my future work to focus on the implications of introducing 
the SAFERsleep ? system into clinical practice within theatres, and the impact this 
may have on culture and safety within the Trust. I specifically want to explore 
whether there is a reduction in medication errors with the introduction of the 
SAFERsleep ? system and also whether it reduces other errors. I also want to 
explore whether the use of the SAFERsleep ? system streamlines the process of 
information transfer in the pre-operative, peri-operative and post-operative periods, 
and whether there is also a reduction in medication errors in the pre-operative and 
post-operative periods. 
 
This thesis has highlighted that education, experience, environmental and 
technological matters all play a part in creating latent conditions, latent conditions 
that are capable of generating situations where medication administration is not 
ideal and potentially unsafe. However, it has also become apparent to me that the 
inherent culture within the anaesthetiƐƚ ?Ɛ working environment also plays a 
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significant role in the safety of medication administration and the adoption of any 
safety initiative.  
 
It is important to continue exploring the processes that influence and impact on 
patient safety.  HŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐ
may come up with different latent factors, contributing factors, solutions or 
intrinsic factors of the system. It is clear that there are many different ways in 
which drug errors in anaesthesia may occur, however technology is seen as the way 
forward in addressing some of these issues.  
 
I have come to the conclusion that a major paradigm shift at organisational level is 
required to embed any safety measure, such as SAFERsleep ?, in order to realise its 
full potential ĂŶĚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨ ‘ďůĂŵĞ ?ƚŽŽŶĞŽĨ
 ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?This would involve methods of improving culture such as team 
building, team training, education and error awareness. 
 
Further research is now needed in order to determine the best strategies to ensure 
compliance with any safety initiative that is introduced, and the development of an 
evaluation programme to ensure that such initiatives reach their full potential.  
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APPENDIX I: Interview Schedule  W VASER (Chapter 5) 
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Question 1 
What are your views about the quality of the anaesthetic record produced during 
the scenarios? 
x Accuracy 
x time  
x missing data 
x usefulness 
x usability 
x potential 
 
Question 2 
Thinking back to the scenarios can you tell me about the preparation of drugs & the 
differences between VASER & Conventional methods? 
x Time taken to prepare drugs  
x difference between pre-filled or not 
x acceptability 
x cost  
x Distractions  W while prep drugs, should patient be in the room or should 
time be allowed to do this 
 
Question 3 
What are you views on the occurrence of drug errors within anaesthesia and their 
subsequent reporting? 
x Drug Errors  W reporting - harm v no harm 
x Can Technology help in preventing them  - benefits, problems, distractions, 
ideal kit requirements 
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APPENDIX II: Focus Group Schedule - Participants (Chapter 4) 
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Question 1 
What is your perception of drug errors within anaesthesia? 
 
Question 2 
In relation to the system you used: What were the strengths? 
 
Question 3 
 In relation to the system you used: What were the weaknesses? 
 
Question 4 
 In relation to the system you used: What were the opportunities? 
 
Question 5 
In relation to the system you used: What were the threats? 
 
Question 6 
In relation to the system you used: What cultural issues arose when it was 
introduced? 
 
Question 7 
If you could design the perfect system to prevent drug errors in anaesthesia, what 
would it be like? 
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APPENDIX III: Focus Group Schedule  W Observers (Chapter 4) 
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Question 1 
What is your perception of drug errors within anaesthesia? 
 
Question 2 
What were the strengths of the systems you observed? 
 
Question 3 
What were the weaknesses of the systems you observed? 
 
Question 4 
Do you think either of the systems will improve patient safety? 
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APPENDIX IV: Focus Group Schedule - Participants (Chapter 5) 
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Question 1 
The first area we want to explore is the reporting near misses in particular those 
where there is no direct or immediate lasting consequence to the patient. 
x What are the benefits 
x What are the barriers 
x Give some examples of medication errors that you would report 
x Errors of omission/documentation omission and the potential impact 
in the post op period rather than during the immediate/intra-op 
period 
x DVT prophylaxis and the responsibility of individuals to prescribe 
x Pre-op medication given/not given, recorded or not? 
 
 
Question 2 
What aspects of conventional practice predispose the occurrence of medication 
errors? 
x Time pressure 
x Distractions during preparation or administration 
x Accuracy/standardisation of documentation to check the 
administration pre and post anaesthesia 
x Preparation of less common infusions/drugs 
x Equipment/method of delivery 
x Use of standardised protocols  W which drugs, theatre staffs role? 
 
 
Question 3 
dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĂĐŬƚŽƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞ
positive aspects and where do you think differences/inaccuracies would be 
compared to the conventional record  
x Time saver 
x Welcomed advance? 
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APPENDIX V: Focus Group Schedule - Non-Participants (Chapter 5) 
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Question 1 
The first area we want to explore is what constitutes a near miss?  
x When does it become an incident or a non event 
x Give some examples of medication errors that you would report 
x Errors of omission/documentation omission and the potential impact 
in the post op period rather than during the immediate/intra-op 
period 
x DVT prophylaxis and the responsibility of individuals to prescribe 
x Pre-op medication given/not given, recorded or not? 
 
Question 2 
What aspects of conventional practice predispose the occurrence of medication 
errors? 
x Time pressure 
x Distractions during preparation or administration 
x Accuracy/standardisation of documentation to check the 
administration pre and post anaesthesia 
x Preparation of less common infusions/drugs 
x Equipment/method of delivery 
x Use of standardised protocols  W which drugs, theatre staffs role? 
 
Question 3 
What do you think the barriers to reporting are? 
 
Question 4 
How do you think practice should or could change to influence the risk of 
medication errors occurring? 
x Awareness of Technology available to benefit practice 
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APPENDIX VI: Reflective Diary (Chapter 4) 
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Trust Headed Paper 
 
REFELECTIVE DIARY 
 
Try and complete the diary as close to finishing the list as possible while the main 
issues of using the double checking methodology, whether positive or negative are 
still fresh in your mind. The prompts within each box are there to give you an idea 
of the some of the areas you may want to reflect on but are not exhaustive. 
 
If you have any problems with using the double check methodology or need further 
clarification please contact a member of the study team as follows: 
 
Chief Investigator   Professor Ravi Mahajan RCoA  0115 823 1009 
Research Associate  Mrs Rachel Evley  RCoA 0115 823 1004 
Co-Investigator   Ms Beverley Norris  NPSA 0207 927 9559 
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ĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨdŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ>ŝƐƚ 
Number of patients on list  
Start and end time of list  
 
Setting 
x Type of Theatre  W including type and length of surgery,  
x Brief description of anaesthetic room - including drug storage, working space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
Drug Preparation 
When were the drugs prepared  W in advance for the whole pathway or just for the 
induction phase?  
x Were any drugs prepared for the next patient? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time 
x Did the double check cause any delay in giving drugs? How and why? 
x Which part of the anaesthetic was delayed  W induction, maintenance or reversal? 
x Were there any delays to the list due to the double-checking procedure? 
If yes, could they have been avoided with an amendment to the double-checking 
procedure? 
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Feasibility 
x Were there any problems in using the double checking procedure? Please describe   
x What parts of the double-checking protocol did you find most difficult to adhere 
to? 
x Was a member of staff available to carry out the double check? If not describe 
what happened 
x Feedback & Criticisms by staff  W all grades  
x Potential Impact on patient? Is the double checking effective in preventing errors 
or near misses?  
x Can you think of any error or near miss you have experienced or witnessed where 
the double-checking protocol could have prevented it from occurring? 
x If there were any emergencies, did you manage to use the double check? 
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Other Comments 
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APPENDIX VII: Observation Schedule (Chapter 4) 
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Observation Schedule 
The observation schedule set out below is designed to help you focus your observations. 
 
Please feel free to use as many pages as are necessary to record all data for an 
observational session, and number pages at the top. An observation session is defined as 
each time the pathway is followed, so each time a new patient enters the anaesthetic room.  
 
Please record the start time in the left-hand column and any key time points within the 
session, such as the checking or administration of drugs etc.  
 
Record as fully as possible all talk and all actions by Anaesthetists, Operating Department 
Practitioners, Theatre Nurses and other members of the theatre team in relation to the 
main themes set out below. If you feel something is important to the study and is not 
covered in the main themes please feel free to include this as well. 
 
The following precautions will make this data fully usable:  
o try to keep handwriting legible  
o leave a lot of space so that annotations and corrections are easy to make  
o keep a key to any abbreviations used at the bottom of the page 
 
x Setting 
x Type of Theatre 
x Brief description of anaesthetic room 
x Grade of Anaesthetist observed 
x Level of support staff  W type and number 
 
x Drug Preparation 
x When are drugs prepared i.e. for whole pathway in advance or just induction phase 
x Which syringes are used for which drugs 
x Bolus or infusions  W which drugs? 
 
x Time 
x To prepare drugs following the pathway 
x Is there any delay in giving the drug? 
x Is induction delayed? 
x Is the list delayed? 
 
x Pathway / Electronic workstation 
x Ease of use 
x Problems with use  
x Staff adherence to its use 
 
x Feasibility of use 
x Staff availability to follow pathway 
x Criticisms by staff  W all grades 
x Impact on patient 
x Is it effective in stopping errors occurring  W near misses? 
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Observation Schedule 
Name of Observer  
Date of Observation  
Duration of Observation Start time:                              Finish time: 
Type of Theatre   
Number of patients per 
list/day 
 
Type & length of surgery 
observed 
 
 
Un-Scrubbed Theatre Team 
Members 
Grade/Band 
 
How long has the lead 
anaesthetist worked 
with each team 
member? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
How long have the team worked 
together? 
 
Do team work together regularly? 
 
Are there rotations through different 
theatres / shift patterns? 
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TIME OBSERVATIONS 
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Reflections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VIII: A Guide to being an Observer (Chapter 4) 
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A guide to being an observer 
 
Please read this guide carefully.  Observation for evaluation research is 
a skilled task that requires structure, focus and concentration. 
Preparation is important.  Consider the principles outlines below and 
think how you will apply them before you start the observations.  
 
µObservation begins the moment the observer enters the setting, where 
he or she will strive to set aside all preconceptions and take nothing for 
granted¶ [Angrosino 2007]. 
 
In everyday life we know that several people witnessing an event will 
interpret the event differently. We all have filters which screen out a lot of 
information.  Do not make assumptions about what is relevant information. 
Remember that the data collected in the observations must be comparable 
across sites and across observers. 
 
When you record your observations think of them as 4 parts.  
x Factual descriptions  
x Talk of participants  ± record as close as word for word as possible,  
x Your perceptions of what is happening and by the views of 
participants gathered while talking to them (such as during coffee 
break)  
x Your reflections of what you have observed over the day. 
 
When you write down any observations please make a note in the margin as 
to which of these 4 categories your observations fall into. This will help when 
we come to analyse and when you reflect at the end of the day. There is a 
page at the end of the observation sheet for you to elaborate on your views 
and reflections. 
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Some principles of observation 
x There should not be interaction between the observer and staff during 
the observation; you are there to watch only. We know this will be 
difficult. But please try not to give your clinical view on either of the 
double checking systems to those participating at the sites.  
x 'RQ¶WEHGUDZQLQWRKHOSLQJDQGGRQ¶WLQWHUIHUHLQZKDW\RXDUH
observing. If you see a drug error about to happen you can in your 
professional capacity stop this, but the incident must then be reported 
through the normal critical incident event reporting system within that 
Trust. 
x Describe what you observe accurately, factually and thoroughly. 
Remember that absence of action or communication may be relevant 
x Focus on the process under scrutiny (of double checking) and any 
factors that contribute to or affect its implementation. Do not get 
distracted by irrelevant detail. For example the activities of the 
surgeons are unlikely to be relevant except when this directly affects 
the anaesthetic team. 
x Make sure that every page on the observation schedule has the date 
and page number on. 
x When recording observations write the notes down, however brief, as 
quickly as possible after seeing or hearing something interesting such 
as little phrases, quotes, key words, etc. 
x Record verbal exchanges in the participants own words when possible, 
putting these in inverted commas. Nothing conveys the sense of 
µEHLQJWKHUH¶PRUHWKDQWKHDFWXDOZRUGVRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV 
x Go over your notes as soon as possible after the observation, to make 
sure they are clear, legible and readable. Note your abbreviation key 
DV\RXJRVRWKDWZKHQ\RXGRQ¶WHQGXSDVNLQJµZKDWGLG,PHDQE\
WKDW"¶ 
x When writing up the reflective sheet do this as promptly and as fully 
as possible, at the very latest at the end of the day. Expand on 
anything you have documented in the observation schedule that may 
be unclear to us and note your impressions and your views as a 
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clinician. Also record your views and feelings on the process of the 
observation.  
x 'RQ¶WZRUU\LI\RXWDNHFRSLRXVQRWHVDERXWUHOHYDQWDFWLYLWLHV,ILQ
doubt, write it down.  But there may also be times when there is little 
to record. 
 
References: 
Angrosino M. Doing Ethnographic and Observational Research. London: 
Sage. 2007. 
Patton, MQ (1987) How to use qualitative methods in evaluation 
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A guide to making observation notes for the double checking project 
 
Please find below guidance about each section of the observation schedule 
to help you complete them.  
 
Information to be collected before start of observation 
Make time with the lead anaesthetist beforehand to ask for this information. 
 
Setting 
Describe what type of theatre list is taking place: 
  The type and length of surgery 
  The usual number of patients on the list per day. 
Describe the anaesthetic room and theatre layout and their relationship to 
each other, giving some idea of size.  It may be easier to draw a diagram. 
Include drug storage in the description. 
 
Staff & Teams 
For the purpose of this study we are looking at the interactions between the 
un-scrubbed members of the theatre team ± anaesthetists, ODPs, & nurses.   
1. Document each member of the team and grade1 . Note if any are agency 
staff.   
[It is a good idea to allocate abbreviations or shorthand, such as A1 for 
anaesthetist 1, ODP 1 etc and to use these throughout the observation.] 
2. Ask if there will be changes of staff during the list and find out about the 
new members of staff, and how the handover will be conducted 
3. Find out whether lead anaesthetist has worked together on a regular 
basis with each member of the team: 
 How long (weeks, months, years)? 
 How many days in the last 7 days? 
                                                     
1
 Training /grade of staff: 
Anaesthetist: Consultant,  Specialist trainees (include year of training); Foundation trainee 
(year 1 or 2) 
ODP: record band 
Nurse: record band 
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Also, whether the rest of the team work together regularly, or if there are 
regular rotations/shift patterns. What is the role of the ODP? How much 
autonomy do they have? 
If a scrubbed member of the theatre team is involved in double checking 
activity this should be noted in the main section of the observation record. 
 
Observation during anaesthesia and surgery  
 
Communication 
Make a note of when there is verbal and non-verbal communication between 
WHDPPHPEHUVDQGZKRWKRVHPHPEHUVDUH,IWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQLV³WDVN
RULHQWHG´LHDERXWWKHMREEHLQJGRQHGRFXPHQWDVSUHFLVHO\DVSRVVLEOH
what is said (or done if it is non-verbal). Things to consider include: 
 Are instructions/information specific?  
 Is it addressed to a specific person? 
 Is it timely? 
 Are instructions/information acknowledged? 
 Are instructions/information clearly audible to you?  If not, do you think 
they were clearly audible to the staff member?   
 What factors might affect audibility?  E.g. clarity of speech, noise 
interference, face mask. 
 Does the person receiving instructions/ information seek clarification? 
 Is double checking discussed at the beginning, before any drugs are 
administered, or not, including assigning the double checker? If it is, try 
to document precisely how it is discussed. 
 
Please also note when there is non-task communication, such as talking to 
the patient, general conversation with colleagues and non-verbal 
communication.  It is not necessary, however, to record the content of this 
communication.  
 
Also estimate the time spent on each type of communication - task oriented 
and non-task oriented.  
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Movement 
Please try to document all movement in & out of the theatre/anaesthetic 
room by the un-scrubbed team members and any communication related to 
this movement. Document the purpose of the movement if this is clear; if it is 
not clear also make a note of this. 
 
Environment 
Document noise and activity that might affect the staff administering the 
drugs.  
 
Drug Preparation/Administration 
This section needs to be documented in as much detail as possible. Try to 
document what each individual says and does during the double check and 
any non-verbal actions that take place which are connected with the double 
check.  
x Are staff following the flowcharts to the letter?  
x If not, at which points are they deviating from them?  
x Can you tell why?  
x When and how do they label the syringes?  
x How do they preparHWKHQH[WSDWLHQW¶VGUXJV" 
x Are there any logistical problems with completing the double check  
x Which staff are used as the second checker?  
x Are scrubbed team members ever asked to double check?  
 
It would be extremely useful for us to know in the greatest detail possible 
about the actual double check process so if in doubt record everything you 
see! 
 
7KHPRVWIUHTXHQWGUXJHUURUVLWHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLVµV\ULQJHVZDS¶WKLVLV
where the wrong syringe is selected and the drug administered. It is 
therefore very important for us to know if there are any problems or barriers 
to using the double check prior to administration of the drug. 
Do the anaesthetists have their own system to prevent drug errors? Such as: 
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x Do they use certain syringes for certain drugs?  
x Do they place labels on the syringe differently for different drugs?  
x Do they place certain drugs in separate trays? 
x Do they keep them in different areas whilst in theatre?  
x If so which drugs are separated off? 
 
Anything they do themselves to try and prevent drug errors would be very 
useful to know 
 
Time 
Try to record length of time the double check takes. Note down any delays 
caused by using the double check, how and why they occur such as: 
x No staff to check,  
x Software problem  
x Not being able to prepare in advance   
 
Double Checking / Workstation 
This is combined with the drug preparation section (see above). Record any 
comments the staff involved make about the use of double-checking/ 
electronic workstation. Is the double check used throughout all stages of the 
anaesthetic - induction, maintenance and reversal?  
In your observation notes please make the distinction between the double 
check being used for preparation of the drug and when it is used to check 
prior to administration.  
 
Feasibility of Use 
Note down any problems encountered using the double-checking method or 
the electronic workstation. Try and record, word for word, the criticisms and 
praises of staff of the systems as accurately as possible.  
x Did the use of the double-check/workstation impact at all on the 
patient? 
x Did they comment at all about the process?  
x If there were any emergencies did the double check take place in full?   
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x If not, which parts were missed out or changed and how?  
 
If in doubt about what to record, write it down.  
 
Reflections 
We have included a reflective sheet at the end of the observation schedule to 
enable you to record your reflections from observing, and to give greater 
detail or explanation about any events you have seen or recorded.  
Refer to your observation notes for supporting evidence for these reflections. 
Your perceptions are valuable, but try to differentiate these from the factual 
observations.  
 
You may wish to reflect on the following. 
 What were the team dynamics and the communication between the staff 
that might have had an impact on the double-check being performed? 
 Did the team work well together; was communication effective within the 
team?  
 Consider the role of leadership and the skill mix. Does being in charge 
vary by clinical activity? 
 What contributed to the success of the double check - enthusiastic user, 
team work?  What makes it unsuccessful ± VKRUWDJHRIVWDIIXVHU¶V
perception, dynamics within the team? 
 Did the double check prevent any drug errors during your observations? 
Please also reflect on how you think the double check could have taken 
place safely during an emergency. 
 
I hope this has been useful, but please if you are unsure about any aspect of 
the observation let me know, my contact number is 0115 8231004, or if you 
prefer please let me have your contact number and I will happily contact you 
to go over anything. 
 
Best Wishes 
Rachel 
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Borg Workload Scale 
 
 
6 No exertion               (completely sedentary subject) 
7 Extremely light 
8  
9 Very light 
10  
11 Light 
12 Workload level of a routine, oral, 
asleep, intubation of anaesthesia 
13 Somewhat hard 
14 
15 Hard (heavy) 
16 
17 Very hard 
18 
19 Extremely hard 
20 Maximal exertion       (during a full blown OR resuscitation) 
232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX X: Participant Information Sheet (Chapter 4) 
 
233 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Hospital headed paper 
Title: A multi-centre qualitative study to evaluate the process of double-checking of 
drugs administered during anaesthesia in order to reduce the risk of drug errors 
and improve patient safety. 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish. 
x Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen if you take part. 
x Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Many published surveys from different parts of the world have suggested that most 
practicing anaesthetists have experienced at least one drug error. There is now 
growing awareness that the magnitude of drug errors during anaesthesia is more 
serious than previously thought. Using facilitated incident monitoring, and data 
collected from over 10,000 anaesthetics in New Zealand, approximately 1 drug 
error has been shown to occur for every 130 anaesthetics.
 
 Similar figures have 
been reported from Seattle, and many other studies also suggest similar magnitude 
of the problem.  
In the UK, a national survey of lead obstetric anaesthetists in all consultant-led 
maternity units showed that 39% of the respondents knew of at least one drug 
error in their unit in the previous year. In another survey in the South West Region 
of England, 55% of the respondents indicated that they had made at least one drug 
error in the previous 12 month period; the majority of the respondents did not 
report the incidents. Of the reported incidents to the National Patient Safety 
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Agency (NPSA), 685 incidents were related to drug errors during anaesthesia in the 
time period between January 2007 and December 2007 (personal communication).  
It has been identified by an Expert Consultative Group made up from 
representatives of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), the Royal College of 
Anaesthetists (RCOA), the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland 
(AAGBI), the College of Operating  
Department Practitioners, the Association for Perioperative Practice, independent 
experts and patient representatives that prevention of drug errors during 
anaesthesia is an area of priority for action to improve patient safety. 
This group decided that, before making firm recommendations on how to prevent 
drug errors during anaesthesia, it will be necessary to conduct a work-place 
evaluation of two different methods that have been proposed to reduce drug errors.  
The two methods to be evaluated are second person double checking and 
electronic checking using an electronic anaesthetic workstation supplied by 
^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? ?EĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ) ? 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being asked to participate in this study because you are an Anaesthetist, 
Operating Department Practitioner or a Theatre Nurse working within the theatre 
that has been chosen as one of the sites for this qualitative observational study.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you whether or not you decide to take part.  If you do, you will be 
given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are 
still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
A member of the research team will discuss with you what will happen if you take 
part. After reading all this information and you decide to take part in this study, you 
will be asked to sign a consent form. 
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You will be asked to follow a Pathway for the preparation and administration of all 
injectable drugs for 3 months. This will involve double checking all injectable drugs 
prepared using a designated pathway and double-checking all injectable drugs prior 
to administration using another pathway.  
However, when it is not possible to double check the injectable drug, your 
participation in this study should NOT delay the administration of the drugs during 
anaesthesia and you should conduct the anaesthetic as routine practice. 
During this time you will also be asked to keep a log book to document how often it 
was not possible to perform the double-check methodology, at what time points in 
the pathway they were unable to perform the double-check methodology and why? 
Anaesthetists will also be asked to record how many patients they anaesthetise 
during this period. 
Over the 3 month period where the double-checking methodology is incorporated 
into clinical practice, you will be observed in the clinical environment at least once 
by an anaesthetist, ODP or theatre nurses from another NHS Trust. A member of 
the study team will also observe you during the 3 month period. 
At the end of the 3 month period you may be asked to participate in a Focus group 
to be held at the Royal College of Anaesthetists in London.  
The purpose of the focus group is to gain an insight into your experiences of the 
process of double-checking, the strengths and weaknesses of the process of 
double-checking drugs and what modifications you would suggest to make the 
method of double-checking widely acceptable. 
All reasonable travel expenses will be paid to allow you to attend the focus groups. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
There should be no disadvantages of taking part in this study. However, some time 
may be involved in completing the reflective diary. We do not anticipate that the 
study will impact on your routine practice, but the double checking of the 
preparation of drugs may cause a slight delay between the two anaesthetics. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This study is to perform a work-place evaluation of the practice of double-checking 
using second-person checks and/or electronic (bar-coding) checks, to determine 
feasibility and barriers in introducing double-check methodology. 
There is an opportunity to have your experiences of the double-checking 
methodology known at the focus groups, and to ensure the recommendations 
made by the Expert Consultative Group reflect the practical feasibility of 
introducing double-checking into clinical practice. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
The occurrence of any problems as a result of participation within this study is not 
expected. If any errors in practice are detected or observed during this study then 
normal NHS procedures for critical incidence reporting will apply. However, if the 
observers were to see a drug error about to be made they can, in their professional 
capacity, alert the person involved to prevent such an error occurring. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All the information about your participation in this study will be kept confidential. 
The details are included in part 2. 
 
Contact details: 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact one of us on the 
following phone numbers. 
 
Professor Ravi Mahajan Chief Investigator  0115 823 1009 
Ms Beverley Norris  Co-Investigator (NPSA) 020 7927 9559 
Mrs Rachel Evley  Research Associate  0115 823 1004 
 
This completes Part 1 of the information sheet. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before making any 
decision. 
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Part 2 
tŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. However all data collected in 
your log book and from any observations that have already taken place will still be 
used in the final analysis. 
 
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak with 
the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions.  The contact 
numbers are: 
 
Professor Ravi Mahajan Chief Investigator  0115 8231009 
Ms Beverley Norris  Co-Investigator (NPSA) 020 7927 9559 
Mrs Rachel Evley  Research Associate  0115 8231004 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can so this through the 
NHS complaints procedure. You can complain orally or writing to the [insert name] 
Trust. In the event that you are harmed during participation in this study there are 
no special compensation arrangements, the normal National Health Service 
complaints mechanisms will be available to you. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
If you chose to take part in the study, all information which is collected about you 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Nothing you say 
will be read by anyone other than the research team. Names will not be written on 
the transcripts and you will be anonymous in any written or verbal reports on the 
research. All information generated by this study will be archived securely within 
the Division of Anaesthesia, University of Nottingham and destroyed 7 years after 
the study is completed.   
Representatives of regulatory authorities and authorised people from the Trust may 
inspect the data to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a 
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duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and nothing that could 
reveal your identity will b disclosed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings will be used by the Expert Consultative Group to produce 
recommendations for future practice on the use of double-checking for preventing 
drug errors during anaesthesia. The findings of this study will also be presented to 
various national/meetings, along with publication(s) in medical journal(s).  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The Chief Investigator for this study is Professor Ravi Mahajan and it is sponsored 
by the University of Nottingham. The study is funded by the Royal College of 
Anaesthetists in collaboration with the National Patient Safety Agency. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by the West Glasgow Regional Ethics Committee 1.  It 
has also been reviewed and approved by the Research & Development department 
at [Insert Trust R&D Department Here]. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you decide to take 
part you will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form 
to keep. 
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University of Nottingham 
School of Clinical Sciences 
Division of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 
YƵĞĞŶ ?ƐDĞĚŝĐĂůĞŶƚƌĞ 
Derby Road 
Nottingham 
0115 8231009 
 
Anaesthetist Participant Information Sheet 
Validating Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research  
(the VASER study). 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Please take the time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Iatrogenic harm, often due to error, is a major public health problem, expensive in 
human and financial terms. There have been international calls for initiatives to 
reduce it, but evidence is needed to justify investment in such initiatives. From the 
viewpoint of human cost, error in healthcare (including anaesthesia) is 
unacceptably frequent, but for the purpose of demonstrating the benefit of safety 
interventions it is relatively uncommon; the number of anaesthetics needed for a 
clinical randomised controlled trial (RCT) to evaluate any safety intervention in 
anaesthesia is therefore very large (even using surrogate endpoints such as errors 
rather than harm). A significant reduction of patient harm from any safety initiative 
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in anaesthesia (even pulse oximetry) has never been demonstrated in a clinical 
randomised controlled trial. There are also considerable ethical, legal and practical 
difficulties in investigating safety initiatives in the clinical setting. High fidelity 
simulation offers an alternative which circumvents many of these difficulties by 
avoiding the possibility of actual harm to patients. In addition, a statistically 
powerful paired study design  (the Design) for simulation-based randomised 
controlled  trials has been created and tested in which complex scenarios make 
high rates of error likely, thereby making it easier to show a difference between 
groups with relatively small numbers of participants. Simulation RCT evidence could 
potentially be as compelling as clinical RCT evidence (and much less expensive to 
obtain) provided it can be shown that the conclusions of these approaches are 
equivalent. Few studies have examined this important question. In the Validating 
Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research (VASER) Study we will compare the 
conclusions of a large clinical trial with those of a simulation study designed to 
answer the same questions.   
 
The problem of error in drug administration is particularly pressing in anaesthesia 
because of the many potent agents given during the relatively short period of an 
anaesthetic. A record of these drugs forms part of the overall anaesthesia record, 
an important clinical tool, medico-legal document and resource for audit (the value 
of which depends on its completeness and accuracy. In response to this problem, a 
ƐĂĨĞƚǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? )ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƌƵŐ
administration error, facilitate safe practice and improve the quality of record 
keeping in anaesthesia. It is multifaceted and includes purpose designed drug 
drawers and trays, prefilled syringes with colour coded and bar-coded labels, a 
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ “ƐƉĞĂŬƐ ?ƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨĞĂĐŚĚƌƵŐǁŚĞŶŝƚƐďĂƌĐŽĚĞŝs swiped, and an 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚŬĞĞƉĞƌ ?Z< ) ?dŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐ
commercially available and in regular clinical use in within one Trust in the United 
Kingdom, and has also been used in well over 250,000 anaesthetics worldwide.   
As for any safety intervention, evidence of its value or lack thereof is needed. To 
ƚŚŝƐĞŶĚĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƌĂŶĚŽŵŝƐĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚƚƌŝĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?
system vs. conventional methods of delivering anaesthesia has recently been 
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completed at Auckland City Hospital, New Zealand. In the VASER Study we will 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝƚŚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƐŝĂƵƐŝŶŐ
a specific research design to evaluate high-fidelity simulation as a research tool.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being asked to participate in this study because you are a Consultant 
Anaesthetist or a Trainee (post fellowship (FRCA)) working within the Specialist 
^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽĨEŽƚƚŝŶŐŚĂŵhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ,ŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐE,^dƌƵƐƚ ? 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you whether or not you decide to take part.  In order to participate in 
the study, one of the requirements, in order to meet the inclusion criteria, is that 
you are willing to participate in a semi-structured interview and a focus group.  
If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
be asked to sign a consent form.  
You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
A member of the research team will discuss with you what will happen if you take 
part. After reading all this information and you decide to take part in this study, you 
will be asked to sign a consent form. 
You will attend a morning or an afternoon at the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills 
Centre, where you will complete, with a participating Operating Department 
Practitioner (ODP), three simulated study scenarios, one to allow you to familiarise 
ǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƚǁŽƐƚƵĚǇƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ?WƌŝŽƌƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐ
the VASER study day you will be provided with pre-reading material.  
At the beginning of the VASER study day we will show you and the participating 
KWŚŽǁƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇďĞŚŝŶĚŝƚƐĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?
This briefing will also reinforce specified key points related to the use of simulation, 
details of the study, format of the study day and the tests used.   
An introductory simulation scenario will then follow which will allow you to 
familiarise yourself, and the participating ODP, with the simulation environment. An 
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educational debrief will follow this scenario, which will allow for additional 
ĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬŽŶƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞŽƉƚŝŵĂůƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?
system.   
You and the participating ODP will then be asked to complete together two 
standardised highly scripted simulated anaesthetic scenarios (Scenario A and 
Scenario B).  For each simulation there are two possible states: Intervention (in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝůůďĞƵƐĞĚ )ĂŶĚŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
methods).  These states will be allocated randomly between the two scenarios with 
stratification for time of day (morning/afternoon). 
Before beginning the first study scenario you will be asked to complete a NASA Task 
Load Index (TLI) questionnaire. During the study period you will be asked to 
complete a Vigilance Latency Task (VLT), this involves acknowledging the 
illumination of a small, bright light on the anaesthetic machine at 9 to 14 minute 
ƌĂŶĚŽŵŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůƐĂŶĚǇŝĞůĚƐĂŶŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĂŶĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ?ƐǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƉĂƌĞǁŽƌŬ
capacity. In this study a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) with a touch screen will be 
ƵƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚĂƐŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁŝůůŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŽƵĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?ƐƐĐƌĞĞŶ ?ƚ ?
to 15 minute random intervals, psychological workload will be measured with the 
Borg Workload Scale both by the observing researcher and by yourself. This will 
involve the researcher asking you to verbally rate your work load scale at that 
particular time. 
At the end of the procedure you will be asked to complete another NASA Task Load 
Index questionnaire and use visual analogue scales (VAS) to rate the physical and 
mental demands of the previous anaesthetic and specific components of the new 
system and comparable conventional alternatives.  
All scenarios will be video recorded and will form part of the data collection for the 
study, the Video recordings will also be used during the educational feedback to 
allow reflection on practice and behaviours observed during the simulation. The 
educational debrief will be video recorded to highlight any themes that need 
further exploration within the semi-structured interviews and focus groups.  
At the end of the study period you will be invited to take part in a semi-structured 
interview, to allow deeper understanding of the impact the introduction of 
technology can have on anaesthetists and ODPs working practice and the effect 
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(good and bad) on patient safety. You may also be invited to take part in a Focus 
group to be held in the University Department of Anaesthesia, Nottingham. Lunch 
and refreshments will be provided during the research scenarios study day and all 
reasonable travel expenses will be paid to allow you to attend the research scenario 
study day, interview and focus group. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
There should be no disadvantages of taking part in this study. However, it will 
involve attending the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre for half a day, an 
interview for one hour and attending a focus group, which would be a maximum of 
one and a half hours. 
 
What if some aspect of my practice is observed that causes concern? 
Simulated scenarios are designed in a way that mistakes are likely to occur. The 
occurrence of such mistakes and the underlying predisposing factors form the basis 
of the subsequent debriefing session. Very occasionally practice may be observed 
that could potentially cause serious patient harm if this occurred in clinical practice. 
Once again such a witnessed occurrence would be discussed, as part of the 
debriefing process, following the scenarios (aided by the use of video). This will 
allow clarification of any issues highlighted and provide an opportunity for us and 
you to gain insight into your demonstrated practice.   
 
If the debriefing fails to acknowledge insight into potentially harmful practice the 
matter would be discussed further with the Chief Investigator and the Director of 
the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre. In the unlikely event following this 
discussion it is felt the issue in question raises potential concerns about future 
clinical practice it will be discussed with the head of service (for Consultant 
Anaesthetists) or Educational Supervisor / Training Programme Director (for 
Anaesthetic Trainees). This would be done with your full awareness and 
involvement.  
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These measures follow the defined protocol of the Trent Simulation and Clinical 
Skills Centre for managing such situations, in the interest of patient care and safety. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit of taking part in terms of material gain. However there is 
the possibility of indirect benefit through working in the hi-fidelity simulation 
environment of the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre, participating in 
feedback allowing the opportunity to verbalise and reflect on your experience of 
participating in the simulated scenarios, as well as the potential for an increased 
awareness of patient safety issues.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
If you chose to take part in the study, all information which is collected about you 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Nothing you say 
will be read by anyone other than the research team. Names will not be written on 
the transcripts and you will be anonymous in any written or verbal reports on the 
research. All information generated by this study will be archived securely within 
the Division of Anaesthesia, University of Nottingham and destroyed 7 years after 
the study is completed.   
Representatives of regulatory authorities and authorised people from the 
University of Nottingham and the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust may 
inspect the data to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a 
duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and nothing that could 
reveal your identity will be disclosed.  
 
tŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. However all data collected 
during the simulation, from the interview and the focus group will still be used in 
the final analysis. 
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What if there is a problem?  
The occurrence of any problems as a result of participation within this study is not 
expected.  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak with 
the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions.  Any distress 
caused through participating in the study scenarios will be addressed using 
facilitated debriefing; this process is standard policy within the Trent Simulation and 
Clinical Skills Centre. If you still have concerns following this process we would 
encourage you to discuss the issues further with either your educational supervisor 
or a Consultant peer and a process of mentorship or counselling would be available 
should the need arise.   
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can so this through the 
NHS complaints procedure. You can complain orally or writing to the Nottingham 
University Hospitals NHS Trust. In the event that you are harmed during 
participation in this study there are no special compensation arrangements, the 
normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms will be available to you. 
 
Contact details: 
Please do not hesitate to contact one of us on the following phone numbers. 
 
Professor Ravi Mahajan   
Chief Investigator               0115 823 1009  
(University Department of Anaesthesia) 
 
Professor Bryn Baxendale  
Co-Investigator           0115 9249924 Ext. 67095  
(Director - Trent Simulation & Clinical skills Centre)  
 
Mrs Rachel Evley   
Trial Manager / Co-Investigator   0115 823 1004 
(University Department of Anaesthesia) 
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings of this study will also be presented to various national/meetings, along 
with publication(s) in medical journal(s).  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The Chief Investigator for this study is Professor Ravi Mahajan and it is sponsored 
by the University of Nottingham. The study is funded by a grant from the 
Association of Anaesthetist of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by the Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland 
Ethics Committee 1.  It has also been reviewed and approved by the Research & 
Development department at Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you decide to take 
part you will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form 
to keep. 
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University of Nottingham 
School of Clinical Sciences 
Division of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 
YƵĞĞŶ ?ƐDĞĚŝĐĂůĞŶƚƌĞ 
Derby Road 
Nottingham 
0115 8231009 
 
Operating Department Practitioner Participant Information Sheet  
     
Validating Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research  
(the VASER study). 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Please take the time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Iatrogenic harm, often due to error, is a major public health problem, expensive in 
human and financial terms. There have been international calls for initiatives to 
reduce it, but evidence is needed to justify investment in such initiatives. From the 
viewpoint of human cost, error in healthcare (including anaesthesia) is 
unacceptably frequent, but for the purpose of demonstrating the benefit of safety 
interventions it is relatively uncommon; the number of anaesthetics needed for a 
clinical randomised controlled trial (RCT) to evaluate any safety intervention in 
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anaesthesia is therefore very large (even using surrogate endpoints such as errors 
rather than harm). A significant reduction of patient harm from any safety initiative 
in anaesthesia (even pulse oximetry) has never been demonstrated in a clinical 
randomised controlled trial. There are also considerable ethical, legal and practical 
difficulties in investigating safety initiatives in the clinical setting. High fidelity 
simulation offers an alternative which circumvents many of these difficulties by 
avoiding the possibility of actual harm to patients. In addition, a statistically 
powerful paired study design  (the Design) for simulation-based randomised 
controlled  trials has been created and tested in which complex scenarios make 
high rates of error likely, thereby making it easier to show a difference between 
groups with relatively small numbers of participants. Simulation RCT evidence could 
potentially be as compelling as clinical RCT evidence (and much less expensive to 
obtain) provided it can be shown that the conclusions of these approaches are 
equivalent. Few studies have examined this important question. In the Validating 
Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research (VASER) Study we will compare the 
conclusions of a large clinical trial with those of a simulation study designed to 
answer the same questions.   
 
The problem of error in drug administration is particularly pressing in anaesthesia 
because of the many potent agents given during the relatively short period of an 
anaesthetic. A record of these drugs forms part of the overall anaesthesia record, 
an important clinical tool, medico-legal document and resource for audit (the value 
of which depends on its completeness and accuracy. In response to this problem, a 
ƐĂĨĞƚǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? )ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƌƵŐ
administration error, facilitate safe practice and improve the quality of record 
keeping in anaesthesia. It is multifaceted and includes purpose designed drug 
drawers and trays, prefilled syringes with colour coded and bar-coded labels, a 
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ “ƐƉĞĂŬƐ ?ƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨĞĂĐŚĚƌƵŐǁŚĞŶŝƚƐďĂƌĐŽĚĞŝƐƐǁŝƉĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚŬĞĞƉĞƌ ?Z< ) ?dŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐ
commercially available and in regular clinical use in within one Trust in the United 
Kingdom, and has also been used in well over 250,000 anaesthetics worldwide.   
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As for any safety intervention, evidence of its value or lack thereof is needed. To 
this end ĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƌĂŶĚŽŵŝƐĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚƚƌŝĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?
system vs. conventional methods of delivering anaesthesia has recently been 
completed at Auckland City Hospital, New Zealand. In the VASER Study we will 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝth conventional methods of anaesthesia using 
a specific research design to evaluate high-fidelity simulation as a research tool.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being asked to participate in this study because you are a qualified 
Operating Department Practitioner (ODP) working within the Specialist Support 
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽĨEŽƚƚŝŶŐŚĂŵhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ,ŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐE,^dƌƵƐƚ ?  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you whether or not you decide to take part.  In order to participate in 
the study, one of the requirements, in order to meet the inclusion criteria, is that 
you are willing to participate in a semi-structured interview and a focus group.  
If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and 
be asked to sign a consent form.  
You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
A member of the research team will discuss with you what will happen if you take 
part. After reading all this information and you decide to take part in this study, you 
will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
You will attend a morning or an afternoon at the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills 
Centre, where you will complete, with a participating anaesthetist, three simulated 
study scenarios; one orientation scenario to allow familiarisation with the 
^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚǁŽƐƚƵĚǇƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ?WƌŝŽƌƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞs^ZƐƚƵĚǇ
day you will be provided with pre-reading material.  
At the beginning of the VASER study day we will show you and the participating 
ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚŚŽǁƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇďĞŚŝŶĚŝƚƐ
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design. This briefing will also reinforce specified key points related to the use of 
simulation, details of the study, format of the study day and the tests used.   
An introductory simulation scenario will then follow which will allow you to 
familiarise yourself, and the participating anaesthetist, with the simulation 
environment. An educational debrief will follow this scenario, which will allow for 
additional feedback on simulation behaviours and on the optimal use of the 
^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
 
You, and the participating anaesthetist, will then be asked to complete together 
two standardised highly scripted simulated anaesthetic scenarios (Scenario A and 
Scenario B).  For each simulation there are two possible states: Intervention (in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝůůďĞƵƐĞĚ )ĂŶĚŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
methods).  These states will be allocated randomly between the two scenarios with 
stratification for time of day (morning/afternoon). 
Before beginning the first study scenario you will be asked to complete a NASA Task 
Load Index (TLI) questionnaire. At the end of the procedure you will be asked to 
complete another NASA Task Load Index questionnaire and use visual analogue 
scales (VAS) to rate the physical and mental demands of the previous anaesthetic 
and specific components of the new system and comparable conventional 
alternatives. Please be aware also, that during the study scenarios the anaesthetist 
you are working with will be interrupted by one of the researchers as part of the 
data collection. 
All scenarios will be video recorded and will form part of the data collection for the 
study, the video recordings will also be used during the educational feedback to 
allow reflection on practice and behaviours observed during the simulation. The 
educational debrief will be video recorded to highlight any themes that need 
further exploration within the semi-structured interviews and focus groups.  
At the end of the study period you will be invited to take part in a semi-structured 
interview, to allow deeper understanding of the impact the introduction of 
technology can have on anaesthetists and ODPs working practice and the effect 
(good and bad) on patient safety. You will also be invited to take part in a Focus 
group to be held in the University Department of Anaesthesia, Nottingham. Lunch 
253 
 
and refreshments will be provided during the research scenarios study day and all 
reasonable travel expenses will be paid to allow you to attend the research scenario 
study day, interview and focus group. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
There should be no disadvantages of taking part in this study. However, it will 
involve attending the Trent simulation and clinical centre for half a day, the 
interview for one hour and the focus group, which would be a maximum of one and 
a half hours. 
 
What if some aspect of my practice is observed that causes concern? 
Simulated scenarios are designed in a way that mistakes are likely to occur. The 
occurrence of such mistakes and the underlying predisposing factors form the basis 
of the subsequent debriefing session. Very occasionally practice may be observed 
that could potentially cause serious patient harm if this occurred in clinical practice. 
Once again such a witnessed occurrence would be discussed, as part of the 
debriefing process, following the scenarios (aided by the use of video). This will 
allow clarification of any issues highlighted and provide an opportunity for us and 
you to gain insight into your demonstrated practice.   
 
If the debriefing fails to acknowledge insight into potentially harmful practice the 
matter would be discussed further with the Chief Investigator and the Director of 
the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre. In the unlikely event following this 
discussion it is felt the issue in question raises potential concerns about future 
clinical practice it will be discussed with the Matron for Theatres Directorate. This 
would be done with your full awareness and involvement.  
 
These measures follow the defined protocol of the Trent Simulation and Clinical 
Skills Centre for managing such situations, in the interest of patient care and safety.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit of taking part in terms of material gain. However there is 
the possibility of indirect benefit through working in the hi-fidelity simulation 
environment of the Trent Simulation & Clinical Skills Centre, participating in 
feedback allowing the opportunity to verbalise and reflect on your experience of 
participating in the simulated scenarios, as well as the potential for an increased 
awareness of patient safety issues.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
If you chose to take part in the study, all information which is collected about you 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Nothing you say 
will be read by anyone other than the research team. Names will not be written on 
the transcripts and you will be anonymous in any written or verbal reports on the 
research. All information generated by this study will be archived securely within 
the Division of Anaesthesia, University of Nottingham and destroyed 7 years after 
the study is completed.   
Representatives of regulatory authorities and authorised people from the 
University of Nottingham and the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust may 
inspect the data to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a 
duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and nothing that could 
reveal your identity will be disclosed.  
 
tŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. However all data collected 
during the simulation, from the interview and the focus group will still be used in 
the final analysis. 
 
What if there is a problem?  
The occurrence of any problems as a result of participation within this study is not 
expected.  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak with 
the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions.   
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Any distress caused through participating in the study scenarios will be addressed 
using facilitated debriefing; this process is standard policy within the Trent 
Simulation and Clinical Skills Centre. If you still have concerns following this process 
we would encourage you to discuss the issues further with the Matron for Theatres 
Directorate, a process of mentorship or counselling would also be available should 
the need arise.   
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through the 
NHS complaints procedure. You can complain orally or writing to the Nottingham 
University Hospitals NHS Trust. In the event that you are harmed during 
participation in this study there are no special compensation arrangements, the 
normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms will be available to you. 
 
Contact details: 
Please do not hesitate to contact one of us on the following phone numbers. 
 
Professor Ravi Mahajan    0115 823 1009 
Chief Investigator    
(University Department of Anaesthesia) 
 
Professor Bryn Baxendale    0115 9249924 Ext. 67095 
Co-Investigator    
(Director - Trent Simulation & Clinical skills Centre)  
 
Mrs Rachel Evley     0115 823 1004 
Trial Manager / Co-Investigator  
(University Department of Anaesthesia) 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings of this study will also be presented to various national/meetings, along 
with publication(s) in medical journal(s).  
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Who is organising and funding the research? 
The Chief Investigator for this study is Professor Ravi Mahajan and it is sponsored 
by the University of Nottingham. The study is funded by a grant from the 
Association of Anaesthetist of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by the Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland 
Ethics Committee 1.  It has also been reviewed and approved by the Research & 
Development department at Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you decide to take 
part you will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form 
to keep. 
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APPENDIX XIII: Participant Consent Form (Chapter 4) 
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Hospital Headed Note Paper 
Study Number: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
A multi-centre qualitative study to evaluate the process of double-checking of drugs 
administered during anaesthesia in order to reduce the risk of drug errors and 
improve patient safety. 
 
Researchers:  Professor Ravi Mahajan 
  Ms Beverley Norris  
  Mrs Rachel Evley 
 
Please write your initials in each box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
(version 1 dated 21st February 2008) for the above study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.  
 
3. I understand that if I participate in the Focus Group it will be tape 
recorded but that I can refuse to answer a question if I wish and leave the 
focus groups at any time without having to give an explanation.  
 
4. I understand that all information will remain strictly confidential.  
 
5. I agree that all information collected about me as part of the study can be 
stored and analysed by the research team at the Division of Anaesthesia, 
University of Nottingham. 
 
6. I understand that small parts of what I say may be quoted anonymously 
when the results of the research are reported. 
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
_____________________            _________________         __________________ 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
 
_____________________            _________________         __________________ 
Name of Researcher   Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX XIV: Participant Consent Form (Chapter 5) 
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CONSENT FORM   
Validating Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research (the VASER study). 
 
Researchers:  Professor Ravi Mahajan   Study Number: 
  Professor Bryn Baxendale  
  Mrs Rachel Evley            Please write your initials in each box 
 
8. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet (version 2 
dated 3rd August 2009) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
9. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason and without my legal rights being affected. I 
understand that should I withdraw then the information collected so far cannot 
be erased and that information may still be used in the project analysis.  
 
10. I understand that all data collected in the study may be looked at by authorised 
individuals from the University of Nottingham, the research group and 
regulatory authorities where it is relevant to me taking part in this study. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to these records and to collect, 
store, analyse and publish information obtained from my participation in this 
study. I understand that my personal details will be kept confidential. 
 
11. I understand that the simulation scenario will be video-recorded and used in 
the debriefing session for educational purposes and in the analysis of the 
study.  
 
12. I understand that if I participate in a semi-structured interview or the Focus 
Group they will be tape recorded, but that I can refuse to answer a question if 
I wish and leave the interview or focus group at any time without having to 
give an explanation. I understand that small parts of what I say during the 
interview or the focus group may be quoted anonymously when the results of 
the research are reported. 
 
13. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher   Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX XV: Flow Chart  W Double Checking Process for Drug 
Preparation (Chapter 4) 
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APPENDIX XVI: Flow Chart  W Double Checking Process for Drug 
Preparation and Administration (Chapter 4) 
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APPENDIX XVII: Error Questionnaire - Participants (Chapter 5) 
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VASER error questionnaire 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Drug errors are common in 
anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Drug errors can cause significant 
harm in anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Drug errors that are caught and 
corrected do not need to be 
reported  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Failing to record a drug given during 
an anaesthetic is a medication error 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. My thoughts or actions are 
commonly influenced by the risk of 
medication error during my 
anaesthetic practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Inadvertent administration or failure 
to administer medication, that has 
no immediate potential to harm the 
patient, should be recorded as an 
error 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Anaesthetic records should be 
computerised  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. New technology will prevent drug 
errors in anaesthetic practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I have previously used computerised 
record keeping within anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The introduction of new technology 
will have a positive impact on my 
future anaesthetic working practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Whenever feasible, all drugs for 
parenteral administration should be 
supplied in pre-labelled and pre-
filled syringes 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. On the balance of probabilities, 
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ^&ZƐůĞĞƉ ? ?
would reduce syringe swap errors 
occurring 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX XVIII: Error Questionnaire  W Non Participants (Chapter 5) 
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VASER error questionnaire 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Drug errors are common in 
anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Drug errors can cause significant 
harm in anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Drug errors that are caught and 
corrected do not need to be 
reported  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Failing to record a drug given during 
an anaesthetic is a medication error 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. My thoughts or actions are 
commonly influenced by the risk of 
medication error during my 
anaesthetic practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Inadvertent administration or failure 
to administer medication, that has 
no immediate potential to harm the 
patient, should be recorded as an 
error 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Anaesthetic records should be 
computerised  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. New technology will prevent drug 
errors in anaesthetic practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I have previously used computerised 
record keeping within anaesthesia 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The introduction of new technology 
will have a positive impact on my 
future anaesthetic working practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Whenever feasible, all drugs for 
parenteral administration should be 
supplied in pre-labelled and pre-
filled syringes 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I would welcome the addition of 
new technology in anaesthetic 
practice which is designed to reduce 
the chance of medication errors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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